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Förord
Denna avhandlingsresa startade i december 2005 då jag deltog vid en dis-
putation vid Åbo Akademi i Vasa. Här återknöts den trevliga bekantskapen 
med docent Steve Lindberg som jag tidigare träffat 1986 i Åbo när han var 
redaktör för Finsk Tidskrift. Jag arbetade då med säkerhetspolitisk lång-
siktsplanering på det svenska försvarsdepartementet. Vår delegation ville 
på väg till Helsingfors passa på att ta del av den så kallade Åbo-skolans då 
något kontroversiella perspektiv på finsk och rysk säkerhetspolitik, vilket 
kanske inte helt uppskattades av mer offentliga finska företrädare. Detta blev 
början till ett nära samarbete mellan den svenska Försvarshögskolan (FHS) 
och Åbo Akademi med antal gemensamma seminarier och föreläsningar om 
rysk säkerhetspolitik, nya samhälleliga hotutmaningar m.m. 
Jag fick här allt fler propåer från Steve om att med min breda praktiska 
erfarenhet i bagaget även rätta till mitt akademiska CV med en doktors-
titel. Det forskningscentrum jag förestår – Centrum för Asymmetriska 
Hot- och TerrorismStudier (CATS) – är inriktat på policyrelevanta studier 
med flera disputerade medarbetare och det skulle ju se bättre ut om che-
fen också var det. Då det i Finland till skillnad från Sverige är vanligt med 
statsvetenskapliga sammanläggningsavhandlingar skulle jag också i stort 
kunna fortsätta med mitt heltidsarbete vid FHS. Det faktum att jag tidigare 
hade skrivit några kortare akademiska artiklar användes som argument om 
att jag redan hade kommit en bra bit på väg för en artikelavhandling – vilket 
dock självklart visade sig vara en sanning med mycket stor modifikation. Jag 
gav dock efter och blev våren 2008 antagen som doktorand.
Beträffande ämnet så har jag under drygt 20 år i arbetslivet har haft 
möjlighet att studera kopplingen mellan hot och planering inom det svenska 
säkerhetspolitiska systemet – särskilt de nya hoten mot informationssam-
hället. Insikten har blivit allt starkare om att även om nya hot visserligen 
kan uppmärksammas inom rimlig tid – inte alltid dock från de underrät-
telse- och säkerhetsorgan som har till uppgift att följa detta – så är det en 
än svårare och mer trögflytande process att få denna insikt planeringsgrun-
dande för samhällsberedskapen. Devisen ”tvärsektoriella hot kräver tvärsek-
toriella lösningar!” är fortfarande tämligen utopisk i praktisk politik, varför 
jag önskade djupdyka i de bakomliggande processerna och fann att dessa 
aldrig syntes ha akademiskt tydligt beskrivits och än mindre granskats.
När jag nu efter många års hårt arbete ska sätta punkt för avhandling-
sprocessen med en disputation så är det ett antal personer som särskilt bör 
framhållas och tackas för det stöd jag fått i denna arbetsprocess. Först och 
främst vill jag tacka min kloke och tålmodige handledare och vän docent 
Steve Lindberg, vilken som ovan nämnts är upphovet till denna avhandling. 
Många ”nötter” har knäckts vid sommarstället i Nagu där den vedeldade 
bastun frigjort tankeverksamheten. Stort och varmt tack Steve!
Likaså vill jag tacka professor Göran Djupsund som med sitt eminenta sinne 
för struktur alltid var snabb med att få ordning, pedagogik och logik i fram-
ställningen. Det har varit ett sant nöje och en förmån att få delta i de forskar-
skolor i Portugal och på Kreta som han lättsamt och med ständig intellektuell 
spänst drivit. Den trevliga stämning och ömsesidiga respekt som präglade såväl 
ledning som doktorandkollegor är här minnen för livet. Stort tack för detta 
Göran!
Då jag varit distansdoktorand har jag också behövt bollplank och stöd i 
Sverige. Jag vill här särskilt framhålla Dr. Greg Simons, Uppsala universitet, 
som varit ett omistligt stöd – inte minst vid den språkliga och formmässiga 
utformningen av de större artiklarna och enkäterna. 
Likaså förtjänar forskningsassistent Linnéa Arnevall vid FHS/CATS ett 
varmt tack för de otaliga omformateringarna, referens- och bibliografi-up-
pställningarna m.m. där hennes kritiska nogsamhet är något varje forskare 
önskar som stöd. Medarbetaren och kollegan doktor Magnus Ranstorp har 
även bidragit med glada inspirerande tillrop under processen.
Ett särskilt omnämnande för stöd med viktiga kontakter i samband med 
min enkätundersökning rörande think tanks i USA går också till Dr. Greg Tre-
verton, US National Intelligence Council – tidigare verksam vid RAND Corpo-
ration och tillika gästprofessor vid FHS/CATS.
Jag vill även särskilt tacka fakultetens förhandsgranskare av mitt manuskript 
– docent Tomas Ries vid Åbo Akademi och docent Mark Rhinard vid Stock-
holms universitet – som under maj-juni i år tog sig tid att läsa och granska mitt 
manuskript och i augusti leverera var sitt utlåtande. Det var både med glädje 
och ödmjukhet jag tog del av era insiktsfulla och sakliga yttranden.
Jag måste här också tacka Försvarshögskolan där mina institutionschefer 
– tidigare professor Bengt Sundelius och nuvarande chefen överste Jan Mört-
berg – varit starkt uppmuntrande och bägge bidragit till att jag kunnat få tid 
och resurser för mitt avhandlingsarbete. En viktig extern finansieringskälla har 
också varit Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (MSB) som med sitt 
miljöstöd till det forskningscentrum jag ansvarar för vill öka det akademiska 
intresset för dessa näraliggande frågor.
Slutligen vill jag också rikta ett tack till min hustru som burit en stor börda 
då helger och semestrar inte kunnat ägnas åt familj och barn när mina tankar 
varit fokuserade på helt andra områden.
Stockholm den 7 oktober 2015
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7Abstract
Within the framework of state security policy, the focus of this dissertation are 
the relations between how new security threats are perceived and the policy 
planning and bureaucratic implementation that are designed to address them. 
In addition, this thesis explores and studies some of the inertias that might 
exist in the core of the state apparatus as it addresses new threats and how these 
could be better managed.
The dissertation is built on five thematic and interrelated articles high-
lighting different aspects of when new significant national security threats 
are detected by different governments until the threats on the policy planning 
side translate into protective measures within the society. The timeline differs 
widely between different countries and some key aspects of this process are also 
studied. One focus concerns mechanisms for adaptability within the Intelli-
gence Community, another on the policy planning process within the Cabinet 
Offices/National Security Councils and the third focus is on the planning pro-
cess and how policy is implemented within the bureaucracy. The issue of policy 
transfer is also analysed, revealing that there is some imitation of innovation 
within governmental structures and policies, for example within the field of 
cyber defence.
The main findings of the dissertation are that this context has built-in iner-
tias and bureaucratic seams found in most government bureaucratic machin-
eries. As much of the information and planning measures imply security clas-
sification of the transparency and internal debate on these issues, alternative 
assessments become limited. To remedy this situation, the thesis recommends 
ways to improve the decision-making system in order to streamline the pro-
cesses involved in making these decisions.
Another special focus of the thesis concerns the role of the public policy 
think tanks in the United States as an instrument of change in the country’s 
national security decision-making environment, which is viewed from the per-
spective as being a possible source of new ideas and innovation. The findings in 
this part are based on unique interviews data on how think tanks become suc-
cessful and influence the policy debate in a country such as the United States. 
It appears clearly that in countries such as the United States think tanks smooth 
the decision making processes, and that this model with some adaptations also 
might be transferrable to other democratic countries.
Keywords: Threat, Security Policy, Policy Transfer Analysis, Intelligence, 
Bureaucracy, Think Tanks.
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9A. Introduction
Globalization, and not least the development of a modern information society, 
has resulted in a general prosperity and economic and political development 
for many societies, but it has also resulted in new types of vulnerabilities and 
societal cross-border threats by those opposed to them. This development has 
given rise to new types of threats and challenges for national security policy 
considerations, which in turn requires new types of adaptability by policy and 
planning departments. Do governmental bureaucracies currently anticipate 
and plan relevant protective measures against the spectrum of such threats in a 
timely manner?
Within the framework of state security policy, the focus of this dissertation is 
on the relations between how new threats are perceived and the policy planning 
that is designed to meet them.  The purpose is to study the inertias that might 
exist in the core of the state apparatus and how these could be better managed. 
In short, the added value of this approach is that it provides the combination 
of a cross-sectorial approach and up-to-date unique research data, all within a 
theoretical-empirical nexus to operationalize them. The intended result is to 
establish new knowledge and understanding and thus hopefully better support 
national security planning processes within governments.
1. Changes in the International Security Environment
The main focus of this dissertation is bureaucratic adaptability within the 
sphere of security policy in relation to developments in the international envi-
ronment. In the shadow of the balance of threat from 1945-1991, the security 
policy environment created, perhaps paradoxically, the feeling of stability and 
safety, as well as predictability between East and West. The fall of the Berlin 
Wall, the break-up of the Soviet Union, the liberation of the former members of 
the Warsaw Pact in Eastern Europe, and Germany’s unification brought secu-
rity political détente, as well as economic development in Europe and globally. 
In his article, The End of History, Francis Fukuyama (1989) wrote about the end 
of ideologies in a multipolar world resulting from the end of the Cold War, and 
thereby the end of war between countries.
However, simultaneously, other types of religious, ethnic and territorial 
conflict issues, previously contained by the larger bipolar balance of power, 
were set loose. The United States sensed this development when it was discov-
ered that they in fact had more enemies than before, as expressed by then-CIA 
director R. James Woolsey in 1993: “We have slain a large dragon. But we live 
now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in 
many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of.”1 (Garthoff, 2007:221).
1 In testimony before the SSCI, 2 February 1993, just before his installation as DCI. The 
colorful metaphor provided a “sound-bite” justification for his view that substantial intelligence 
resources were still needed in the post-Cold War era” (Garthoff 2007:221).
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Over the period from 1991 until early 2015, one of the most important 
changes in the international environment has been the change in security and 
defence policy, as well as the need for incorporating a more extensive threat 
picture when defining the components of societal security. This change has led 
to a more extensive concept of security with the addition of emerging threats 
such as increases in economic competition, climate change, migration flows, 
energy and oil dependency, terrorism, IT/cyber threats etc.
We now live in a new world order with the United States as the only super 
power, though maybe in the future challenged by an emerging China. The 
development has also dismantled borders, increased trade and has led to more 
integration between economies as well as individuals. Economic, as well as 
trade, developments have led to new equilibriums, and nowadays, previously 
poor and underdeveloped countries such as China, South Korea, Brazil, and 
India etc. are economic powers with an emphasis on high-tech development 
and growth. Today, it is primarily Africa that lacks its own infrastructure, and 
currently there is a race between companies, mainly from China and France/
United States, over economic influence in regions such as Africa and elsewhere 
– hence, increasing competition over security policy (Brookes & Shin, 2006).
The flipside of largely positive technical and industrial development are 
the problems they contribute to an increasingly complex set of security pol-
icy options to address them. Increasing industrialization without balanced 
frameworks cause carbon emissions, increasing temperature levels, contami-
nates land, environmental degradation and climate change. Problems that in 
substance are uncontested (except among some fundamentalist circles in the 
United States over climate change), however, are not always well understood 
by policy makers in terms of their scope and their size (Gromet, Kunreuther, & 
Larrick, 2013; Hmielowski et al., 2013).
The UN’s climate panel (IPCC, 2014) has pointed to the trend of extreme 
weather including storms, droughts in Africa that ruins harvests which in turn 
causes displacement of people, as well as melting glaciers and the reduction 
in sources of drinkable water etc. Against this background, the phenomenon 
of widespread economic refugees fleeing Africa, in search for a better life in 
the EU, has become increasingly evident over the past five years. Furthermore, 
these trends can also be translated into changes in security policy power rela-
tions – especially, at the regional level, as governments attempt to cope with 
such an upsurge in refugees.
In addition to the impact of climate change on regional security policy rela-
tionships, the supply of energy also has a clear security policy dimension. In 
Europe, the so-called energy weapon – primarily threats of reduction in or loss 
of gas supplies from Gazprom – has been used by Russia to not only affect 
countries in its immediate neighbourhood, but also other European countries 
such as Germany, France etc. that now are linked to the extensive system of gas 
pipelines from Russia (Paillard, 2010; Grigas, 2013; Daily Mail, 2009).
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Another issue is the oil resources of the Middle East with its links to the 
conflicts between Iran and other Arab countries, as well as the conflict between 
Israel and Palestine, to mention two examples. Western economic dependence 
on oil from the Arab countries has also been one of the foundations for the rise 
of the Islamist movements that protested against their totalitarian regimes, as 
well as the perception of an unhealthy influence of Western values over their 
societies. Earlier, paradoxically, the United States opposition to the Soviet occu-
pation in Afghanistan led to a collision course after the first Gulf War in 1991 
when American bases were located in Saudi Arabia, thereby helping to mobilize 
al Qaeda against the U.S.
In turn, this led to an upsurge in fundamentalist and religious revival in 
which several Muslim countries imposed political Islam and an extreme inter-
pretation of Sharia law. The concrete threat consisted of the growth in extreme 
Islamic terrorism with Al-Qaida and 9/11 as main features, but also resulted in 
a comprehensive multi-pronged threat of terrorism. The militant Sunni move-
ments also pose a serious threat to the states in the Middle East and Africa in 
which they operate, e.g. Iraq/Syria, Nigeria, Mali and Somalia/Kenya (Pham, 
2012; Burke, 2004; Sergie & Johnson, 2014; CNN, 2014).
Countermeasures against international terrorism, with the perceived stig-
matization of Muslims (see for example Simons, 2010, for example) as well 
as second and third generation of immigrant youths in Britain, France and 
other Western countries being attracted by the new Islamic identity, has also 
evolved into a myriad of societal problems. It is worth noting that youths from 
excluded and segregated areas in Western European cities tend not to be the 
typical Islamist terrorists, as these have generally been well-educated from 
middle-class backgrounds as in the case of the two multi-pronged attacks in 
London in July 2005 (Brighton, 2007), which were carried out by operatives 
previously considered to have been well integrated. As for causes of violent rad-
icalization there are varied socio-economic backgrounds behind them.
In addition to previously mentioned changes, globalization has also resulted 
in the development of the information society and our IT dependence, which 
in turn has led to economic growth as well as opening up for democratic move-
ments in previously politically closed countries. On the flipside however, is the 
increase in possibilities for digital espionage and surveillance by governments, 
as well as direct threats by adversaries against a society’s critical information 
infrastructure. Technological and economic development comes before safety, 
and it is both difficult and expensive to patch up existing systems. The integra-
tion and interdependence that has evolved in-between, for example electricity 
and telecommunications infrastructure built upon IP protocols, has created 
windows of vulnerabilities not anticipated (PCCIP, 1997). An example of this is 
the trend towards “Internet of Things” and “Smart Grid” in which refrigerators 
and electricity consumption at home and in larger substations is controlled via 
the Internet.
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The information society has also created opportunities to upgrade the 
capability of counter terrorism to monitor suspicious individuals’ movements 
and communication patterns with so-called “big data” analytics.2 Additionally, 
threats of economic espionage and sabotage from state actors can also be added 
to this list of new vulnerabilities in modern society.
The countries in Europe – particularly the Nordic countries – that during 
the Cold War considered themselves to be at risk of armed aggression from the 
Soviet Union have to a large degree kept their heritage with a total defence con-
cept where their civil infrastructures had a large degree a built-in redundancy. 
These countries are therefore relatively less vulnerable to accidental or delib-
erate large-scale IT failures than other countries (Rantapelkonen & Salminen, 
2013).
Yet another change in the international environment is global cooperation 
due to endogenous incentives such as international crisis management via the 
EU, G8 and others (Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, 2013). The UN has also become 
more active in granting mandates for armed interventions in Afghanistan as 
well as in Africa, in order to help resolve those conflicts. Increased European 
integration through common foreign and security policies in the EU via the 
Maastricht and Lisbon treaties have changed the conditions of reacting during 
a crisis radically as well as with other problems outside national borders.
Geopolitically, Russia has after its relative democratization and economic 
decline in the 1990s, begun to recover. Events in Ukraine during the spring of 
2014 indicated that President Vladimir Putin seeks to recapture the superpower 
role of the former Soviet Union in the international arena based on its posses-
sion of nuclear weapons and an invigorated totalitarian society (Speck, 2014).
2. Dissertation template
In this dissertation the entire process within security policy is covered with a 
certain emphasis on the role of think tanks as elements within an innovative 
model to compare and draw lessons from on how such private sector think 
tanks can contribute to improving policy making in their societies. The US was 
chosen as a role model because of the constructive role that such think tanks 
play in its society, hence it is the focus on the thesis, also owing to its dominant 
role in international politics and innovative ways of generating ideas, practices 
and policies (McGann, 2007). This is posited to provide a template for other 
countries to follow. This is the first step, to identify those aspects that facilitates 
or hinder the policy process, the rest is for future research.
Conceptually, the policy process can be divided in three sub-areas. The first 
one is the “policy making environment” (e.g. Cabinet offices, National Security 
Council structures etc.) within the political and administrative centre in the 
state apparatus (B). The second one (A) is the “input” environment (e.g. intelli-
2 The collection of large amounts of data to be able to find new information and cor-
relations would otherwise be hard to access.
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gence services). The third sub-area (C) is the “output” environment (executive 
agencies and authorities).
Consequently, the “policy making environment” indicates those deci-
sion-making and administrative settings within the state apparatus in which 
threat assessments are linked to counteractions and protection, as well as the 
formulation of relevant policies. The policy making environment can also in its 
turn be divided into three subparts – the first constituting the customer/client 
function to the intelligence community (B1), the second part dealing with the 
decision-making weighed upon political preferences and economic/budgetary 
consequences (B2), and the third is the planning part that sends sharp and 
clear signals to the administration/bureaucracy so that decisions are adopted 
and implemented as intended (B3).
The purpose of focusing on the policy environment is to study the interac-
tion and linkages between, on the one hand, state institutions which have to be 
on the alert and warn of various forms of antagonistic threats, and on the other 
hand, the structures planning for community preparedness whose function is 
to quickly and seamlessly convert these signals into steering directives along 
with corresponding resource allocations to vulnerable sectors. The requirement 
for greater speed in this process has increased dramatically in the information 
society in which yesterday’s routines are not suited for today’s new threats and 
vulnerabilities. Therefore, studies of mechanisms that can affect the speed of 
the process are highly policy relevant.
Evans and Davies (1999:361), in an attempt to understand policy transfer 
remark on the diffuse nature of the field. They note that a variety of disciplines 
are used, and researching policy transfer has a multi-disciplinary character. 
There are similar research agenda across different disciplines, however, the 
findings often do not connect and can talk past each other (Evans & Davies, 
1999:361). It is noted that “a sound model is not necessarily one that purely 
explains or predicts with precision. It is one rich with implications. […] But 
in order to make stronger knowledge claims it must engage in theoretical and 
methodological pluralism and integration” (Evans and Davies, 1999:364). In a 
similar vein, this thesis has chosen to take a multi-disciplinary approach over 
any single discipline. It is hoped to gain a greater level of explanatory value by 
avoiding the pitfall of an individual and unitary theory approach that could 
result in missing the bigger picture through talking past each other. Ultimately, 
the thesis seeks to enrich the implications of research in this field of study.
Since there are currently no identified theories that describe incentives for 
change within closed monopolies of the state apparatus’s innermost core, the 
dissertation proposes a new conceptual framework. Hence this dissertation 
attempts to fill this void in which decisions-making processes and its bottlenecks3 
 are studied from the very beginning to the very end of the process.
3 Bottlenecks refers here to knowledge monopolies, change aversion, insufficient admi-
nistrative priorities etc.  The chain of decision can partly be due to actual exogenous differences 
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Besides this, existing theories are evaluated through the empirical applica-
tion of interviews with experienced practitioners in the field of security pol-
icy. Consequently, the dissertation does not only summarize the state of the 
research today, but also challenges the research aspects of the current state of 
the art on the security policy decision-making process.
An important supposition in the dissertation is that greater pluralism – on 
both understanding the threat and the planning side in addressing it – con-
tributes to an increased willingness to change regarding the implementation of 
prompted measures as well as change in the administrative/bureaucratic struc-
tures. This is partly based on the comprehensive discussion that, among others, 
Max Weber (1922) presented about the value of a certain overlap between sec-
tors even in a very limited state apparatus, as well as based in the contemporary 
debate between monists and pluralists. Therefore, the balance between thinking 
correctly in relation to thinking freely is discussed frequently in an American 
administrative/bureaucratic context with a politicized administration.4 The 
most basic rationalist argument for systematic pluralism appears frequently in 
the economic context, enabling additional insights and thereby reduces the risk 
that any aspect is not sufficiently illuminated (Stiglitz, 1999).
Thus, a lack of pluralism in the policy planning process could lead to an 
inadequate and suboptimal utilization of resources to the detriment of taxpay-
ers and the state interest. The balance between government offices (the cus-
tomer/client) and government agencies (the producers) can also be skewed in 
systems with small cabinet departments and strong autonomous agencies.
In this dissertation the question of policy making pluralism is tied to studies 
and strategies for protection of various military defence systems and civilian 
critical information infrastructures that are connected to the electrical and 
telecommunication systems. A special relation here is that these processes 
predominantly take place in a closed system with a knowledge monopoly in 
which external influence (“peer review”, market mechanisms etc.) is almost 
non-existent.
The structure of the dissertation consists of a general introduction, as well 
as five articles that in different ways illustrate some problems and core issues 
concerning the link between “threat” and “planning” at the national level - two 
of which are shorter and more indicative whilst three are more profound. The 
conclusions from the three more profound main articles then become pieces 
of the puzzle in the concluding part. In turn, the fifth and last long article is 
divided into two parts, one is more theoretical and one is more empirically 
in various countries’ legal and constitutional systems, but the interesting thing is if there also are 
endogenous general phenomenons that contributes to reducing or delaying the type of specific 
decision-making processes that are studied.
4 A more theoretical discussion on the value of monism vs. pluralism within state bu-
reaucracy/administration can be found in both Weber (1922) and in Michael W. Spicer’s article 
Value pluralism and its implications for American public administration (2001).
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oriented. Finally, a concluding chapter attempts to identify the bottlenecks that 
may exist in this type of planning.
Although the reasoning is primarily intended to be applied in a smaller 
market economy and countries with developed information technology, such 
as Sweden, several illustrations are gleaned from the United States due to the 
relative transparency in handling these issues there (Hastedt, 1991).
The research field on this approach is generally understudied – possibly 
because the research question cuts across several academic disciplines (inter-
national relations, public policy/public administration, economics, law etc.). 
One relatively new academic school of thought of use here is “Policy Transfer 
Analysis” (Evans & Davies, 1999:361) that has a cross-sector approach, though 
no corresponding cross-sector theories adapted to the scope of this dissertation 
yet have been identified.
Hence, hopefully, this dissertation’s conceptual framework will result in new 
inter-disciplinary knowledge, and also might be considered as a “critical onto-
logical turn” as these relationships and activities within the core of government 
apparently seems to have received little if any systematic scholarly attention.
In 1929, Martin Heidegger discussed the issue of the critical ontological 
turn, which necessitated an investigation of the nothing:
Man’s existence as Dasein inherently elevates the legitimacy of the nothing 
to unseen standards in western “logic.” Questioning the nothing recognizes 
the nothing as a practice of philosophy and alludes to the main criterion of 
Heidegger’s existentialism: the Dasein of existence. Any choice immediately 
throws the subject into responsibility, but affirmation lies at how one orients 
himself to the human nature of Dasein – and tangentially, to the nothing 
[…] Affirmation, then, lies at the ability of the free subject to hold them-
selves to the nothingness – or, the search of an authentic subjectivity that is 
revealed through this practice (Zausen, 2014).
Therefore, affirmation is about the ability to find the authentic in face of the 
obstacle of nothingness.
A quest for knowledge begins when the existing knowledge in the social 
and political environment loses its legitimacy or usefulness (Beal, 2011:56-57). 
“Affirmation is a sought existence, a reaction to the infinite antagonisms to 
which the free subject necessarily must interact. Subjectivity invokes a search 
for overcoming the unauthentic in search for the authentic, in the face of the 
nothing” (Zausen, 2014).
The political underpinnings of our ontological model need to be thoroughly 
scrutinised as failing to do so may result in alternative possibilities being 
missed or excluded, which necessitates a critical approach being undertaken 
(Beal, 2011:57). It is a matter of projecting experience of the nothing towards 
the subject in order to locate the nothing through experiencing it. “Ontology is 
always in motion and never static; it is a relation of subjects with objects, and 
the outcome of this interaction” (Zausen, 2014). The political and theoretical 
potential of ontology is found not only in the present, but also the influence 
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of the past, which is particularly relevant in the sphere of social (and political) 
transformation (Beal, 2011:62).
Within the context of this thesis, this is a question and a matter of an indi-
vidual or organisation and their ability to make sense and create an under-
standing of an unknown environment, and therefore, to shape and influence a 
competitive edge in a highly contested political environment.
2.1. Research question
As mentioned earlier the purpose is to study the inertia (“bottlenecks”) that 
exists in the core of the state policy making apparatus and how it could be 
better managed. Thus the main research question at heart is to be formulated 
as: From the discovery of a new threat until the implementation of policy to 
address the problem, what variables affect the policy planning process and 
how?
Related to the main research question three sub-questions are developed:
• How are security policy threats evolving and perceived in the post-Cold War 
era?
• Do these threats stimulate innovation and change in government bureaucra-
cies as well as policy formulation and implementation?
• What are the main obstacles/problems in addressing the new threats?
The first sub-question relates to the security policy arena where as the two 
other sub-questions deal with the policy process and the responsible state 
machinery. These three sub-questions connect to the research focus and ques-
tions in the articles that form the part B of this thesis.
The first article (Shielding the Net – understanding the issue of vulnerability 
and threat to the information society) focuses on the timelines from detection 
of a threat to implementing necessary safeguards, and thus are related to the 
sub-questions 1 and 3.
The underlying research question in the second article (Understanding Intel-
ligence Community Innovation in the Post 9/11 World) is about innovation in 
closed government policy making environments, and thus relates to sub-ques-
tion 2 above.
The third article (Information Terrorism – When and by Whom?) elaborates 
on possible venues of innovative terrorist modus – i.e. when will terrorists 
attack the vulnerabilities within the information societies – and here relates to 
sub-question 1.
The fourth article (The Trojan Horse in the Information Age) focuses on the 
new threat environment and the need for changed approaches compared to the 
Cold War-era.
Finally, the two last articles (The role of Think Tanks in the US Security Policy 
– A Forgotten Actor? and The recipe for think Tank Success: From the Insiders 
Perspective) poses the research questions “Do Think Tank influence Security 
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Policy?” and “How do they do it and become successful?”, which relates to all 
three sub-questions.
2.2. Definitions
In order to understand the subject there are two processes that need explana-
tion, firstly, “Intelligence”, and secondly, “Knowledge Monopoly”.
2.2.1. Intelligence
There are several categories of definitions of intelligence where the two most 
important take their stance in what is done and others in what type of activities 
that are included. The focus for this dissertation is in intelligence that is used 
in support of foreign and security policy. The intelligence methodology itself 
can of course also be applied to security intelligence, criminal intelligence and 
business intelligence. As a business concept, there should always be a demand/
customer – most often the highest levels of decision-making (Armed Forces 
Head Quarters, Cabinet Offices) that handles military or foreign issues. Nowa-
days, finance and trade departments are often considered a customer as infor-
mation in these areas affects a country’s “economic well-being” as the British 
SIS describes their task (SIS, 2015).
One example of the first category mentioned above, intelligence as a method 
and what is being done, is to systematically process, analyse and disseminate 
information (data) to make sense and create knowledge. “The function of 
institutionalized intelligence is to centralize, process, and disseminate informa-
tion useful to the formation and implementation of a foreign policy.” (Marrin, 
2002:1).
Michael Warner (2007) provides an even more distinct version: “Intelligence 
is secret, state activity to understand or influence foreign entities.”
A more interpretive definition in the same category is “…the umbrella term 
referring to the range of activities – from targeting through information gath-
ering to analysis and dissemination – that are conducted in secret and aimed 
at maintaining or enhancing security by providing forewarning of threats or 
potential threats in a manner that allows for the timely implementation of a 
preventive policy or strategy.” (Gill & Phytian, 2004:1).
An example of the second category definitions mentioned above, about 
activities included, in an American context is provided by Shulsky and Schmitt 
(2001) in Silent Warfare when they divide intelligence into four parts – collec-
tion, processing/analysis, security intelligence and “covert action” (e.g. paramil-
itary activities).
A more official US definition can be found in the CIA’s A consumer’s guide to 
intelligence (1995:vii):
Reduced to its simplest terms, intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge 
of the world around us - the prelude to decision and action by US policyma-
kers. Intelligence organizations provide this information in a fashion that al-
lows consumers, either civilian leaders or military commanders, to consider 
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alternative options and outcomes. Above all, the analytical process must be 
rigorous, timely, and relevant to policy needs and concerns.
In a traditional European context “covert action” is not included as this is 
considered part of the executive policy implementation. Likewise, specifically 
in-between American and British intelligence, there is a difference in emphasis 
in regards to “raw intelligence” being delivered straight up to the highest polit-
ical level in the UK. This rarely occurs in the United States where the intelli-
gence is processed and contextualized into the information that thereafter for 
example is presented in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB). A further distinction 
is that the main activities are collection and analysis – not “counter intelli-
gence” – as the security intelligence service rather is a related sub-discipline for 
foreign intelligence service.
Thus, the intelligence community is a producer of fact-finding and assess-
ment reports and according to all available theory separated from the policy 
environment and the decision-making process, or to use a British expression 
“on the tap but not on the top”.
2.2.2. Knowledge Monopoly
The term knowledge monopoly has primarily been described in the literature 
on “Knowledge Management”, and has sometimes been linked to public admin-
istration. Knowledge Management describes information in three layers of an 
increasingly higher degree of processing – data, information and knowledge 
(Easterby-Smith & Lyles, 2003b:1-15).
Within crisis management literature the focus is on the sub-division “orga-
nizational learning” which attempts to identify what knowledge is available, 
and especially where about in the system in the context of time-critical exter-
nally generated events. However, this area is also useful here. Knowledge here 
is twofold – first, the formal knowledge (“explicit knowledge”) possessed by 
an individual obtained through for example training and/or holding a specific 
position, and secondly, the informal “silent” knowledge (“tacit”) is also central. 
It is not always enough to have the recipe for a cake; it is a completely different 
thing to be able to bake it (Koraeus, 2008).
Thus, an ideal organization learns to pass on even “silent” knowledge – tacit, 
which likewise can be applied in a closed national security system as outlined 
in the so-called SECI-model “socialization, externalization, combination, inter-
nalization” (Nonaka & Toyama, 2003).
A potential problem may be that the bureaucrats in the administration get 
the upper hand as Max Weber (1922) described, and as subsequently developed 
by William Niskanen Jr. (1994). Niskanen was one of the leading representa-
tives who supported the Reagan administration when contextualizing the con-
cept “New Public Management”, which sought to have a minimal state appara-
tus and outsourced public services. However, Niskanen pursued specialization 
between the government agencies that would remain at the state’s core, as this 
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would more clearly demonstrate where tax money provided the best results in 
relation to agencies undertaking servicing tasks that overlap.
In this context, Niskanen described the concept of “knowledge monopoly” 
as a “bilateral monopoly” where the administrator within the bureaucracy/
agency always had the upper hand against the more budgetary focused sponsor 
organization (“policy environment”/Cabinet Offices). “All or nothing”-pro-
posals were often proposed, in which the agencies often got their requests 
approved, as the representatives from the sponsor organization seldom could 
call the cards (Lindroos, 2013). It should be added that this was before the big 
public budget cuts in the United States undertaken in more recent years.
2.3. The security policy arena5
The main institutional actors in the state apparatus that traditionally are 
involved in the design and implementation of security policy are the foreign 
and defence ministries, while the armed forces and other foreign service agen-
cies as well as the strategic intelligence services – if not included in any of the 
sectors above – are implementing. The Prime Minister and the President’s 
offices respectively has always by definition a role in this – not least for the EU 
Member States where much of the coordination takes place at this level.
At the margin, other parts of the state apparatus can be included in the 
implementation, such as the judicial sphere with the Department of Justice, 
police and security services, as well as trade policy functions with export con-
trol agencies and the Department of Finance concerning economic aid and 
sanctions. Generally, parliaments are quite marginal in these contexts; however, 
the Congress in the United States, as a non-parliamentary legislature, is a case 
of exception.
Security policy decision-making can roughly be divided into three levels – 
territorial defence, diplomacy and trade, and international security coopera-
tion including transnational threats. The first – often seen as the hard core – is 
about different types of threats to the nation’s survival in the context of war, 
which concerns the design of the nation’s military power resources as well as 
any agreements with other countries on defence and security assistance. The 
main participants are the Department of Defence and Armed Forces as they are 
responsible for concrete aspects of defence planning. As terrorism and cyber 
threats now are for real the department/agencies concerned with Justice and 
Homeland Security must also be included (Clapper, 2015).
The second level involves, on the one hand, actions vis-à-vis other countries 
in the peacetime international environment – especially actions linked to the 
country’s geographical neighbourhood – as well as diplomatically and econom-
ically coordinated responses to potential threats from other countries. It can 
comprise military exercises in disputed maritime areas to mark attendance at 
5 For more information on Swedish government administration please see Bäck et al. 
(2011:170-217) and Petersson (2006).
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an economic zone or stabilizing possible impeding developments that may pre-
vent freedom of navigation and transport.
On the other hand, on the second level there are also jointly coordinated 
sanctions against a state that behaves in an unacceptable and destabilizing man-
ner in the neighbourhood. One example of a relatively harsh economic marker 
is the economic sanctions imposed by the EU and others against Russia due 
to the developments in Ukraine in the spring of 2014. The events in Ukraine 
clearly demonstrate that dimensions of economic and trade policy nowadays 
are used as tools in security policy to pressure nations, in which arms export 
(France), gas (Germany) and financial investments (UK) are used as pieces in 
the game (Maliukevicius, 2006).
The third level concerns engagement in the international environment out-
side immediate zones of own territorial boundaries, such as participation in 
stabilizing and terrorism prevention efforts in Afghanistan or Africa (Council 
of Foreign Relations, 2013; Wallström, 2014). Choice of coalition partners and 
in which auspice this occurs matters geopolitically, as well as actions against 
international terrorism at large, including intelligence issues. Positioning one-
self concerning interstate conflict in the international forum, e.g. the UN, also 
gives signal values in security policy.
The main difference between formulating security policy compared to other 
policy areas is the exclusiveness and secrecy that characterizes the business. 
However, foreign confidentiality is necessary to be able to pursue confidential 
talks with other countries and prepare joint actions. Even more important is 
the maintenance of confidentiality in defence issues, which is a necessity to 
impede an enemy’s intelligence gathering and possible preparations for an 
attack. The need for secrecy in preliminary investigations conducted by the 
intelligence services and police is equally obvious to not reveal to terrorists and 
other adversaries what is known causing our information sources to go abate.
The necessary secrecy entails a number of serious problems such as lack of 
transparency and insight. Only a selected few in the state apparatus handles 
these issues why thorough oversight and a second opinion normally is lack-
ing which also reduces democratic accountability. An important feature of this 
study is therefore to study how such decisions are handled in the state appara-
tus and if there are examples of how elements of pluralism and transparency 
that have been or might be included.
2.4. The Process
The relatively stable world order during the Cold War resulted in low willing-
ness to change among state institutions planning for disruptive events. Basi-
cally, a modus vivendi with no major territorial conflicts characterized the 
relationship between the various intelligence services, the cabinet departments 
relevant for the security policy, and the military.
This is well described in incremental organization theory, based on studies 
of state budget processes Wildavsky (1964) found that existing budgetary bases 
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and structures were rarely or never questioned, as the changes that occurred 
were on the margin. However, this theoretical concept began to be questioned 
with the introduction of program budgeting and budget cuts in the United 
States in the 1970s and 1980s, which in turn made Wildavsky modify his theory 
to some degree (Lane, 1989).
Regarding the security and defence policy systems with privacy aspects and 
associated knowledge monopolies, it would be fairly uncontroversial to claim 
that the threshold for structural change in this sphere is even higher than in 
other policy areas.
New multifaceted threats in the Western world – non-state actors such 
as terrorists and organized crime - which are involved in illegal activities as 
human trafficking, drug smuggling, and cyber threats, began to replace the 
old state-based threat from the Soviet Union. It took several years before any 
changes began to appear regarding the relevant government intelligence and 
planning institutions. Only with strong external influences – such as 9/11 and 
the information revolution where telephony and IP traffic went from satellites 
to fibre optics – some major internal and external structural changes took place 
within the intelligence communities.
The elimination of one problem can actually spark other problems to evolve. 
We may not see them coming as there is a sense of jubilation and victory. For 
example president George W. Bush´s triumphant declaration under the banner 
“Mission accomplished”  on board an aircraft carrier after the successful con-
clusion to the high intensity regular war against the forces of Iraq´s Saddam 
Hussein in 2003 (CNN, 2003). This was short lived after the low-intensity irreg-
ular war emerged a short time later. The same references could be observed to 
events during “The Arab Spring” in Libya, Egypt etc.
In the United States after 9/11, state structures on the planning side were 
affected mainly by the creation of the large-scale Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), whereas previous systematic attempts to change the “input” 
and “output” structures - in the light of estimated counterterrorism and IT 
threats in the 1990s (Marsh Commission and PDD 62+63) – hardly had any 
direct impact.
The need for readjustment became particularly significant as “The Global 
War on Terrorism” (GWOT) began after the 9/11 attacks in late 2001. New 
coordinating bodies at the political and agency level, both nationally and inter-
nationally, were added, while the basic structure of government agencies were 
largely untouched. However, within the intelligence community, the existing 
cultures and working procedures needed to be challenged and reformed.
On the analysis side, conditions had changed with the new terrorism focus 
in relation to the Cold War, the target was no longer a single state and its inter-
nal processes, but now obscure non-state actors without limits. Opportunities 
for non-conventional aggressions and suicide attacks by religiously inspired 
groups and individuals – as opposed to strictly organized terrorist groups with 
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a territorial focus as PIRA and ETA – required new knowledge disciplines (reli-
gion history, cultural anthropology, etc.) and analytical methods (Ranstorp & 
Brun, 2013; Council of Foreign Relations, 2012; Svenska Dagbladet, 2011).
The main conclusion from the 9/11 Commission report (2002:339) was that 
the U.S. intelligence system (including the FBI) “lacked the imagination” to 
anticipate the attacks. Another criticism was the inability to collaborate and 
pool the available information that existed at various places in the intelligence 
system but could not be communicated between “stovepipes”. Even within gov-
ernment institutions, such as the FBI, there was information available at vari-
ous levels but that never got compiled into a holistic threat picture or context.
A lesson learned is the establishment of so-called “fusion centres” in several 
Western countries, where different types of intelligence and security services, 
and sometimes even customs, coast guard, etc., are co-located to collectively 
process information relating to terrorist threats in order to streamline the 
threat and response measures (Persson, 2013). Keeping in mind that this was 
the result of an external event, while change and adaptation projects initi-
ated from within is harder to find (some examples can be found in the article 
“Understanding Intelligence Community Innovation in the Post 9/11 World” in 
section B).
On the collection side, the readjustment due to GWOT was the most rad-
ical as the problem no longer was the difficulty to access secret information 
(“pieces of the puzzle”). Now there was open information in abundance, but it 
was all about weeding out the “noise” in the gigantic amounts of information to 
find not just a needle in the haystack but the right straw (Gorman 2008). Thus, 
the challenges for the design of an ideal scheduling system to anticipate pos-
sible new and old (antagonistic) threats is about – given especially exogenous 
external changes – optimizing both “input” structures in the form of competent 
intelligence organizations and “output” structures with implementing agencies.
In the former case, the political-administrative level requires proper pur-
chasing skills towards the intelligence community. In the latter case, the politi-
cal-administrative level needs a clear planning function that quickly gives lucid 
directions to the societal authorities that are supposed to implement protec-
tive measures against these threats. The link between “threat” and “planning” 
becomes an iterative bureaucratic process with a number of challenges and 
bottlenecks. The existence of a clear process and structure in the “policy envi-
ronment” is central here.
2.5. Delimitations
A first delimitation of the study is towards non-antagonistic threats such as nat-
ural disasters etc., as well as towards reactive stochastic “disasters” such as 9/11 
The event itself lead to external influence through the 9/11 Commission report 
(2002) which tried to correct the system from the outside. Instead this dis-
sertation focuses on the self-initiated inclination to change occurring after the 
Cold War. A second delimitation is towards prospective studies (“foresight”), 
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which focuses upon long-term time horizons (15-20 years), whilst the intel-
ligence phenomena addressed here focuses on the intelligence community’s 
main threat perspective in the short (2-5 years) and medium-term (5-10 years). 
Likewise, there is a third delimitation towards the more traditional military 
geopolitical threats that traditionally constitute the core for intelligence ser-
vices, and instead focus is on “new threats” (IT, terrorism) that requires greater 
institutional adaptability.
2.6. Research and literature review
As the process from identification of threats to the implementation of protec-
tive measures is quite inaccessible and being situated in the state power’s inner-
most core, the research and theory situation is for these obvious reasons rather 
thin.
Still there are some examples where individual sub-processes have been 
described in academic terms, however, in a US context. The three sections 
below firstly address the discovery and identification of threats (“Early Warn-
ing”) as discussed in the intelligence literature – often linked to the field of 
International Relations, as well as “Management”. An important work here is 
Roberta Wohlstetter´s Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (1962) on the fail-
ures of “connecting the dots” already in the 1940´s:
If our intelligence systems and all our other channels of information failed 
to produce an accurate image of Japanese intentions and capabilities, it was 
not for want of the relevant materials. Never before have we had so com-
plete an intelligence picture of the enemy (1962:400).
Thereafter, the literature examines (not time-critically) decision-making in 
the policy process in which the academic studies might be captured within the 
political science literature on “Public Policy”. Finally, the research also touches 
upon public administration (“Public Policy/Public Administration”) and how 
these decisions are processed and implemented.
Some general questions can be discerned in Treverton and Agrell (2009) and 
Wildavsky (1964), but still no one has managed to describe the bigger picture 
in this kind of public administration inertia, which often is based on an even 
more rigid budget process (Caiden & White, 1995).
A less successful attempt to theoretically try to argue the position of bureau-
cratic “threat mongers” has also been identified (Eriksson, 2001). The thesis 
here about “securitization” of the IT-threat in Sweden based in the state appara-
tus was though tainted, as the driving forces in reality came from the periphery 
(Parliament and non-establishment actors) and not the security policy estab-
lishment. A more fruitful approach – which also may serve as delimitation for 
my focus – is provided by Thomas Birkland (2006) who looked at how policy 
and “the process of learning” changes after major disastrous events. Specifically, 
9/11 is mentioned here and the subsequent 9/11 Commission Report (2002) 
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with its extensive recommendations and directions, but the emphasis is on 
other non-antagonistic events such as Chernobyl, Hurricane Katrina, etc.
2.6.1. Threat/detection (Intelligence)
In regards to the first “input” part of the decision chain under study, there 
are some studies that describe the dynamics of the intelligence system and its 
need for flexibility to be able to adapt to a new kind of threat environment. 
However, concerning intelligence studies there is an emphasis on single case 
studies rather than comparative studies in-between countries, and for the most 
part the studies focuses on, in this context, the relatively transparent United 
States, while cases studies on other countries are not as well developed (Hast-
edt, 1991).
The concept “Revolution in Intelligence Affairs” (RIA) was transferred into 
the debate around 2005, piggybacking on the former term for the change in 
military organizations after the Cold War – “Revolution in Military Affairs” 
(RMA). Among other things, the debate emphasizes the need for experimen-
tation and risk, as well as creating the “architects of change”6 (Barger, 2005). 
Meanwhile, voices from the outside the Intelligence Communities (IC) were 
raised arguing that it is not enough to share information from the IC to other 
non-traditional customers without integrated collaboration and co-alignment 
with instances of law enforcement, customs, etc. (Harrison, 2006).
The bulk of the academic literature in this area concerns intelligence anal-
ysis and its methodology. It is often argued that positivism and behaviourism 
fit badly with intelligence analysis, as there are too many unknown factors for 
a methodologically secure manner to measure and theorize about it. This is 
especially true for the postmodernist approach, which, therefore, assumes that 
it is not possible to create a theory of intelligence, but only strive for better 
understanding (Gill & Pythian, 2004). Another approach is the statistically ori-
ented Bayesian method, which is more suited for graphic presentations than 
analysis (Laquer, 1985).
Of course there are also some threats and events (“Black Swans”7) that 
hardly can be expected to detected such as the 22 July-attack in Norway 2011. 
It was here the self-radicalized right-wing activist Anders Behring Breivik who 
first bombed the government quarters in Oslo and later killed 77 people - of 
which 34 were between 14-17 years - in a youth camp at Utöya (BBC 2012). 
Professor Wilhelm Agrell has analysed the mechanisms within the security 
apparatus that permit such an individual to go undetected “under the radar”, 
even if the same situation should repeat itself (Agrell, 2013).
6 Roughly, central individuals in an organization that have clear ideas and advocate 
change/renewal of structures and working methods.
7 The term describing highly improbable events was launched by Nassim Nicholas Taleb 
(Taleb, 2007).
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2.6.2. The policy process (“the Missing Link”)
The policy process is key in identifying unnecessary bureaucratic gaps or 
seams, and as described in the beginning of this chapter, it can be divided into 
three sub-sections – the requirement and evaluation of information and assess-
ments provided by the intelligence community, the generation and selection of 
decision alternatives, as well as finally planning directives to the administra-
tion/bureaucracy to implement.
In the United States, there are additional elements, such as public policy 
think tanks for “input” to the policy process (McGann, 2007). Their role in 
this area seems to be overlooked and under researched, which is why this 
special type of actor deserves to be studied closer within the framework of 
this dissertation. Think tanks are especially useful because they complement 
both the intelligence community’s assessments, as well as the remaining two 
sub-sections of generating decision alternatives for planning/implementation 
guidance.
The established role of think tanks in the US political system in an ancillary 
way is an attempt to compensate for the non-parliamentarian model (e.g., of 
Western Europe and Canada), especially as a research and analytical support 
mechanism for members of the US Congress who not are supported by robust 
political party machineries. Examples include The Heritage Foundation for the 
Republican Party and the Center for American Progress for certain elements of 
the Democratic Party.
Nevertheless, the US Congress does though have a robust research insti-
tution of its own – and which is also congressionally funded – that in many 
ways is comparable to a think tank: the Congressional Research Service (CRS). 
CRS is mandated by Congress to approach its research topics from a variety of 
perspectives and examine all sides of an issue, as opposed to offering partisan 
policy recommendations. CRS’s staff thus analyzes current policies that affect 
Congressional legislation and other interests and presents the impact of pol-
icy alternatives, without taking a stand on them. CRS research and analytical 
services come in many forms, such as reports on major policy issues, tailored 
confidential memoranda to members of Congress, briefings and consultations, 
seminars and workshops, expert congressional testimony and responses to 
individual inquiries.
The main difference between the private think tanks and CRS is that CRS, as 
a bipartisan entity, must not present policy advice or suggests policy directions. 
While this should not be seen as a public policy limitation, since CRS still pro-
vides an important support to Congress, it does create a “market” opportu-
nity for the private think tanks, as different policies with the latter could be 
“benchmarked” and debated more thoroughly (CRS, 2015).  At the same time, 
however, due to their non-profit and charitable tax code, even think tanks are 
prohibited from engaging in partisan political activities, such as supporting 
political candidates.
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The think tanks also serve as a “revolving door” where political appointees 
of an outgoing administration could reside until the next election, when they 
are able to obtain funding for such positions (Think Tank Watch, 2012). The 
most precious value of a successful Think Tank is their reputation of integrity 
and expertise, although in recent years this has come to be questioned (see 
Article 5.2).
Thus, the process can be described theoretically, but the actual organization 
is often fluid and ad hoc, and in the United States characterized by the four-
year presidential periods. There is also a risk of “politicization” of intelligence 
assessments in the relationship between the intelligence process and the pol-
icy process. This can happen either directly through subjective interpretations 
from the policy side, or indirectly as the management level in the intelligence 
community “adapt” the results to the expected political environment and recep-
tion (Warner, 2007).
The links between the intelligence process and the policy process, and their 
different focuses, are described well in the table below (Treverton & Ghez, 
2012). An important difference in the examination of the inertia in the decision 
chain and the link between intelligence and the policy process above is that the 
intelligence community focuses on foreign countries while decision makers are 
interested in the impact upon domestic politics.
The second sub-section within the policy process – the generation and selec-
tion of decision alternatives – is the most unpredictable element, as it partly 
concerns political preferences, connections of individuals, constituencies, 
national organizations/companies and other cabinet departments or commit-
ments to other countries. Not least when it comes to decisions with financial 
and organizational consequences it often becomes a budget negotiation within 
the government apparatus.
As previously noted, the incremental vision constitutes an important 
explanatory basis as both Wildavsky (1964) and Berry (1990), among others, 
previously have described. In other words, existing budget areas are not ques-
tioned as new additions occur on the margin, and a significant redistribution 
between different ministries/departments is extremely rare. In the United States 
the Congress has both a strong and detailed steering role in the budget process, 
which must also be taken into account here. Thus, incrementalism underscores 
that the policy process – and thereby the increasing willingness to change – 
might be just as disadvantageous as the inertia of public administration.
It is also in the second sub-section that think tanks in the United States 
appear to have the most impact by analysing different decision alternatives, and 
here contribute to a unique pluralism (which articles 5.1 and 5.2 covers).
When it comes to time-critical decisions that primarily do not have finan-
cial consequences, there are other examples of breath in decision-making such 
as “multiple advocacy” (George & Stern, 2002). This mainly concerns “second 
opinion” functions outside the ordinary chain of command-structures in the 
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United States President’s immediate surroundings – such as John F Kennedy’s 
chosen advisor at the Bay of Pigs invasion, “EXCON” during the Cuban Mis-
siles Crisis, as well as Lyndon Johnson having the habit of using a “devil’s advo-
cate” in major decisions with a foreign policy character.
It deserves to be mentioned here that although the examples above are 
from the US, both the time critical and the non-time critical examples also 
might have a generic interest for government machinery’s in other Western 
democracies.
In the third sub-section – planning directives to the administration/bureau-
cracy – one can identify where the real executive power resides. In some coun-
tries, this function has been relocated from the highest policy level (Cabinet 
Offices) to the level of the government agencies, given that politicians want to 
present to the voters a small and downsized Cabinet Office simultaneously as 
they require cutbacks in other government commitments and welfare systems.
Contrasting Intelligence and Policy Cultures
Intelligence Policy
Focuses on “over there,” foreign countries. Focuses on “here,” policy process in 
Washington.
Reflective, wants to understand. Active, wants to make a difference.
Strives to suppress own views, biases, and 
ideology.
Acts on strong views, biases, and 
ideologies, at least some of the time.
Time horizon is relatively long. Time horizon is short; an assistant 
secretary’s average tenure is about two 
years.a
Improves analytic products with time. Wants assistance “yesterday.”
Understands the complexity of the world, 
perhaps overstating it.
Wants (and is wont) to simplify.
Knows that sharp answers or predictions 
will be wrong; spells out scenarios and 
probabilities instead.
Ideally, wants “the” answer.
Tends to take the world as given: it is there 
to be understood.
Tends to take the world as malleable: it is 
there to be shaped.
Tends to be sceptical of how much U.S. 
action can affect the world.
Tends to overstate what the United States 
(and policy itself ) can accomplish.
Works in an amost entirely written culture. Works in a culture that is significantly oral.
a This is an estimate across the enire government. In the George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations, the 
median tenure of cabinet officers was 2.5 years and that of the immediate subcabinet level was 2.3 years; 
one-quarter of the officers served less than 18 months. For a nice summary, see M. Dull and P. S. Roberts, 
”Continuity, Competence, and the Succession of Senate-Confirmed Agency Appointees, 1989–2009,” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, 2009, pp. 432–453. Although these numbers have not changed much 
over time, there are large variations across agencies and positions.
Figure 1: Contrasting Intelligence and Policy Cultures
28
In the United States the White House administration, in close proximity 
to the President, has a limited role relative to the departments. The President 
still though has through his/her power of appointment the possibility of direct 
control of both Secretaries of the Departments, as well as even three to four 
levels of politically appointed officials beneath this level, if something was to 
be considered to go in a completely the wrong direction. It is found in the rela-
tions of the agency level below where tension arises.
If the policy making level disposes relevant planning divisions for their 
business there is clearly a better chance for controlling the underlying bureau-
cracies, that almost always have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo 
(Forester, 1982:68; Halperin, Clapp & Kanter, 2006:99).
The relations between these three sub-sections on the level of the Cabinet 
Office appear to be highly variable between different countries, and in some 
cases these relations are not very transparent. An assumption  here is that a sys-
tematic context often is missing when it comes to combine threat and planning 
perspectives in bureaucratic handling – notably, the third sub-section at the 
policy level regarding planning – hence, “The Missing Link”.
2.6.3. Implementation/bureaucracy
Article 1 (Shielding the Net – understanding the issue of vulnerability and threat 
to the information society) in the dissertation’s part B illustrates the problem 
discussed above – that the politicians own the policy while the bureaucracy 
usually own implementation. Another important observation is that the 
national security in different areas of society – for example the vulnerabilities 
in IT systems – is associated with large technical uncertainties and complexities 
and therefore seems not to be viewed in a wider threat context as when the risk 
is perceived as strong and challenging (Goldman, 2001:65).
One IT-incident within a single company (malware, virus or design/
installation faults) can have large unexpected cascading effects far outside the 
company itself and affect critical societal functions like power grids, stock 
exchanges and communications like the big outage in North America 2003 (US 
and Canada Power Outage Task Force, 2004). It is very rare with governmental 
critical information infrastructure dependability analysis and the gap between 
government and the private sector concerning these kinds of responsibilities 
seems widened with the New Public Management influences and outsourcing.
The economic values seem to have superseded other values like public safety 
and security, with more of bureaucratically “stove pipes” and less of a holistic 
horizontal and resilient approach (Hood, 1991:11). Beside unintended threats 
due to complexities there are thus always opportunities for antagonistic insid-
ers who can exploit these weaknesses, which are out of the scope and resources 
for intelligence and security services to look for.
The fundamental scholarly work on bureaucracy’s role within governments 
was written by Max Weber, in which he saw bureaucracy’s role confined to 
implementing laws and regulations, and not to create new rules and activities. 
29
Also, Weber claimed that the bureaucracy is hard to control and that the poli-
tician emerges as a “dilettante” in relation to the bureaucratic expert (Gerth & 
Mills, 1946).
The questions thus arise why there seems to be inertia in bureaucracy and 
why they cannot deliver decisions in accordance to the direction disseminated 
by the policy level? A number of adumbrative traits that explains these short-
comings have been described by James Wilson (1989):
• Inefficiency in the public sector depends on bureaucratic rules and proce-
dures such as norms, rules, reward systems, goals, constraints, culture and 
values.
• Government agencies are not independent companies meaning that incenti-
ves and reward systems are different from those in private enterprise.
• Government agencies may not retain profits or receive benefits through the 
organizations possibilities to earn or increased efficiency.
• Organizational design is not determined by its own agency administration.
• The organization’s goals and objectives are not determined by the organiza-
tion itself.
• There is a tendency to focus and worry about processes rather than outco-
mes.
• Legality and uniformity is more important than efficiency for several go-
vernment activities.
• The various limitations and restrictions pertaining to the public sector make 
it much more risk averse.
• Public organizations tend to have more managers than equivalent private 
sector organizations with similar functions.
When it comes to the bureaucrats’ willingness to change its own organi-
zation and activities some problems might occur because “The bureaucratic 
system is basically inert; it moves only when pushed hard and persistently. The 
majority of bureaucrats prefer to maintain the status quo, and at any one time 
only a small group is advocating change.” (Halperin, Clapp & Kanter, 2006:99).
A decision-making process may be ignited and affected by dramatic events 
and circumstances initiated by states or other external actors, new technology, 
changed public perceptions of societal development or bureaucracy, routine 
reassessments, change of managers/staff, or self-initiated actions (Halperin, 
Clapp & Kanter, 2006:101-105).
For change to succeed, John Thompson (1995) claims that all concerned 
parties should recognize the need for change. The ideal state requires permis-
sion to experiment, as well as being allowed to learn from failures and thus be 
able to adapt quickly to changing circumstances and new opportunities.
Wilson (1989) on the other hand, put forward some successful and perhaps 
somewhat paradoxical examples and traits on how organizations within the 
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state’s core activities have updated and changed themselves without much out-
side pressure:
The most dramatic and revealing stories of bureaucratic innovation are the-
refore found in organisations – the Navy, the Marine Corps, the FBI – that 
have acquired settled habits and comfortable routines. Innovation in these 
cases requires an exercise of judgement, personal skill, and misdirection, 
qualities that are rare among government executives. And so innovation is 
rare (1989:232).
A factor in this context may be that competition, between armed services to 
acquire new weapons and capacities for example, contribute to a greater will-
ingness to change. When aspects of cyber defence became a current element 
in the American debate, rivalry almost erupted between the armed services to 
become the first and principal actor in this area. In fact, Cyber Defence pro-
grams were the only programs who obtained new budgets for development and 
more resources when others awaited cuts for existing weapons programs (Navy 
Cyber Power, 2012).
If the discussion becomes even more qualified by discussing non time-crit-
ical threats (e.g. structural threats to the information society), which are 
cross-sectional and involve several agencies, complexity increases as bureau-
cracy is not a monolith, which Allison and Halperin (1972) points out:
• “Bureaucracy: the ‘maker’ of government policy is not one calculating de-
cision-maker, but rather a conglomerate of large organisations and political 
actors who differ substantially about what their government should do on 
any particular  issue and who compete in attempting to affect both govern-
ment decisions and the actions of their government.” (1972:42).
• “Both the bargaining and the results are importantly affected by a number 
of constraints, in particular, organisational processes and shared values.” 
(1972:43).
All in all, therefore, policy making pluralism seems to be able to arise among 
established bureaucracies when sensing competition within the government 
apparatus for funding resources and other types of influence, which possibly 
could be utilized by the superior policy environment in order to generate a 
greater variety of decision-making and orientation options.
2.6.4. Summary research design
The overall picture of the research situation on the relations between the threat 
and planning processes is that there is a broad and established tradition of 
research concerning the administrative area and the inner workings of the 
bureaucracy, often emanating in Weber’s ground-breaking work Economy and 
Society from 1922.
Research in the policy area has often focused on two areas, either the trans-
fer of political will (policy) into financial terms or the relatively young research 
area in crisis management – i.e. time-critical situations of decision-making – 
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where perhaps Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision from 1971 paved the way 
for today’s extensive research arena.
Among the three sub-areas under study the intelligence research is the 
youngest, in which there are two traditions. Firstly, a less historically focused 
line of research about “post mortems” reviews of policy decisions on the basis 
of released intelligence documents. Secondly, a larger tradition based in polit-
ical science that for example evaluates the usefulness of various methods of 
analysis to predict relevant global developments and threats. There is also a 
close link to the ability of the policy process to absorb impartial intelligence 
assessments in relation to “politicizing” them. Sometimes practitioners ques-
tion the word intelligence research, as the collection part within this field is 
considered more of an art than a science.
As already noted, these are, however, three areas that normally are not cou-
pled in a thematic way in terms of research. These should now be presented and 
discussed.
3. Policy adaption within the national security environment
The policy processes within the national security environments can be studied 
from two directions – what do the existing postures look like, and how adapt-
able is it to potential upcoming challenges.
3.1. The model of analysis for security policy (“the decision chain”)
Within security policy the abovementioned process is scaled down concerning 
actors and flows. One theme in this dissertation is to study factors that cause 
delay in the decision chain “Detection-Action-Recommendation-Decision-Im-
plementation” in relation to new societal antagonistic threats such as IT threats 
or terrorism. This decision chain is also used in Article 1 as the analytic frame. 
The following description is based in a generic Swedish/Western European con-
text, but as we shall see where the United States constitutes a special case.
In the article 1 (Shielding the Net – understanding the issue of vulnerability 
and threat to the information society) it was established that some countries had 
a shorter reaction timeline (N) from detection of a potential threat to imple-
mentation of protective measures than others. What did these countries have 
in common and what constituted this factor X that gave them this faster pace?
The main components in this decision chain consist of the following 
elements:
Part A Threat detection (“input”) can largely be attributed to the intelli-
gence community’s (including the security services) responsibility of how to 
detect/perceive new trends and tendencies. Inertias – bureaucratic rigidities, 
“group think” and too specific directions – can within this system mean that 
important signals are missed, and that for instance the assigned researchers 
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can come up with important new angles to a problem or other contributions. 
Alternatively, no one notices the “Black Swan”-events.
Part B The policy process (“the Missing Link”) can be divided into three 
separate parts:
1. Policy planning (actions and recommendations) based on intelligence mate-
rial (“raw” and processed).
2. Policy decisions where the recommendations will be put in context and de-
conflicted with other previous or planned policies including budgetary is-
sues.
3. Planning directives for the administration/agencies to guide the implemen-
tation of the decided policy.
The Cabinet Offices/National Security Councils will normally process a new 
or unanticipated threat – observed by the intelligence community or other 
sources of knowledge – with the assigning of a commission or an investigation 
8 These countries are described more concretely in article 1.
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constituted of politicians or senior officials. When the investigation is complete 
it usually results in some findings and recommendations. These findings are 
often sent to concerned agencies and in some cases to NGO´s, for additional 
views and input, thereafter, a bill is processed within the Cabinet Department 
before being sent for approval to the Parliament/Congress. Unfortunately, it is 
in the national security field more common with sweeping “post mortem”-in-
quiries like the 9/11 Commission or the Benghazi-report in US, while the 
inductive pro-active investigations on for example evolving strategic challenges 
(China policy, cyber threats etc.) are more low-key.
In this rather non-transparent process there will be a first match between 
“threat” versus “planning” as the specific threat and its consequences will 
both in Europe and in US be assigned to one specific lead Cabinet Depart-
ment (Department of Defence, Department of Justice etc.). In particular, 
financial and budget effects are for the first time tentatively assessed, as well 
as the Department of Finance adding their restrictions to the directives for the 
investigation. Normally, the new directives must be cost-neutral within the 
national budget and managed within the existing budget limits of the specifi-
cally assigned Cabinet Department.
When in Parliament or in Congress, Cabinet Ministers/Secretaries often 
want to show decisiveness and quickly present actionable proposals for the 
elected officials, however, their own Cabinet Department machinery may have 
another or even a conflicting agenda. In the dialogue with their agencies there 
is a tendency for desk officers within the Cabinet Departments to be less pre-
cise in detailed actions, and instead have more leeway to deal with this in the 
yearly budget dialogue.
The agencies, on the other hand, seldom want an added mission or assign-
ment that conflicts or reallocates resources from the existing ones – especially, 
if it demands a changed competence structure within the agency staff, as that 
is a long-term process. As the bureaucracy, Weber pointed out, normally have 
the upper hand against the policy machinery. The Cabinet officials know that it 
often will be a tough bargain and that they need time to integrate these types of 
planning directives in the annual budget directives for the agencies.
The bureaucracy’s upper hand, in comparison to the policy machinery, can 
be explained by more staff for the production of memos with facts, assessments 
and consequence analysis, a deeper subject matter expertise, and – when it 
comes to security and defence related matters – a “knowledge monopoly”. This 
implies a reactive mode for the policy machinery where they can only react 
– and in some cases maybe execute marginal changes – on a single proposal, 
suggestion or an initiative on certain issues from the bureaucracy, instead of 
having several views and opinions. The American system with its think tanks 
is, as we will see later, an interesting exception among the Western countries.
Part C Implementation (“output”) concerns how bureaucracy finally imple-
ments policy decisions through converting allocated funds and directions into 
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new security measures, rules, regulations and supervisory practices. Here, 
agency executives might have to refocus the business, hire new employees and/
or lay off staff and consultants, while they might have to enter other agencies’ 
areas of responsibility for the proposed security measure to obtain full effect.
If this analysis model is to be further decomposed, the policy process (B) 
can be divided into three sub-parts. B1 manages the contacts with the intelli-
gence community both in terms of receiving intelligence as well as to provide 
intelligence requirements (“order”). B2 is the part where the current policy 
stance is coordinated and balanced against other budget areas. For example, if 
there are perennial budgets in these, there will be more civil servant influence 
here in relation to these decisions being calibrated afresh annually in the gen-
eral budget preparation. B3 is the planning function which in dialogue with the 
agency level should translate the directions from the policy process so that they 
are implemented as intended, and not leaving room for alternative interpreta-
tions that the bureaucracy, in their own organizational interest, may prefer.
With this background, it is important to look at how the empirical data 
concerning challenges in the form of new threats and their characteristics 
developed.
3.2. Challenges for the security policy process concerning new threats
The two most significant new types of threats are terrorism and cyber threats 
– both of which have the attribute of being cross-sectorial and involve areas of 
responsibility within several ministries and agencies. In some countries various 
aspects of terrorism are handled by four different ministers as well as by up to 
ten agencies,9 without coordination among the involved parties. Regarding pro-
tection against cyber threats, it is in Sweden at least four ministries and eight 
agencies10 sharing different aspects of responsibility without an efficient overall 
coordination. Other relevant countries like the United Kingdom, Finland, Nor-
way and the Netherlands have far less fragmented approaches (Nicander, 2010).
The new threats are also “civil” in nature – i.e. they are not only part of the 
military organization and the mission of the Armed Forces. Terrorism mainly 
affects the police and crisis management agencies, as well as local authorities 
9 Cabinet Offices: the Prime minister’s Office, the Department of Justice, the Depart-
ments of Defence, and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
Government Agencies: the Security Service, the Armed Forces/the Military Intelligence and Se-
curity Directorate, the National Defence Radio Establishment, the National Police Board/the 
National Bureau of Investigation, the Civil Contingencies Agency, the Coast Guard, The Prison 
and Probation Service, the Radiation Safety Authority, the Migration Board, the Prosecution 
Authority.
10 Cabinet Offices: the Department of Defence, the Department of Justice, the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs, the Department of Enterprise, Energy and Communications.
Government Agencies: the Security Service, the Armed Forces, the National Defence Radio Esta-
blishment, the National Police Board/the National Bureau of Investigation, the Civil Contingen-
cies Agency, the Data Inspection Board, the National Board of Health and Welfare, the Financial 
Supervisory Authority.
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regarding preventive measures, however military organizations can provide 
some support such as foreign intelligence, bomb disposal etc. Information 
Assurance and Cyber Security deals with the society’s information critical 
information infrastructure, but where there exists neither a direct link to pub-
licly planned preparedness measures.
These two types of new threats have a rapid course of action as opposed to a 
gradually growing geostrategic tension in an adjacent area, which gives the con-
cerned military forces time in a prepared fashion to raise the costly emergency 
measures. A terrorist attack, similar to the one in Stockholm in December 2010 
where the Swedish terrorist was radicalized in England (Dagens Nyheter, 2013) 
- or even the siege of the West-German Embassy in Stockholm 1975 (Hansén & 
Nordqvist, 2006) – may have had only a very vague warning in advance and the 
attacks were boundless by nature. Such threats, therefore, cannot be completely 
prevented as they often are what are termed transferred threats (i.e., originating 
in one country but taking place in another).
The Mohammed Cartoon-incident, which resulted in attacks on Swedish 
diplomatic representations abroad, provides an additional example of trans-
ferred threats (Dagens Nyheter, 2010). This means that an attack against Swe-
den does not have to depend on Swedish foreign policy actions, but can happen 
because, in relation to other countries, Sweden’s merit is as the relatively weak-
est link in security – for example Israeli or American diplomats while travelling 
to or from the airport to their residence.
A large-scale cyber-attack on critical societal functions is also difficult to 
predict. Aside from the fact that it will most likely be anonymous, it will also be 
rapid and take place within seconds before any organized crisis management is 
likely to have the opportunity to come around.
In both these cases, coordination of society’s response opportunities is 
necessary; a necessity for which public administrations in most countries is 
not suited. The needed coordination must come about in command structures 
instead of slow collaboration processes. Also, after a cyber-attack on informa-
tion structures recovery measures may require faster and greater redistribution 
between areas of expenditure than the perennial budget processes to be able to 
handle detected critical vulnerabilities.
An additional factor is the lack of transparency and openness following 
the need for confidentiality, partly to deal with threat information in the form 
of intelligence, but also to not reveal possible critical vulnerabilities under 
protection.
The above mentioned difficulties require an organization with expertise 
and professionalism that are difficult to access on the open labour market, and 
which cannot be solved with consultants and staffing companies. The need for 
security classified personnel also limits the selection of possible individuals 
suited for these positions. The demands for limited dissemination and security 
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perimeters on premises further limits knowledge being transfer sideways or 
from society in general.
4. What processes are studied and how?
This dissertation focuses on where the institutional iterative process takes 
place, where the “input” (mainly intelligence and defence research bodies) sig-
nals of threats and potential vulnerabilities are weighed against the “output” in 
the form of steering directives signals and financial support to the community 
structures that need to be protected and strengthened.
The articles are presented in a step-by-step process. Firstly, in article 1 
(Shielding the net – understanding the issue of vulnerability and threat to the 
information society), the timelines and processes between “input” and “output” 
signals are analysed as a comparison between countries of the chain Detec-
tion-Action-Recommendations-Decision-Implementation, using IT/cyber 
threats as a “case” (please find the figure “Analysis model” in 3.1).
Secondly, in article 2 (Understanding Intelligence Community Innovation in 
the Post-9/11 World), the “input” side and pluralism in the intelligence com-
munity is studied more closely. The focus here is how key players can improve 
their behaviour such as providing flexibility, avoid groupthink and thought 
lockups when, due to reasons of confidentiality, a knowledge monopoly exist.
An example of an illustrative question formulation of when non-state actors 
may consider IT-based attack methods can be found in article 3 (Information 
Terrorism – When and by Whom), where the pros and cons in a terrorist 
modus operandi are analysed.
Figure 3: Relations Intelligence-Policy
The third step involves the “output” side, which begins with a short illustra-
tive background description in article 4 (The Trojan Horse in the Information 
Age) about how the Swedish system acknowledged the IT threat, and how a 
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number of management challenges were identified when actions against these 
threats were proposed.
Figure 4: Relations Policy-Bureaucracy
Thereafter, an extensive review of how pluralism on the “output” side can be 
amplified and override existing knowledge monopolies will be provided. This is 
done by focusing on the specific American phenomenon of public policy think 
tanks and their role in advising the security policy processes.
Figure 5: The impact of think tanks in the policy process
The study of think tanks is done in two steps. Firstly, article 5.1 (The role 
of Think Tanks in the US Security Policy Environment – A Forgotten Actor?) 
provides a theoretical analysis based on an interview survey, among personnel 
working in concerned agencies and ministries, about the importance of think 
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tanks and their role in congressional decision-making. Secondly, article 5.2. 
(The Recipe for Think Tank Success: From the Insiders Perspective) provides a 
more detailed analysis of think tanks’ success factors based on unique insider’s 
perspectives from active senior practitioners.
In summary, this dissertation and its articles are intended to provide a pic-
ture of all the relevant links in the security policy decision-making, from the 
first intelligence information via the specific closed processing procedures up to 
the implementation of protective measures.
Therefore, the research gaps that are filled descriptively concern innovation 
and adaptation to an environment in change within the closed intelligence 
milieu, in which external market mechanisms are lacking, as well as specific 
longitudinal decision-making. The phenomenon of think tanks and their role 
in American security policy is viewed in a new light both descriptively and 
exploratory. The latter through unique insights about how these think tanks 
are successful and affect security policy decision-making from actors “on the 
inside” of security policy.
Hopefully, this will also contribute to a future new theory that bridges 
diverse fields of science such as international relations, public administration, 
sociology and microeconomic theory.
•
This thesis now proceeds with the articles which have been briefly presented 
and discussed in this section. The articles’ findings are thereafter summarized, 
discussed and related to the possible impact on enhanced policy formulating 
governmental processes.
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Abstract
This article looks at the policy processes of a number of different countries, 
from the realisation that a problem needs attention to the implementation 
of government policy. The event that initiates and drives the reform process 
of each country is tracked, revealing differences and similarities in urgency 
and perceived risks in the task of overhauling the legal framework for Criti-
cal Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP). The final part of the article 
seeks to understand and account for those similarities and differences in policy 
implementation or in some cases, the lack of it.
The findings tend to suggest that there were lead countries that initiated the 
process of policy reform in CIIP, and this caused a number of other countries 
to follow suit. Although there are similarities in the trigger mechanism, which 
started the process, there was divergence in the passage of the recommenda-
tions and policy suggestions that resulted from the structure of the national 
governments and bureaucratic structures that has placed constraints upon the 
progress in some cases.
Results from the analysis reveal a number of cases, which reveal compro-
mises and other strategies in an effort to push the reform through in a con-
tested political process, where cooperation from government agencies is not 
necessarily forthcoming. Some of the reform processes have even stalled 
and are in a form of limbo from which they have not been able to gain any 
momentum.
Background and Introduction
This article seeks to address the issue of how countries approach the problem of 
how to protect information networks, through the process of formulating and 
enacting policy. The scope of the article includes the period from 1995 until 
2002, which saw a great number of technological changes and developments 
as well as challenges in terms of protecting critical information infrastructure. 
Originally the intention was to cover a more contemporary period of devel-
opment in this sphere, however, when work began it was soon discovered that 
progress after this period was at times stalled. Hence the focus of this article 
was constrained by this fact.
It should be noted at this point that this article is part of a larger project. 
Therefore, the focus shall be predominantly on the practitioner’s perspective 
and empirically rich. Theoretical concerns and discussions will be treated more 
thoroughly at a later date. The core purpose of the theory and method in this 
article seek to support the hypothesis, with regard to policy formulation and 
implementation that the focus should not only concern the problem that is 
attempting to be solved (in this case CIIP), but an understanding of politics in 
governmental and bureaucratic circles needs to be understood and taken into 
account.
45
The approaches taken to the problem by; Australia, Finland, Norway, Swe-
den, United States and the United Kingdom are examined. These selected 
countries seem quite appropriate to study since they are all early starters and 
became “internet literate” but also represent a variation due to their constitu-
tional systems. Milestones and timelines shall be established, with regard to:
• When were these issues identified?
• When was the decision made on approaching the problem?
• When were the policies/recommendations presented?
• When did the cabinet/parliament decide on how to respond to those recom-
mendations?
• When were the policies chosen and the roadmaps implemented within the 
public and governmental structures?
However, these questions are tied to and influenced by a number of dif-
ferent issues concerning the shape and nature of national (and in some cases 
international) bureaucratic politics. These considerations include; institutional 
characteristics, understanding catalysts for change, the politics of administra-
tive reform, and the problems associated with policy implementation.
Institutional design according to Peters (2005) is “the formation of institu-
tions within rational choice is the conscious design of institutions. […] In some 
ways the principal purpose of understanding institutions in this approach is to 
be able to manipulate the outcomes in subsequent rounds of design.” (Peters, 
2005, p. 64) It is a matter of trying to manipulate the environment in order to 
introduce as much predictability and reduce as much uncertainty as possible. 
An alternative is the “successive limited comparisons” that is a series of con-
trasts against the characteristics of the rational model. This casts some doubt 
upon the assumption that actors behave ‘rationally’. In part the issue is prob-
lematic due to the fact that determining and understanding what is rational and 
what is not, is not clearly defined or maybe not clearly understood.  (Allison, 
1971, p. 154)
An aspect that can be overlooked, when the focus is centred upon ‘logi-
cal’ behaviour of individuals in institutions and organisations, is the role of 
the leadership in the direction and the life of an organisation or institution. A 
contested assertion, by William Niskanen, is that the leadership of governmen-
tal bureaucratic organisations use their authority and standing to “maximise 
personal utility, usually through instruments such as larger budgets and larger 
allocations of personnel.” And that these achievements are used in order to 
increase the personal prestige of the ‘bureau chief ’ and greater material bene-
fits. A similar model has been developed for political actors too, as legislators 
and those responsible for identifying and assigned tasks and responsibilities. 
According to the traditions in normative institutionalism, membership to an 
institution imposes limits upon the rationality of individuals. (Peters, 2005, 
46
pp. 55-56)11 In other words there are certain stereotypical expectations and 
demands that are imposed upon positions in society.
Graham Allison argues that organisations are far from monolithic struc-
tures, even at the top, where competition and different agenda affect the logic 
and functioning of those institutions. Thus decisions and policies are not 
necessarily the result of ‘pure’ and logical though, but rather as the result of 
a bargaining process.12 This implies that the most appropriate response to the 
problem is at times a political compromise, which has implications for meeting 
problems effectively. With these theoretical aspects in mind we will now see 
how these could be applied in an empirical context and how the policies of pro-
tecting modern information societies were developed in the selected countries.
Scoping and Framing the Problem
There is no universal definition of CIIP or CII, but there is an understanding 
of the consequences and what the task entails. It is “the protection of essential 
electronic information services, such as IT systems, electronic communica-
tions, and radio and television services”. The Swedish Commission on Vulner-
ability and Security identified the following areas as being essential: air traffic 
control systems, electric power systems, financial systems, national command 
systems, and telecommunication systems. (Dunn & Wigert, 2004, p. 159)
There has been an evident shift in the scoping of CIIP with regard to the 
combination of time and events. During the period 1995-2002 the focus was 
centred on antagonistic cyber-threats, which is also the focus of this study. 
After 2002 there was a change to embrace an All-Hazards approach to the field. 
However, the pendulum seems to be swinging back somewhat again, after the 
cyber-attacks in Estonia, Lithuania and Georgia, and the lessons and percep-
tions that have been (and are being) drawn from these events.
This article is primarily concerned with how the ‘protection bar’ was raised 
against those individuals or groups, which with the knowledge and or sup-
port of another country seek to render their victim (another country) helpless 
through a concerted attack. It is also limiting the scope to look for changes at 
the Cabinet or central government level. The independent variables are thus the 
perceived threat, budget constraints etc, and the degree of institutional change 
is the dependable variable for this analysis.
Country Approaches and Analysis
The countries below are sorted approximately in the order of when the IT-vul-
nerability issue in respective information societies was raised. After the coun-
tries have been individually presented, a table is used as a ready means to high-
11  William Niskanen is the President of the CATO Institute in Washington DC. Accor-
ding to normative institutionalism the constraints are mostly internalised by participants, but 
according to rational choice institutionalism the restraints are more externally based.
12  Please see Allison, G. T. 1971. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, New York, Harper Collins Publishers
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light the similarities and differences of all the countries studied in one quick 
glance followed by an analysis.
Country Approaches
United States
Besides the earlier mentioned debate in the USA - which led to commission-
ing of the PCCIP - vulnerability of the electronic information infrastructure 
was also realized by the military when the Pentagon 1996 published a report 
titled Information Warfare Defence. O. Sami Saydjari, former computer security 
expert for the Pentagon and current President of the private company Cyber 
Defence Agency13 went as far as to state: “The threat and vulnerabilities to our 
national infrastructure is serious, it’s getting worse, and it’s getting worse at an 
increasingly fast rate.”14
In 1996, Executive Order (E. O.) 13010 was issued, which recognised the 
importance of dealing with the problem of physical threats and dangers asso-
ciated with the development of the IT sphere. It is perhaps the first official step 
that acknowledges the risks and threats to critical information infrastructure.15 
This also brought about the establishment of the Presidential Commission of 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP).16 In 1997 the PCCIP released the 
report Common Defence Against Uncommon Threats: The Federal Role in Crit-
ical Infrastructure Protection. A key message of the report was that the time to 
act was now and not to wait.17 This call seemed to give an impetus to the goal 
of CIIP.
The Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PPD-63), of 22 May 1998, of Pres-
ident Bill Clinton designed to ensure protection of the critical infrastructure 
created a number of new organisational structures to facilitate this objective.
The overall coordinating body for the implementation of PDD-63 was the 
National Coordinator for Security, Critical Infrastructure and Counter-ter-
rorism, which were under the auspices of the White House National Security 
Council staff. The official in charge was Richard Clarke - a high-profile person 
on the top of the system that was built up with a very high momentum.18 To 
support him he had the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office - an inter-
agency office based with the Commerce Department, but also dual-hutted as 
13  See the web site of the organisation at - http://www.cyberdefenseagency.com.
14  Bruno, G., Backgrounder: The Evolution of Cyber Warfare, The New York Times, www.
nytimes.com, 27 February 2008
15  Schulze, T. May/June 2006. CIIP – Reached its Peak?, European CIIP Newsletter, Vol. 
2, No. 2, p. 18
16  For detailed account of the activities of the PCCIP please refer to - http://cipp.gmu.
edu/clib/PCCIPReports.php.
17  Common Defence Against Uncommon Threats: The Federal Role in Critical In-
frastructure Protection, Report of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protec-
tion, 1997
18  Pat Milton,  Anti-terrorism Tsar savours challenge, The Associated Press, 11 October 
1998
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a staff element for the White House. It assisted in the drafting of the National 
Plan for Information Security Protection; helps Federal agencies in assessing 
their CI dependencies and interdependencies; coordinates education, aware-
ness and outreach programmes. Information-sharing with the private sector 
was also a significant element here.
There were a number of agencies and committees that dealt with other tasks 
set by PDD-63.19  The most notable innovation here was the National Infra-
structure Protecting Centre (NIPC) which was an operational joint venture 
body between Department of Justice (DoJ) and Department of Defence (DoD) 
that was housed in the FBI Headquarter building and manned by both FBI and 
DoD-personal. It was always an FBI-person who was the head but with a two-
star general from DoD as his deputy.
There has been a steady policy programme of building up CIIP, beginning 
with PDD-63, E.O. 13231 (later revised by E. O. 13286) from 1 March 2003, the 
2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and the related National Strat-
egy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, and 
the HSPD-7 Directive on Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritisation 
and Protection (17 December 2003).20 There has been a flurry of activity to try 
and update and coordinate the protection of CIIP assets. This activity is being 
matched in creating the bodies responsible for the protection too.
The current threat to the critical infrastructure is well recognized, and ways 
and means are trying to be devised to ensure its protection against attack. The 
Bush administration in November 2007 requested that the National Security 
Agency and the Department of Homeland Security coordinate with each other 
in order to protect government and civilian communication networks from 
hackers. Then in January 2008 President Bush signed two presidential directives 
that urged the creation of a comprehensive national cyber security initiative.21
The debate on the vulnerabilities of the information society and antagonistic 
threats started around 1993 and became a priority on the domestic political 
agenda – notably during the Clinton administration.  The developments here 
have been thoroughly monitored by the rest of the leading information societ-
ies around the world. In terms of the initiation of the CIIP process, the United 
States was among the leading nations. Given the nature of the governmental 
bureaucracy, it could be expected to take longer than it did. This gives an indi-
cation to the high priority assigned to the task at all levels.
19  Report of the President of the United States on the Status of Federal Critical Infrastruc-
ture Protection Activities, January 2001, pp. 4-5
Please see pages 3-7 of the document for a complete list of agencies and committees and their 
function.
20  Bloomfield (Jr), L. P. May 2004. Building an International Critical Infrastructure Pro-
tection Policy, The CIP Report, Vol. 2, No. 11
21  Bruno, G., Backgrounder: The Evolution of Cyber Warfare, The New York Times, 
www.nytimes.com, 27 February 2008
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United Kingdom
The importance of Critical national Infrastructure (CNI – equivalent term of 
CIIP) according to the British perspective, which is tied to “the continuity is so 
important to national life that loss, significant interruption, or degradation of 
the service would have life-threatening, serious economic or other grave social 
consequences for the community or would be of immediate concern to the gov-
ernment.” (Dunn & Wiegert, 2004, p. 185) ICT its importance are attached to 
the economic reforms of the 1980s and the early 1990s, where high-tech growth 
has replaced the former heavy industry focus.22 Thus ICT and its well-being 
is in effect a centrepiece to the economic well-being of the UK. There are two 
perceived types of threat to CNI in the UK; one from terrorist attack (i.e. a 
physical attack), and an electronic attack on information and electronic systems 
(i.e. a virtual or cyber-attack).
The Information Warfare responsibility moved from the Ministry of 
Defence to the Cabinet Office and became a civilian issue in 1997. Legislation 
was implemented at an early stage in the UK in 1990 the Computer Misuse 
Act was introduced. Although an act, this legislation was much more as it not 
only tried to anticipate new and emerging potential threats, but also sought to 
head them off. It set out a number of crimes relating to committing crime with 
or to ICT systems, and prescribed the punishments for those transgressions. 
This was updated in 2006 with the Police and Justice Bill, which also seeks to 
bring UK legislation in line with the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cyber-
crime. (Abele-Wiegert & Dunn, 2006, pp. 306-09)
In July 1996 the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) launched 
Project Trawler, which was a study into computer crime. A report from the 
project, Crime on Information Highways, was released in 1999. Computer 
crime was defined in the report as “an offence in which a computer network is 
directly and significantly instrumental in the commission of a crime. Computer 
interconnectivity is the essential characteristic.”23 NCIS was later tasked by the 
Association of Chief Police Officers to design a nationally coordinated high-
tech crime strategy that could lead to the establishment of a high-tech crime 
fighting unit by April 2001.24
In 1998 the approach to information society was established by the Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry Competitiveness White Paper. It duly noted the 
role that ICT played in promoting economic growth. This was followed in Sep-
tember 1999 with the report e-commerce@its.best.uk by the then Performance 
and Innovation Unit (now the Cabinet Office’s Strategy Unit). It recommended 
an organisational and policy framework for attaining the goals outlined in the 
White Paper. These recommendations have since been implemented under the 
national strategy UK Online. (Dunn & Wiegert, 2004, p. 186) As with a number 
22  UK Policy Developments, IAAC Briefing Paper, No. 2, 27 April 2000
23  The Virtual Horizon: Meeting Law Enforcement Challenges, Scoping Paper, Australa-
sian Centre for Policing Research, Payneham (Australia), 2000, p. 72
24  Ibid., p. 73
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of other countries in this study, the UK strategy involves understanding and 
protecting the vulnerable CII on the one hand, and on the other to promote 
and expand information society.
The formation of agencies, tasked with protecting the UK from electronic 
attack, began in Parliament in 1999. In 2001 two different bodies were estab-
lished. First the National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre (NISSC) 
was created as an entity attached to the British Security Service (MI 5), and 
secondly the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) within the Cabinet Office 
which should prepare for all contingencies besides “electronic attack”. Then in 
2007 NISSC had physical protection merged, all threats evolving from elec-
tronic attack and terrorism were merged in to the Centre for the Protection of 
National Infrastructure (CPNI).25
Part and parcel with CIIP is the necessity to have a national strategy and a 
coordinating body for that strategy. A Government Information Assurance Strat-
egy was produced, which covers counter-terrorism strategies, national security 
concerns, and efforts directed against high-tech crime. The aim of the strategy 
is to convey the perception that measures are being taken to secure the infor-
mation society as a means to instil confidence in ICT and the authorities.
Central Sponsor for Information Assurance (CSIA) is the coordinating body 
for the strategy, and works with government agencies. (Dunn & Wiegert, 2004, 
p. 186) CSIA was established within the Cabinet Office on 1 April 2003. In 2004 
the agency produced a document, Protecting Our Information Systems – Work-
ing in Partnership for a Secure and Resilient UK Information Infrastructure. This 
paper deals with the government’s approach to different risks and threats that 
challenge the security of information systems across the UK. (Abele-Wiegert 
& Dunn, 2006, pp. 300-01) The approach taken is proactive by the authorities, 
whose chief aims seem to be related to the task of firstly, prevention and then to 
considerations of mitigation.
The United Kingdom has managed to draw upon a wealth of experience in 
dealing with crowd and transport related disasters from the 1980s and 1990s, in 
thinking about the task of CIIP. These lessons taught that no one single agency 
has the ability and resources to respond effectively to a disaster involving CNI.26 
11 September 2001 in the United States and 5 July 2005 in London, highlight 
the fact that ‘conventional’ terrorism still poses a significant risk for society 
and the government. But there have been other events, which demonstrate the 
emergence of a new threat (which was predicted some time ago as a possibil-
ity), with attacks on CII in the UK. To illustrate the level of the problem there 
was a news report stated that in 2005, “nearly 300 UK government departments 
and businesses critical to the country’s infrastructure were the subject of Trojan 
horse attacks, many reportedly originating in the Far East.”27
25  CPNI website, http://www.cpni.gov.uk/aboutcpni188.aspx, accessed 3 September 2008
26  Critical Infrastructure Protection and Crisis Management in Britain, IAAC Briefing 
Paper, No. 14, 8 January 2001
27  Fingers Pointed at Chinese Military After Hacking Reports, Sophos, http://www.sophos.
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The issue of CIIP and Defensive Information Warfare raised a heightened 
interest in 1994-95, but was debated in its early forms in the UK already by 
1990. The developments are unfortunately not that publicly traceable as UK 
sorted these issues much to the domains of its intelligence community. NISCC 
was in reality a virtual coalition with a small staff of its own and technically 
dependent on the Central Electronic Security Group (CESG) – the information 
security branch of the UK signals intelligence agency GCHQ in Cheltenham.
Australia28
The definition of CI, according to the Australian concept is as “infrastructure 
which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, 
would significantly impact on social, or economic well-being or affect national 
security or defence.” There is an identified subset of CI, national information 
infrastructure (NII). This is defined as being “a subset of the critical infrastruc-
ture which comprises the electronic systems that underpin critical services 
such as telecommunications, transport and distribution, energy and utilities, 
and banking and finance.” The aim of CIIP, according to the Prime Minister 
was “to assure Australians that both the physical safety of key assets as well 
as the information technology systems on which so many of them depend is 
protected.” (Abele-Wiegert & Dunn, 2006, pp. 35-36)
Events that appear to have sparked an Australian interest in actively seeking 
to protect their Critical National Infrastructure occurred in the late 1990s. A 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group research paper in 1998, drew atten-
tion to the issue. Dr Cobb of the Australian National University observed that; 
“while law enforcement organizations are concentrating on physical security 
they do not appear to have canvassed cyber-security issues.” Awareness and 
perception of the potential risk was further elevated by the Sydney Olympic 
Games in 2000, which put the nation’s reputation on the line in front of the 
world and simultaneously making Australia an attractive target.29 It seems that 
the trigger for Australia to look into its information infrastructure security was 
the Olympic Games. There was a lot at stake in terms of national pride and 
political reputations.
Going back to 1997, the National Police Research Unit (NPRU) published 
the report, Minimum Provisions for the Investigation of Computer Based 
Offences. In November 1997, the report was endorsed by the Australasian Police 
Ministers’ Council (APMC), and then referred to the Standing Committee of 
the Attorney General (SCAG) for consideration. A committee, which reports 
to SCAG, the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee (MCCOC) released 
com/pressoffice/news/articles/2007/09/chinese-hack.html, 5 September 2007
28  The main agency through which CIP is regulated in Australia is the Trusted Informa-
tion Sharing Network, information can be found on their website - http://www.tisn.gov.au/
29  IAAC Briefing Paper. 19 October 2000. Australian and Canadian policy Overviews, 
No. 11
Comment is from: Dr A. Cobb, Thinking about the Unthinkable: Australian Vulnerabilities to 
High-Tech Risks’, www.aph.go.au/library/pubs/rp/1997-98/98rp18.htm, 19 September 2000
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a report in January 2000 titled Chapter 4: Damage and Computer Offences. The 
proposals were very similar to the UK’s 1990 Computer Misuse Act.30
Products and services that have been defined as being CI in Australia 
include; communications, energy, finance, food supply, government services, 
health, manufacturing, National Icons (such as Opera House), transport and 
utilities. (Dunn & Wiegert, 2004, pp. 39-40) These products and services are 
considered essential for Australian society to continue functioning in its cur-
rent state of development.
The agency that bears much responsibility for CIP and CIIP is the Austra-
lian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO).31 They work with the Federal 
Police and Defence Signals Directorate in relation to threats affecting the 
National Information Infrastructure. It has developed the Protective Security 
and T4 programs. These programs are under the guidance of the Security Con-
struction and Equipment Committee (interdepartmental), which reports to the 
Protective Security Policy Committee (an interdepartmental body that oversees 
protective security policy in Australia).32
In early 2003 it was publicly announced that a new inter-agency online secu-
rity agency had been formed in order to protect Australia’s information infra-
structure against perceived threats such as; viruses, hackers and cyber-warfare. 
The new body, the E-Security Coordination Group, their tasks include; setting 
the standards for security reporting and skills; organizing responses to any 
attacks made on the national information infrastructure. The agency is oper-
ating under the National Office for the Information Economy. Threat and 
vulnerability assessment is to be conducted by a new sub-committee, the Crit-
ical Infrastructure Priorities Group, which is under the authority of the Attor-
ney-General’s Department.33
A key part of the CIP programme is the Trusted Information Sharing Net-
work (TISN), and in particular an integral part of it, the Critical Infrastruc-
ture Advisory Council (CIAC). TISN was announced by the Australian PM in 
November 2002. CIAC provides advice to the Attorney-General’s Department 
on a national approach to CIP. They are part of a wider network in North 
America, the Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISAC).34
30  Australasian Centre for Policing Research. 2000. The Virtual Horizon: Meeting Law 
Enforcement Challenges, Scoping Paper, Payneham (Australia),  pp. 96-7
31  To find out more about the ASIO please refer to their website: http://www.asio.gov.au/
ASIO defines critical infrastructure as “those physical facilities, supply chains, information tech-
nologies and communications networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable 
for an extended period, would significantly impact on the social or economic well-being of the 
nation, or affect Australia’s ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security”. 
http://www.asio.gov.au/Work/Content/CIP.aspx
32  IAAC Briefing Paper. 19 October 2000. Australian and Canadian policy Overviews, 
No. 11
33  Australia: Government Regroups in War Against Cyber-Crimes, The Canberra Times, 1 
February 2003
34  Report of the President of the United States on the Status of Federal Critical Infrastruc-
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Australia did start off quite late with the debate on information threats 
(1997-98) but had a very fast implementation phase due to the Olympics in 
2000. The results of different interdepartmental committees in this area though 
are not that transparent as these not were public investigations.
Sweden
A number of committees were formed in the 1990s and in the early 2000s deal-
ing with issues arising from a re-thinking and a revamp of the crisis manage-
ment and civil emergency system. The Cabinet Working Group on Defensive 
Information Operations (Ag IO/IW) was established on 12 December 1996. 
Its members were drawn from the cabinet office and concerned agencies with 
the main task to produce a new strategy on these new digital threats, and it 
produced two reports in 1997 and in 1998. The latter suggested a new holistic 
Information Assurance scheme with changed organisational responsibilities, 
and which also became the basis of a Cabinet Bill in 1999 and a Parliamentary 
Decision the same year. The group did also visit Finland and Norway in 1997 
and 1998 to brief on their reports.
In its later more consultative phase from 2000 the Working-Group also 
included members from pertinent private companies and organisations. Duties 
of this working group in this phase included; monitoring emerging threats and 
risks within the sphere of information warfare and to spread information about 
them; proposed solutions on assigning responsibilities and formulating guide-
lines in order to develop a strategy for guarding against IO. The group was 
disbanded at the end of 2002 when some of its functions was transferred to the 
newly established Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA). (Chris-
tiansson & Fischer, 2005, p. 6) The main “customer” and promoter for Cabinet 
WG during this period was the parliamentary composed Defence Commission 
under its dynamic chairman Håkan Juholt (MP).
Other commissions and committees have followed. A Swedish government 
decision on 23 June 1999 authorised the Minister of Defence to lead a com-
mission of inquiry that was designated the task of analysing and submitting 
proposals for standards that would generate a more integrated approach to civil 
defence and planning/preparation for emergencies. In May 2001 the Commis-
sion on Vulnerability and Security delivered its report, which was regarded 
as a significant step towards the intended changes. The report highlighted a 
lack of coherency in the system in Sweden for dealing with serious IT threats. 
One suggestion on how to help remedy this was the formation of an agency for 
Information Assurance (IA). During 1997-2003 there existed some six differ-
ent committees on CIIP, somewhat parallel, all tasked with creating a national 
strategy.
The importance of CIIP in Sweden can be judged by the government bill An 
Information Society for All (1999/2000:86), which stated the desire that Sweden 
was to be come the first country in the world where information society was 
ture Protection Activities, January 2001, p. 12
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for all. (Christiansson & Fischer, 2005, p. 9) In 1972 Sweden was the first coun-
try to introduce a Data Protection Act (SDPA), which was reformed in 1998 
to fit with EU standards, and renamed the Personal Data Act (PDA). This act 
regulates the handling of personal data in both electronic and non-electronic 
forms. (Christiansson & Fischer, 2005, p. 10) With a lot of functions between 
government, citizens and business done over the internet, plus the CII, Sweden 
has a number of vulnerabilities and serious consequences for the functioning of 
society if CII is inoperable.
This raises the question, which agency or agencies are responsible for the 
running and protection of CII in Sweden? There are a number of governmental 
agencies involved in CIIP, the primary ones are; SEMA, the Swedish Defence 
Material Administration (evaluating threats), Swedish National Defence Radio 
Establishment (locating the source of threats), and the Swedish National Post 
and Telecom Agency (security issues related to ICT). SEMA shall be the focus 
of this part of the article.
Established on 1 July 2002, SEMA took over some functions from its prede-
cessor organisations (Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning and the 
National Board for Psychological Defence). It is the coordinating body for civil 
preparation in times of crisis and war. Within SEMA is the Information Assur-
ance Department, which educates, researches, develops and informs different 
stakeholders (in the state sector and the private sector) on issues relating to 
information assurance. It also manages the National Council of Information 
Assurance (successor to the Cabinet Office Working Group on Information 
Operations). (Christiansson & Fischer, 2005, pp. 14-15) In addition to the tasks 
of coordinating the above, SEMA encourages interaction between the public 
and private sectors and has a number of collaborations with similar agencies 
overseas.35
Sweden was a relatively early starter in the process of CIIP. Their initiation 
of the process also sparked other Nordic countries (such as Finland and Nor-
way) into starting their national CIIP programmes too. However, the political 
system that does not allow for a strong central leadership, combined with the 
nature of the state bureaucratic structures meant that progress has slowed con-
siderably as the result of increased resistance and friction among the various 
actors in the process.
Finland
The issue of CIIP in Finland has received a high priority, and being vital to 
the national interest. Security measures undertaken in Finland are based upon 
the Security of Supply Act and on the order of the National Emergency Supply 
Agency (NESA), which was established in 1992.36 (Dunn & Wiegert, 2004, p. 
35  Harrop, M. 2003. Approaches to Critical Network Infrastructure Protection: An Over-
view of Measures Being Taken by Some Countries Outside North America to Protect Critical 
Network Infrastructures, Canada, Electronic Commerce Branch, Industry Canada, Contract 
5009657
36  Another significant document from the 1990s was released by the Ministry of Finance 
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75) Throughout the 1990s there were a number of reports published on the 
theme of information society.
A report named National Outline Policy for the Development of Information 
Networks 1995-1998, which was produced by the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications. The purpose of the report was to investigate methods for 
enhancing the infrastructure for data exchange. Reports such as this formed 
the basis for departments to produce action plans and to make funds available 
for projects concerning information society. A National Information Society 
Committee and an Information Society Forum were created by the Ministry 
of Finance in 1997, and with some obvious influences from the first Swedish 
report the same year. The Ministry of Transport and Communications con-
centrated upon the technical and security related aspects.37 (Dunn & Wiegert, 
2004, p. 76)
In 2000, the Information Society Advisory Council (Ministry of Finance), 
published the report Finland as an Information Society. It summed up the 
then current situation in terms of the stage of development, and attempted 
to gauge the economic and social effects of information society. Other topics 
that were dealt with included the promotion and development of information 
society, and the domestic regulatory framework for it. (Dunn & Wiegert, 2004, 
pp. 76-77) The first step, as has been the case in a number of other country 
approaches, was to consider what Finland already had in terms of CII, and then 
to evaluate its level of importance to Finland (i.e. understand the effects should 
the CII cease to function).
In June 2001 the Ministry of Defence handed in a report, Finish Security and 
Defence Policy 2001, to the parliament. One of the cornerstones of the docu-
ment was the broadening of the concept of national defence, to include; mili-
tary, economic, civil defence, social welfare and healthcare, technical systems 
operation, public order and security, and defence information activities. The 
body that is responsible for defining the areas and sectors that are vital to soci-
ety is the Security and Defence Committee. It is in charge of drafting a national 
strategy for precautionary measures. According to the report:
The precautionary measures cover both military and civilian measures […] 
and are based on extensive cooperation as the activities in different sectors 
of society become more interdependent. (Dunn & Wiegert, 2004, p. 77)
These developments demonstrate an awareness that measures cannot be 
taken piecemeal as the different sectors are interconnected and therefore vul-
nerabilities in one part of the system weaken the system as a whole, and the 
boundaries between civil and military also begin to fade in this regard.
A contact point for citizens, government, business and organisations was set 
up by the government, the Advisory Committee for Information Security (ACIS), 
in 1997 on Data Security and Law. An executive summary of this is available in English.
37  Also see www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/5/2004573.pdf for more information on general 
CIIP policies in Finland.
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was established as a focal point regarding information security issues. ACIS is 
subordinated to the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA), 
and reports to the Council of State. It provides a forum for different sectors of 
society in the management of information security concerns.
The first stage of ACIS work involved the publication of the report Infor-
mation Security Review in June 2002. This was a summary of security threats 
that could potentially affect Finland, and a number of suggested measures to 
counter them. The stated goal was that “Finland will be an information-se-
cure society that everyone can trust and that enables all parties to manage 
and communicate information safely.” November 2002 saw the release of the 
National Information Security Strategy Proposal by ACIS, which was accepted 
by the government on 4 September 2003. In this document there was a focus 
on policy objectives (and how they were to be met), contingency planning and 
the assignment of responsibility to the various stakeholders that are involved. 
(Dunn & Wiegert, 2004, pp. 78-79)
In 2003, the Finnish government issued a paper, Strategy for Securing the 
Functions Vital to Society, which divided vital functions into seven areas: state 
leadership, external capacity to act, national military defence, internal security, 
economy and society, population’s livelihood and capacity to act, and mental 
crisis endurance. It is a follow-up on the preceding papers, with updated ver-
sions appearing in 2006 and the next in 2010. In addition to the regular reports, 
the Security and Defence Policy report is submitted by the government every 
three to four years to the parliament. (Abele-Wiegert & Dunn, 2006, p. 86)
Finland’s approach to CIIP is very systematic and comprehensive. The pro-
cess began with understanding the nature of sector; moving to identifying pos-
sible threats and the consequences; then progressing to suggesting remedies 
and assigning responsibilities to various actors. The time-span is reasonably 
prompt, which implies that there is a perception from the authorities that this 
is a potentially serious problem, this is then transformed into political will to 
resolve the highlighted problems.
We find here that Finland came out quite early (1997) with government ini-
tiatives just after the issue been raised, but the process was somewhat halted 
when it came to formulate a coherent government decision. The implemen-
tation phase after the decision was made seem though to have a very good 
momentum.
Norway
From the late 1990s the issue of CIIP has received greater attention and impor-
tance in Norway. This began with the State Secretary Committee for IT (SSIT) 
in 1998, which formed a sub-committee with the intention to survey the state 
of IT vulnerability. The Defence Review 2000 and the Defence Policy Commis-
sion 2000, both also stressed the importance of CIIP. Then the events of 11 
September 2001 pushed the issue of security to the top of the political agenda, 
as it did in most other parts of the world too. (Dunn & Wiegert, 2004, p. 150) 
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These various policy statements set the background for the events that set the 
reasoning and the agenda for CIIP. The process was prompted, perhaps in part, 
due to Sweden’s work in the area that began in the late 1990s.
A number of decrees, commissions and projects were also initiated during 
the period from the 1990s until the early 2000s. Findings from the governmen-
tal commission on A Vulnerable Society, which was established by royal decree 
on 3 September 1999, provided a stepping stone in the process of establishing 
priorities and policies. One of the controversial recommendations of this com-
mission was that safety, security and emergency planning should be handled 
by a single ministry. It also proposed the following: a partnership between the 
public and private sector, promote information exchange, create early warn-
ing capacity, harmonisation and adjustments of laws and regulations, public 
responsibility for CIP is vital to ICT systems. (Dunn & Wiegert, 2004, p. 151) 
The commission laid the groundwork for determining future priorities and how 
the goals were to be achieved.
The Ministry of Trade and Industry was responsible for setting in motion 
a number of initiatives concerned with the vulnerability and security of ICT 
in Norway. This began in 1999 with the ICT Vulnerability Project. This group 
coordinated with the A Vulnerable Society group to present their findings. This 
culminated in the National Strategy for ICT Security. The national strategy was 
published in June 2003, which proposed a number of ideas along the lines of 
the OECD Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks. The 
concept of security, which ranged from the individual through to the national 
level, which related to the use and functioning of ICT. The strategy began to 
be implemented from the autumn of 2003, beginning with the opening of the 
Centre for Information Security, and other initiatives such as education and 
awareness programmes. (Dunn & Wiegert, 2004, p. 152)
In the spring of 2002, two more initiatives commenced, on 5 April 2002 the 
Ministry of Justice and Police issued report No. 17 on the Safety and Security of 
Society. This was a report that focussed on the issue of the consequences should 
the failure of CI occur. A result was the formation of the Directorate for Civil 
Protection and Emergency Planning. The second event, worthy of mention is 
the presentation of the eNorway 2005 Action Plan in May 2002. It describes the 
needs, responsibilities and action that are required to develop IT society. This is 
linked with the European Union eEurope Plan. A focus was made on e-Govern-
ment and e-Business. (Dunn & Wiegert, 2004, pp. 152-53)
Norway’s initiatives seem to be sparked or at least guided by initiatives that 
are occurring in neighbouring environment. But once sparked, they are very 
quick in implementing the initiatives.
Norway was a late starter (1998) but geared up with the creation of the gov-
ernmental commission under the former Prime Minister Kåre Willoch. There 
also seems to have been significant influences from Sweden’s second report of 
the Cabinet Working-Group on organizational structures.
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Explaining Differences and Similarities
If we based on the country descriptions above try to identify and extract by 
year the five phases/milestones we want to look at the following table will 
appear.
Comparative Country Approach
Country EW/
Debate
Decision on 
Investigation/
Enquiry
Proposals 
from Inves-
tigation
Cabinet Bill/
Parliamentary 
Decision
Implemen-
tation
USA 1993-4 1995 (*PCCIP) 1997 (PCCIP) 1998 (PDD63) 1998
UK 1990 1996 1999 2001 2002
AUS 1997-98 1999 1999
SWE 1994-6 1996 1998 1999 (2000) 2003
NOR 1997 1998 + 1999 2000 2001 2002
FIN 1997 1997 2001 2002 2003
*PCCIP – Presidential Commission of Critical Infrastructure Protection
From observing the timelines of the individual countries in the above table, 
a number of quick points can be made for each of the countries listed.
The United States seems to have the shortest decision-making cycle of the 
studied countries (with a OODA-Loop in military jargon) from the Early Warn-
ing to the Implementation phase. In one sense, this is somewhat of a paradox 
as it is often stated that the United States has one of the biggest (and hence 
implied cumbersome) bureaucracies in the world. On the other hand, it may 
not be that strange as this is where the debate on CIIP began. Another factor 
that may have had an effect is the US Constitution and its ‘spoil-system’, which 
promotes fast results as it is tied to the four year presidential term.
A problem arose in the case of the United Kingdom, which was that the pro-
cess was rather hard to trace. This appears to be the result of the constitutional 
system, which is not very transparent, in terms of public investigations etc., as 
other Western democratic states. Often the administrative development takes 
place within ministerial and Cabinet Office committees. One reason for this 
could also be that UK - in contrast to the other countries in this survey - to a 
large extent put these issues into the “intelligence portfolio”, where the British 
Security Service (MI 5) has got a key role.
Australia experienced a late detection phase, however, the implementation 
phase was attained very quickly. This should been seen within the context of 
the situation, which demanded a sense of urgency. With the Olympic Games 
(and Y2K) due to be held in Sydney in 2000, an overhaul of all government 
protective schemes and programmes was undertaken. Australia is also a rel-
atively homogenous country, which is reflected in its administrative system, 
which has the effect of hastening the decision-making process.
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Sweden detected the problem quite early and enjoyed a good momentum 
early on in the process, up until the implementation phase when things seemed 
to grind to a halt (1999-2003). A possible explanation for this is the odd Swed-
ish Constitution (in European terms), with its small cabinet departments and 
big independent agencies. Added with the fact that ‘ministerial rule’ is explic-
itly forbidden. Such a system demands a strong ‘judge’ (i.e. a strong Prime 
Minister’s Office) to resolve conflicts that emerge between different sectors in 
the form of ‘turf ’ fights between agencies on cross-sector issues, which often 
continues up to their respective Cabinet Departments. An absence of a strong 
‘judge’ could explain the halt at the implementation phase.
Although Finland entered the process rather late, fast results have been 
achieved, with the Ministry of Finance taking the lead. However, work does 
not in the early phases seem to have been coordinated with the Ministry of 
Defence or Interior, which may account for a pause in the process. It all seems 
to have been put back on track again when the Defence and Security Commit-
tee received a wider mandate that encompassed CIIP.
Norway in comparison, detected the problem somewhat later, but imple-
mented the CIIP programme much quicker than Sweden. The Norwegian sys-
tem is characterized by a strong system of ministerial rule, which seems to lead 
to a faster implementation phase after two or more ministers are able to come 
to an agreement.
Another way of clustering the diffusion of ideas is that USA, UK and Aus-
tralia (together with Canada and New Zealand) are part of the “five-eyes club” 
with strong multi- and bilateral intelligence relations. This leads also to more 
of information sharing on threats and a common view on how to protect their 
common inter-dependable information networks.
The various policies on how to protect the wider information society – for 
example between the USA and the UK - seems though to be based on the 
different constitutions and different approaches to the role of the intelligence 
community in their national Information Assurance schemes. USA treated 
the CIIP as new “operational” political issue and created new institutions with 
some support of the intelligence community, while UK to a large extent treated 
this as an intelligence and security matter coordinated within Whitehall and 
with some new responsibilities given to existing organisations.
A second possible clustering here is the Nordic countries where Sweden 
adapted the US debate early and where ideas influenced the processes in Fin-
land and Norway, even if the constitutional framing differed.
These reasons may perhaps explain why Norway was able to pass through 
the process of initiating the debate through to implementing the decisions. It 
has a cash surplus due to the oil reserves, this being coupled with perception 
of threat and the realisation of the consequences should CII be attacked. Most 
important though was that it put its intelligence community as the lead body 
during the initial phases and thus bridged the traditional gap between the Intel-
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ligence Services and Law Enforcement bodies. Some bureaucratic turf fight 
did appear later though when the protective measures should be implemented 
within other parts of government, as the intelligence community generally 
doesn’t have the budget to handle these problems.
In a number of cases, the trigger for initiating the process of CIIP policy was 
the result of another country beginning the process. Either way, it had the effect 
of ‘kick-starting’ the process through raising awareness and creating perception 
of the issue and prompted governments to act on an issue (by raising the prior-
ity of the issue).
A number of the countries studied have failed to implement policy, even 
after a quick and determined start to the process. There appear to be a number 
of reasons for this failure. One possible reason being, as mentioned above, the 
issue of scarcity of resources for the state. This problem being compounded by 
the fact that many of the CII resources are in the hands of the private sector, 
which complicates issues of jurisdiction and who foots the cost. Another pos-
sible reason for the apparent loss of drive is a possible lowered level of threat 
perception by a number of countries. This being the result of no more major 
terrorist attacks on the scale of 9/11 and perhaps a feeling of being ‘safe’ as they 
do not perceive themselves as being an attractive target (when compared to the 
United States for example).
Conclusion
The issue of CIIP initially began as a military issue, but soon came to encom-
pass the whole spectrum of society. An initial event triggered the debate and 
early warning phase in some of the cases, whether the event affected the coun-
try in question or an event abroad was responsible. In some cases it was the 
events of 9/11 in the United States, for others it was the approach of Y2K, and 
for Australia it was the approach of the Olympic Games in Sydney. The United 
States was in the lead with regard to recognising the potential of the problem.
A factor that exacerbates and compounds the potential for a serious incident 
is the fact that many of those vital systems are taken for granted. The develop-
ment of automated control systems that regulate our everyday lives (such as 
air traffic control, provision of electricity and water) has increased the stan-
dard of living and prosperity, but it has simultaneously introduced new threats 
and vulnerabilities. Such a situation (in terms of threat) requires a coordinated 
approach to try and resolve. The United States is in the position of being a 
super-power and therefore likely to be challenged by a range of potential 
threats that seek to expose weaknesses. Other countries, such as Finland, have 
a lot of political and economic capital tied up in the IT sphere. If this is harmed 
profits are endangered and political careers are put in jeopardy.
A country’s ability to successfully navigate the various identified phases of 
the CIIP programme implementation process is determined by a number of 
observable factors. One of these is the nature of the constitutional structure as 
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it relates to the state bureaucracy. The United Kingdom has a tendency to use 
committees behind closed doors. Ministerial rule which is applied in Norway, 
when compared to Sweden, seems to hasten the process, especially when com-
bined with a clear set of goals and using another country’s experience (Sweden) 
to boost the process. These cases would appear to demonstrate the need for an 
effective top down management of the process in order to stop it from being 
delayed or stalling.
There has also been a tendency to try and concentrate the responsibilities 
for CIIP into as fewer different ministries and departments as possible. The 
United Kingdom has done this recently; Australia has employed this tactic too. 
Sweden on the other hand, involved a number of different agencies in the same 
task, and also lacked the strong top down management of the process. Conse-
quently the time span of the implementation process was long.
These findings tend to point to an observation made by Peters; Change can 
be brought about by a number of different factors that exist in the institutional 
environment. This may be the result of a perceived current need, which should 
be addressed or could be the result of an anticipated need. Bureaucratic institu-
tions are prompted to change by their environment, the example of legislatures 
have been used to demonstrate the point.
Legislatures in most countries have become professional and more institu-
tionalised, often as a means of counter-acting the increasing powers of po-
litical executives. This implies that in this perspective institutions change 
in response more to external stimuli than to their own internal values, alt-
hough statements of that sort are rarely discussed. 38 (Peters, 2005, p. 100)
A possible explanation for the delays found in the policy implementation 
process is taken up Kingdon. This becomes especially relevant when a number 
of agencies are involved in the road to shaping and enacting policy. A problem 
highlighted by Kingdon in the process towards administrative reform are the 
political interest and compromises that take place among the different actors in 
order to come to some agreement. He also points out a number of factors that 
may motivate some actors, not previously involved in the process, to become 
involved. In turn, this affects the general perception of the situation.
Consensus building in the political arena, in contrast to consensus building 
among policy specialists, takes place through a bargaining process rather 
than by persuasion. Once participants sense that there is some movement, 
they leap in to protect their interests. This entry into the game, sometimes 
sudden entry, contributes to a sharp agenda change, both because various 
interests receive some benefit from their participation, and because a gene-
ralised image of movement is created. (Kingdon, 2003, p. 163)
This has the potential to affect the entirety of the process, from the reali-
sation of a potential problem to enacting policy that has been passed through 
38  Peters (2005) states that research into the area of institutional change is not well deve-
loped. (p. 61)
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parliament. Therefore it is critical to understand, and to foresee these types 
of problems. It cannot be stressed enough, these processes and phenomena 
require more research in order to draw more decisive results. This article is but 
a very modest step in that direction, and it is hoped to spur more research in 
this direction.
From the current theoretical standpoint, it is often assumed that political 
actors are rational and behave in a predictable manner in order to achieve the 
desired outcome. This does not take into account a whole range of complexities 
and interests that can have the potential to alter this theoretical ideal. Among 
other things, this article points to the potential effects that issues such as per-
ception among the actors, and the issue of competition for resources and pres-
tige. There is also a hint that these aspects are often overlooked or mismanaged 
in the policy change process, which results in lengthy delays or the complete 
stalling of progress. Once more, it needs to be said, this needs further empirical 
investigation in order to start illuminating some clearly definable and defend-
able trends.
One preliminary thesis that without greater risk then could be used – also 
based on the observations and findings in this article - would be that though 
the political system controls the decision-making process (i.e. the first four 
milestones in this article) within the central government machinery, they exer-
cise far less control over the implementation.
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Abstract
The purpose of this article is looking towards at how Intelligence Communities 
innovate (adaptability) and how the new demands of pluralism in the intelli-
gence production process have been fostered. By innovation, it is specifically 
meant that intelligence organisations and the legal/political machinery in the 
sector evolve to meet the changes and challenges found in their environment.
1. Introduction
This article demonstrates that there has been significant investment in and 
transformation of the United States Intelligence Community (IC) in the wake 
of 9/11. But where is all of this growth and investment heading? The matter 
dealt with on the macro-level is on one side the level of reactive adaptability to 
change when an institution(s) is confronted by new forms of external threats 
and obvious failures. The other side is how to proactively and in a controlled 
fashion promote pluralism and innovation in order to create an agile and suc-
cessful organisation able to continuously adapt the business processes to the 
developments of society and targets.
A subtle, yet importance difference lies in the distinction between change 
and innovation, for the purposes of the article. Change is most often something 
that is imposed upon an organisation, especially in the wake of an obvious fail-
ure. On the other hand, innovation is a process of ‘fine-tuning’ the system in 
order to meet evolving or anticipated challenges, and can be internally driven. 
This article is about change and innovation in the intelligence system as a 
whole in the United States, but is equally applicable to the system at the organi-
sational level. A particular focus is on the dynamics within each stovepipe - not 
between as there has not a good record of results from change and innovation 
undertaken to date. An article in July 2010 in the Washington Post highlighted 
a number of these problems.39
There is a deliberate distinction where there is a change of equilibrium 
between agencies as opposed to change within an agency. According to Andrew 
Van de Ven in Central Problems in the Management of Innovation, he defines 
innovation as being “the development and implementation of new ideas by peo-
ple who over time engage in transactions with others within an institutional 
order.”40
Why is this of interest then? Within the area of Public Administration and 
Public Management very little has been written on how the IC as traditionally 
rigid organisations in the core of the State Apparatus evolve and adapt to new 
39  Dana Priest & William Arkin, A Hidden World Growing Beyond Control, Washington 
Post, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-
beyond-control/, 19 July 2010
40  Andrew Van De Ven, Central Problems in the Management of Innovation, Management 
Science, Vol. 32, No. 5, May 1986, p. 590
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circumstances when there are no market or other competitive mechanisms 
present. One of the dilemmas that are presented in the current age of reforming 
governmental structures is trying to understand the nature of government. A 
simple and yet tough question needs to be asked “is government a business”? 
The answer to which, and the application of the findings in terms of the nature 
of the proposed reforms, may have a profound effect upon structures in the 
intelligence community.
It is acknowledged that innovation can be squashed in ‘closed’ organisational 
systems. The United States’ management system of a top-down command struc-
ture and the compartmentalised physical organisation of the parts of an organ-
isation tend to stymie the fostering of an innovative culture.41 Whilst under-
standing and acknowledging that this does occur, the focus of this article is 
not upon this type of system. Organisational learning feeds into the theory on 
innovation and helps us to understand some of the aspects that not only help 
innovation and change, but also either hinder or block it.
An underlying assumption here is that the US Intelligence machinery is a 
driving force compared to for example European Intelligence Communities – 
although in this article the United Kingdom is mostly used to illuminate the 
dichotomy - they seem to be more conservative and to adapt more slowly. In 
this article I will try to examine if this postulate can be supported theoreti-
cally by the general approaches to innovation and developments within these 
communities. From a comparative perspective, the primary research question is 
whether the ‘young’ US IC more innovative than the ‘old’ European ICs or are 
there other factors like resources and technology that play a more significant 
role?
There have been a remarkable number of changes since the end of the Cold 
War in 1991. A number of academics saw an end to conflict with the end of 
the bipolarity that marked the Cold War period (as exemplified by Francis 
Fukuyama and the End of History). However, what this new era heralded in 
was a new set of challenges and risks. These were not based on the principles of 
the Cold War, although in some ways it is possible to argue they were linked. 
Instead of having state actors, which are generally assumed to act in a rational 
and predictable manner, the new opposition is non-state based. The new adver-
sary, which now begins to fall under the general rubric of al-Qaeda, is based on 
an extreme version of Islam and is committed to a long, uncompromising and 
bloody asymmetric struggle.
41  Rod Hague & Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics, 7th Edition, Ba-
singstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pp. 361-2
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2. Theory of Innovation
Framing
The way that this article is framed and focused needs to be explained as the 
issue of the subject of innovation within the IC is very broad and involves many 
different levels. Therefore, this article does not focus on relations between the 
producer (IC) and the consumer/policy maker, which is the focus of the likes 
of Sherman Kent. The horizontal relation between different agencies is also 
not the focus. What is the focus of this work is the internal and intra-agency 
process.
There are a number of other associated points that need to be clarified 
before proceeding further, in order to specifically identify the exact subjects 
and objects of interest. A distinction needs to be drawn at this stage between 
“change” and “innovation”. Innovation within the IC forms the subject of inter-
est. This process is often an internally driven one, designed to address identified 
or presumed changing needs or deficiencies within the existing system.
Intelligence activity can be carried out either on a reactive or proactive 
basis. There are attempts to try and think ahead and understand what is 
going to happen in the future and try to adapt to those assumptions, such as 
the Cold War era intelligence assessments of the Soviet’s military capacity, at 
times forecasting decades out. A problem with proactive intelligence is that it 
connects more with current political requirements, which makes it more prob-
lematic to analyse. For this reason, this work will mainly be looking at reactive 
intelligence.
A final consideration within the frame of this article is that there is a focus 
on the stated problems from a public management perspective. To be even 
more specific, public management concerning government organisations at 
a macro-level, and without any competitive market/economy incentives that 
would influence the outcome.
Theoretical considerations
New Public Management (NPM) is a policy ‘creed’ that has been adopted by 
the Anglo-American world of public administration since the end of the last 
century. It has led to radical change to the public sectors of the countries that 
constitute the Anglo-American world (Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and 
especially New Zealand). One of the inspirations of NPM is summed up by 
one of President Reagan’s comments: “government is not the solution to the 
problem; government is the problem.”42
An approach to understanding NPM is helped by considering Osborne and 
Gaebler’s Reinventing Government article from 1992. It enumerated 10 princi-
ples for improving the effectiveness of government agencies.
1. Promote competition between service providers;
42  Rod Hague & Martin Harrop, op. cit., p. 366
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2. Empower citizens by pushing control out of the bureaucracy into the com-
munity;
3. Measure performance, focusing not on inputs but on outcomes;
4. Be driven by goals, not rules and regulations;
5. Redefine clients as customers and offer them choices – between schools, 
between training and programmes, between housing options;
6. Earn money rather than simply spend it;
7. Prevent problems before they emerge, rather than offering services after-
wards;
8. Decentralise authority and embrace participatory management;
9. Prefer market mechanisms to bureaucratic ones;
10. Catalyse all sectors - public, private and voluntary – into solving community 
problems.43
Hague and Harrop also identify a number of components and characteristics 
associated with the practice of NPM. These include: managers are given more 
discretion but held more responsible for results; performance assessed against 
explicit targets; resources allocated according to results; departments unbun-
dled into more independent operating units; more work contracted out to the 
private sector; more flexibility allowed in recruiting and retaining staff; costs 
cut in an effort to achieve more with less.44 NPM takes a more business-like 
approach to the issue of transforming the public sector from a bureaucracy into 
a responsive and flexible organisation.
Metcalfe (1993) argues that there is a need for new theoretical foundations 
if public management was to be able to make the transition from imitation to 
innovation. He characterised governmental approaches to management prob-
lems in the 1990s as being mere imitation of business management practices, 
and that it was time to move beyond this, and towards innovation. Innovation 
he states, entails the “development of new methods of management appropriate 
to the distinctive needs of government.”45
In his opinion there exist two major challenges facing contemporary gov-
ernments within the sphere of public management. The first challenge is the 
fast pace and type of change that is being faced. Secondly, is that unlike busi-
ness, governments operate through networks of interdependent organisations 
as opposed to independent organisations (that are simply pursuing their own 
objectives). In terms of the focus of public administration and public man-
43  From David Osborne & Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneu-
rial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector, New York and London, Penguin, 1992 in Rod Ha-
gue & Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics, 7th Edition, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2007, p. 367
44  Rod Hague & Martin Harrop, op. cit., p. 368
45  Les Metcalfe, Public Management: From Imitation to Innovation, Australian Journal of 
Public Administration, Volume 52 Issue 3, Pages 292 – 304, 1993, p. 292
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agement, Metcalfe sees that there has been a shift in emphasis and focus from 
stability to change.46 This shift in governmental focus should mean a greater 
chance that some form of change in public policy problems in the contempo-
rary setting than in the past.
In regard to the notion of innovation the article by Van De Ven (1986) is 
particularly useful to understand what is involved within a theoretical frame-
work. According to Van De Ven, four basic concepts are critical to studying 
the innovation process: 1) ideas, 2) people, 3) transactions and 4) context. Van 
De Ven talks of the “currency of ideas” insofar as some ideas gain greater value 
and others are discounted for one reason or another. Innovation is shaped and 
guided to an extent by the frames and perceptions that the problem is viewed.
In July 2007 Christian Stadler had his article, Four Principles of Enduring 
Success, published in the Harvard Business Review.47 The study by Stadler and 
a team at Innsbruck University’s Business School compared nine pairs of Euro-
pean companies over 50 years. Four main findings were derived from the proj-
ect, which Stadler refers to as being the four principles of success. These are:
1. “Exploit before you explore – great companies don’t innovate their way to 
growth, but grow by efficiently exploiting the fullest potential of innovations 
that already exist.
2. Diversify your business portfolio – good companies, conscious of the 
dangers of irrational conglomeration, tend to stick to their knitting. But the 
great companies know when to diversify, and they remain resilient by main-
taining a wide range of suppliers and a broad base of customers.
3. Remember your mistakes – good companies tell stories of success, but great 
companies also tell stories of past failures to avoid repeating them.
4. Be conservative about change – great companies very seldom make radical 
changes, and take great care in their planning and implementation.”48
These particular principles were derived from the European business envi-
ronment. However, they are equally applicable to innovation and change issues 
within the IC environment, especially in an era where government is being 
viewed and run as a business as governments face budgetary considerations 
and constraints and seek to streamline their operations. An “integrative chal-
lenge of building inter-organisational cooperation in the midst of structural 
change” is needed, according to Metcalfe. He also concludes that given the 
expansion of the role of management in government, it should be possible to 
employ existing business management practices more or less directly.49 In a 
blog posting, Tony Campbell notes:
In other words, at least two of the success factors recommend that there 
46  Ibid.
47  Christian Stadler, Four Principles of Enduring Success, Harvard Business Review, 
http://harvardbusiness.org, 1 July 2007
48  Ibid.
49  Les Metcalfe, op. cit., p. 303
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be caution about change. This is something to think about especially when 
intelligence managers are contemplating the “next” organizational change 
initiative. However, having said that, I would go back to the distinction bet-
ween change that hits you and to which you have no choice but to manage 
adaptation for survival (responsive), and change that you have choice about 
launching or not and in what measure (proactive). What Stadler’s advice 
underlines is that you better be very sure that the inevitable dislocations and 
costs of any change will justify the anticipated benefits. 50
Principles one, three and four are the most applicable to the IC sphere, espe-
cially in the innovation and transformation aspects. In terms of innovation, do 
intelligence organisations seek to get the best from what they currently have or 
do they seek to embark upon something completely different? The third princi-
ple more relates to the subject of change, which is learning and admitting past 
errors and mistakes. The fourth principle should be highly relevant given the 
sensitive nature of intelligence and the risks involved in making major changes 
to intelligence agencies and the IC.
Another set of theoretical questions on the public policy process need to 
be asked, in order to place innovation within the context of change within the 
intelligence community in the public sector. It is useful here to get the perspec-
tive of former practitioners, formerly part of the IC, to appreciate where theory 
and practice intersect. Sims and Gerber offer their view of what they refer to as 
being ‘true intelligence transformation’ and what needs to be done in order to 
achieve this objective.
True intelligence transformation fuses wit, creative business practices, and 
selected technologies for the purpose of achieving strategic advantage. It 
implies reform – the ability to beat adversaries faster, more efficiently, and 
with less cost to civil liberties than might otherwise be possible. But its tra-
demark is the marriage of selected technologies with innovative strategies 
and practices such that revolutionary capabilities emerge.51
The notion of ‘transformation’ that is used by Sims and Gerber contrasts 
with this article’s concept of innovation and change. In the quote, the nuts 
and bolts the process of transformation is enumerated without distinguishing 
between externally and internally controlled forces. In contrast this article 
makes a distinction between innovation and change, which is innovation from 
an internally driven perspective and change being an externally imposed pro-
cess. Quiggin states his vision on the future of national security intelligence.
50  Received via email from Tony Campbell on 13 September 2009
From 1993 to 2000, Campbell was responsible for foreign intelligence analysis in the Privy 
Council Office (Canada’s Cabinet Office) as the Executive Director of the Intelligence Assess-
ment Secretariat and Chairman of the interdepartmental Intelligence Assessment Committee. In 
2001 he retired from government service. In 2006 he was made an Honorary Life member of 
the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies. His company, Campbell Intel 
Services is located in Ottawa, Canada.
51  Jennifer Sims & Burton Gerber (Editors), Transforming U.S. Intelligence, Georgetown 
University Press; 1st edition, 2005, p. 10
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The role of national security intelligence will be broader and tougher in the 
future. Change will have to occur repeatedly and the agencies will have to 
reach out beyond their organisations to get the knowledge they need to meet 
the challenges.52
Here Quiggin sees the challenge for the IC in the future. On the one hand, 
the role of the state is in many cases diminishing in society and the role of the 
IC needs to reflect this change. On the other hand, risks and threats are diver-
sifying and society is becoming increasingly vulnerable in a number of aspects 
(not least of which is technological dependency).
Lowenthal cites Richard Best on the reasons why reform and innovation 
is undertaken, which is divided into three broad chronological categories. 1) 
Within the context of the Cold War – to increase the efficiency of the IC. 2) As 
a counter to any criticisms as a result of failures of impropriety – Bay of Pigs, 
Iran-Contra deal, etc. 3) Post-Cold War era – refocus IC structure and require-
ments.53 This implies the changing nature of the security environment necessi-
tates changes in the state’s early warning systems designed to detect sources of 
risk and threat.
The role of innovation in the US today can be seen in the National Intelli-
gence Strategy (NIS) from August 2009 and which reveal a number of interest-
ing aspects about the proposed priorities of the US IC.54 It becomes clear that 
there is a clear focus of the 2009 NIS on one part of the intelligence mission; 
safeguarding national security interests from various threats. The other pri-
mary task is supplying foreign policy customers and maintaining information 
superiority (through information gathered and analysed for policy support and 
coordination.
The underlying reason for the NIS in the first place, is that it is a mechanism 
used to coordinate the activities (and accountability) of the 16 US intelligence 
agencies. Each NIS envisages a four year plan. The DNI stated the motivations 
and reasoning in a press release.
This strategy advances our original, founding directive to achieve an IC that 
is integrated and collaborative. But it really goes much further than that. It 
reflects a more refined understanding of the threats we face and how we’ll 
combat them. In describing our objectives, it prescribes methods for ac-
hieving them that can only be carried out by the IC that is agile, adaptive, 
and united. Most importantly, it recognises that national security hinges on 
good intelligence and it provides me with the tools that I need to monitor 
performance and ensure accountability.55
52  Thomas Quiggin, Seeing the Invisible: National Security Intelligence in an Uncertain 
Age, World Scientific Publishing Company, 2007, p. 22
53  Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 4th Edition, Washington D.C., 
CQ Press, 2009, p. 297
54  The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America, Washington DC, The 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, August 2009
55  DNI Unveils 2009 National Intelligence Strategy, ODNI News Release No. 29-09, Of-
fice of the Director of National Intelligence, Washington DC, 15 September 2009
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Organisational Learning
Learning is a central piece to understanding the issues involved in change ver-
sus innovation.  It is entirely feasible for change and innovation can take place 
without learning. The important point to consider at this stage is not just that 
innovation takes place but that it promotes better intelligence analysis through 
improving the structure and processes employed within the IC.
Lovell does not differentiate between individual and organisational learn-
ing. He states that the elements are characterised “by primary reference to 
the intelligence and sophistication of thought which informs decisions, poli-
cies, and programmes, and to external efficacy, and by secondary reference to 
speed, completeness of relevant knowledge scan, and efficiency of thought and 
actions.”56 The process of organisational learning can be, to an extent, regarded 
as a process that is driven by perception.
Organisations are not actually capable of learning literally; rather this 
is a metaphoric term that is used to describe the process of “detecting” and 
then “correcting” an “error”. The ‘memory’ of an organisation is derived from 
employees who act to adapt the “theory-in-use” of an organisation that are a 
reflection of an organisation’s past experience. Therefore there can be no organ-
isational learning without individual learning, however, although individual 
learning is a condition for organisational learning it is insufficient to bring 
about learning by itself.57
The application of organisational learning is the result of a process that 
involves negotiation and bargaining. This means that there is the influence of 
organisational and political dynamics upon the final result, and not the result 
of ‘pure’ logic, reason and analysis from previous experience.58 As such, organ-
isational priorities and politics can exert an influence on the process, resulting 
in the final product being less than an optimal solution for the identified prob-
lem, error or obstacle.
A lesson from the Second World War is useful in the delineation of organ-
isational responsibility and ownership of tasks and functions. This was seen in 
the approach to the distribution of ownership and responsibility by the various 
belligerents involved in the conflict. Nazi Germany for example, saw the users 
56  John Lovell, “’Lessons’ of Military Involvements:  Preliminary Conceptualization,” in 
Donald Sylvan and Steve Chan (eds.), Foreign Policy Decision Making: Perception, Cognition, and 
Artificial Intelligence, New York, Praeger, 1984, pp. 129-157, p. 133
57  (1) Argyris and Schön quoted by John Lovell, “’Lessons’ of Military Involvements: 
Preliminary Conceptualization,” in Donald Sylvan and Steve Chan (eds.), Foreign Policy Decision 
Making: Perception, Cognition, and Artificial Intelligence, New York, Praeger, 1984, pp. 129-157, 
p. 133
(2) Bo Hedberg, “How Organizations Learn and Unlearn,” in Paul Nystrom and William Star-
buck (eds.), The Handbook of Organizational Design, New York, Oxford University Press, vo-
lume 1, 1981, pp. 3-27, p. 3
58  John Lovell, “’Lessons’ of Military Involvements:  Preliminary Conceptualization,” in 
Donald Sylvan and Steve Chan (eds.), Foreign Policy Decision Making: Perception, Cognition, and 
Artificial Intelligence, New York, Praeger, 1984, pp. 129-157, p. 134
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of intelligence each having their own collection, analysis and counter-spy func-
tions. In Great Britain however, various functions were assigned to different 
responsible agencies. The difference in approach saw the users in conflict with 
each other in Germany, and in Great Britain the suppliers fought.59 These cases 
provide an example of the potential of an organisation to learn from historical 
experience.
However, there have been many cases where an organisation with ample 
access to the necessary information fails to learn from organisational history.
The swine flu instance (1976) thus is crammed with negative examples, 
where the public health authorities and their superiors failed to turn organi-
sational history to their account. But it was all around them, ready to hand.60
Levy defines experiential learning as “a change in beliefs (or the degree of 
confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or proce-
dures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience.”61 Intelli-
gence is only as good as the value assigned to it by the users; history has once 
again provided a number of interesting cases. The prelude to the Nazi German 
assault on the Soviet Union in June 1941 demonstrated that the warning signals 
supplied by Soviet intelligence were ignored. The prevailing belief was that the 
Germans would not want to risk a war on two fronts.62 A situation such as this 
implies the political role of the policy maker and high ranking official in the 
process, and that a ‘failure’ in intelligence may in fact originate at the political 
level and not from the IC.
So what are the reasons for seemingly ‘neglecting’ the historical experience of 
an organisation? There are a number of reasons that can be used to explain this 
situation. The first reason is related to bias, which is inherited in the process. There 
is a limited amount of time to ask the ‘right’ people. Those who are asked have a 
certain interest and knowledge about specific aspects and tend to highlight those. 
Secondly, it relates to the issue of speed. To get an objective picture of an organisa-
tion someone needs to look at the current resources, powers and personnel system, 
which is compared with the past. However, that same person needs to periodically 
ask the question “why”. Thirdly, there not only needs to be knowledge about what 
an organisation does now, but also what it may and may not do in the future. Addi-
tionally there is also the human factor at play too, which requires patience in order 
to increase the chances of success. Pride may be another reason for failure. Incom-
plete, contradictory or imprecise results may also frustrate the process, which 
implies the need for a more systematic approach to institutional development.63
59  Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time:  The Uses of History for Decision-
Makers, New York, Free Press, 1986, p. 214
60  Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, op. cit., p. 219
61  Jack Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy:  Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” Interna-
tional Organization 48, 1994, pp. 279-312, p. 283
62  Ernest May (ed.), Knowing One’s Enemies:  Intelligence Assessment before the Two 
World Wars, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 536-7
63  Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, op. cit., p. 230
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When it comes to the issue of organisational learning - not at the individual 
or simple organisational level a number of new factors need to be considered. 
How does policy making for the organisation, and the state it serves, differ 
from individual and organisational learning?
The learning of a collective – a whole and complex entity such as a nation 
state – is different from the learning of an individual or a narrow decision-
making group. Lessons must be internalised in some enduring, objective, 
consistent, and therefore predictable way. They may be institutionalised, 
embodied in new or revised procedures, preparations, dispositions; or they 
may take the form of new constraints or conditions that are added to the 
policy process. […] Thus, learning a lesson means imposing upon the struc-
ture and process of policy choice a set of decision rules (“if-then” proposi-
tions), often in a concrete form, that will dispose the system to respond in 
certain ways – presumably better than before – to future contingencies.64
Therefore organisational learning as it is applied to the policy process of 
governments seems to be a compromise in terms of initiating change or inno-
vation in order to meet a certain objective or problem. But the process is done 
within the context of understood ‘rules’ and boundaries, and the process should 
be ideally one with a predictable outcome. In the age of New Communication 
Technologies and the advent of 24/7 news, publicity also plays an important 
role in decision making, organisational learning and accountability issues. 
An event that is widely seen can exert a greater sense of urgency in politics 
(Vaughan 1996). This aspect adds an additional pressure upon policy makers, 
and one that they ignore at their peril.
Hedberg identified a number of different triggers for learning that are pres-
ent in the environment in which an organisation operates. He states that an 
organisation cannot afford to continuously scan their environment, and only 
do this intermittently. The search is based upon an attention-directing standard 
operating procedure, which operates only as the result of problems beginning 
to build up. Affluence sometimes starts the search process, although it is more 
likely to be the result of; scarcity, conflict or substandard performance. Wealth, 
harmony and success tend to breed a culture of complacency and therefore 
reinforce existing behaviours. The triggers identified by Hedberg are:
• Problems,
• Opportunities,
• People65
One of the strategies that are promoted by Hedberg to facilitate organisa-
tional learning is through the promotion of experimentation. He states that: 
“if organisations are to survive in hostile and changing environments, they 
64  John Lovell, “’Lessons’ of Military Involvements:  Preliminary Conceptualization,” in 
Donald Sylvan and Steve Chan (eds.), Foreign Policy Decision Making: Perception, Cognition, and 
Artificial Intelligence, New York, Praeger, 1984, pp. 129-157, p. 134
65  Bo Hedberg, op. cit., pp. 17-18
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must change strategies and pursue new development patterns. Organisational 
designs should encourage experimenting so that organisations attain long-term 
viability.”66 Relating to the IC, the changing threat environment from the Cold 
War to post-Cold War threats is a good of the need for organisational learning 
and experimentation.
The Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte issued the National 
Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America in October 2005. A key 
assertion of the document was that the US IC must be a ‘unified enterprise of 
innovative intelligence professionals.’ It went on to outline how this transforma-
tion67 was to proceed, based upon six mutually reinforcing and interdependent 
characteristics: 1) results focused; 2) collaborative; 3) bold; 4) future-oriented; 
5) self-evaluating and; 6) innovative.68 This document came in the wake of a lot 
of criticism aimed at the IC for their failures in 9/11 and the WMD case in Iraq 
from 2003. One of the criticisms faced by the US IC was that it failed to adapt 
to a changing environment. And therefore at the core of the problem is the 
issue of organisational learning.
Making Sense of the Theory
The theoretical discussion is structured in such a way as to take into account 
the various considerations that are not only required, but needed in order to 
bring about change and innovation in the IC. As such, the first stage is the 
realisation and identification of a problem or requirement – the framing of 
the issue is important in this respect. Without an urgent framing an issue is 
unlikely to get on to the policy agenda, the formulation.
It can be deduced from Stadler’s Four Principles of Enduring Success that 
points three and four are the most relevant for the purposes of this paper. Point 
three on remembering your mistakes though is often externally driven and the 
results are imposed from an external agency, therefore relates more to the issue 
of change. Point four that concerns being conservative about change, which has 
implications for both innovation and change.
3. Empirical Views on Innovation – Four Cases
A major focus in this section will be on the challenges to intelligence organi-
zations and adaptability to innovation during the post-Cold War-period. This 
period became – especially in US - a starter for fundamentally rethinking the 
intelligence process and requirements, when the threat picture shifted from a 
180 degree view against the Soviet bloc to a 360 degree view against all kinds of 
66  Bo Hedberg, op. cit.,, p. 20
67  In this regard, transformation is seen as the strategic process relating to bringing 
about an alteration in the IC, whereas innovation and change are seen as a subset of the trans-
formation process.
68  Glen Hastedt and Douglas Skelley, Intelligence in a Turbulent World:  Insights from 
Organization Theory in Peter Gill, Steven Marin, and Mark Pythian, Intelligence Theory, New 
York, Routledge, 2009, pp. 112-130, p. 112
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organisations (non-state actors) and states. Intelligence agencies started to exe-
cute economic espionage against traditional allied partners (for example France 
vs. US), and later on the new terrorism organizations challenged the traditional 
pattern on all aspects of intelligence - collection, analysis, dissemination and 
intelligence collaboration with earlier less desirable countries. Therefore the 
focus of the perceived threat gradually shifted from an ideologically charged 
grouping of states – the Eastern Bloc, to a period where there was a period of 
uncertainty who the enemy was after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc during 
1989-91, and now consists of non-state terrorist organisations and a collection 
of ‘rogue states’ that have been coined the Axis of Evil.
Four cases of challenges - or more paradigm-shifts - will be looked at below 
which affected modern Intelligence Communities worldwide, and also called 
for organizational innovations – mostly from within. In the findings there will 
be some reflexions on similarities and differences on how US and Europe (UK) 
approached these challenges.
1. The Information Revolution and Open Source Intelligence. Another fun-
damental change refers to the technological revolution where new IT-tech-
nologies and “mega-crawlers” created the first real serious competition to 
the Intelligence Communities of the world in being first and foremost with 
adequate information on political developments and crises.
The United States Congress established the Aspin-Brown Commission (for-
merly known as the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the US Intel-
ligence Community) in the wake of the failure of the 1992 National Security 
Act. OSINT came to the fore during a challenge posed by Robert Steele69 to 
the IC, who could gain information on a nominated objective the fastest? 
The target was an African country. In the race, the IC used its secret sources 
and Steele used open source material. The end result was an embarrassment 
for the IC, which took considerably longer to get the necessary material: 
thereby putting into question the nature and means of information collec-
tion.
2. The Counter Terrorism-mission. This is today the most important prio-
rity for almost all intelligence services. It also showed that no intelligence 
agency in the world has the required knowledge and understanding (anth-
ropology, religions, language, cultures etc.) ‘in-house’. The term ‘academic 
outreach’ became known as a way for intelligence services to tap into the 
voluminous research efforts within universities and think-tanks.70 Private 
entities like Oxford Analytica in UK had already in the mid-90s found an 
economic rewarding way of funneling unclassified knowledge within aca-
demia to exclusive assessments for governments and leaders, but now the 
intelligence communities found that this is more than a niche complement 
to the existing working processes.
69  See Robert D. Steele, On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World, Fairfax, VA, 
AFCEA, 2000
70  See the Defence Intelligence Agency’s mission statement with regard to education and 
research at http://www.dia.mil/college/mission.htm.
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3. The increased need for pluralism and innovation in Intelligence Machine-
ries. Here the Israelis institutionalised a ”Devils Advocate”-model already 
after the Yom Kippur War as well as some change also came to daylight in 
UK as a result of false assumptions before the Falklands War. The need for 
pluralism became most obvious in both US and UK after the failed assess-
ments on WMD as a precursor to the invasion in Iraq 2003. The ideas were 
around for a long time, but were given a new visibility when the CIA created 
a “Red Cell” for alternative assessments.
An even wider endeavour to create second opinions and promote innova-
tion and pluralism was the ID-8 proposal.71 It was an attempt to overhaul 
the IC and turn the assessment and knowledge processes “upside down” 
with a primary focus to have an entry point in unclassified research within 
academia. It was thus intended to bring about radical changes to the system, 
but was halted due to bureaucratic obstacles and has ultimately not amoun-
ted to anything.
4. Approaching the new vulnerabilities in the Information Society. When it 
comes to change in the Intelligence Community, it is not just a matter of 
considering what is being done in terms of domestic events and processes, 
which are considered. Of interest are what the Red Team is doing and may 
be planning to do. In addition to this, another angle needs to be factored 
in to the capabilities and intentions of Blue Team allies. This can be tied to 
the maxim of Sun Tzu in the Art of War, where he states that in order to be 
consistently successful on the battlefield one must not only know the enemy 
and their capabilities, but should also know one’s own capabilities. Given the 
level of interoperability within the context of the Global War on Terrorism, 
this insight is still highly relevant. Historically, for instance in 1932 Rear 
Admiral Harry E. Yarnell demonstrated the potential effectiveness of an air 
attack on the American fleet in Pearl Harbour. Nine years later the Japa-
nese used almost the same tactics in destroying the fleet. A report from the 
exercise concluded that “It is doubtful if air attacks can be launched against 
Oahu in the face of strong defensive aviation without subjecting the attacking 
carriers to the danger of material damage and consequent great losses in the 
attack air force.”72 Intelligence and insight is only as good as those with the 
foresight to use it effectively.
An explanation needs to be given at this point to justify why the UK equals 
Europe within the context of this article. Of course Europe is composed of 
much more than solely the UK. Reasons to include the United Kingdom are the 
long and experienced record (hence ‘old’) in the intelligence field, together with 
their ‘special’ relationship with the United States.
71  Stollar, Larry., ID8: New Approaches, New Solutions, powerpoint presentation, April 
2008
72  Jack Young, The Real Architect of Pearl Harbour, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi_qa3834/is_200504/ai_n15743392/pg_3/, Spring 2005
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3.1. The Information Revolution and Open Source Intelligence
Technology has become a part of everyday life, and this is no exception for the 
IC either. Information Technology (IT) forms one important aspect of techno-
logical information. IT was originally developed internally by the government 
for military use. However, the development of technological innovation by the 
open market has exceeded the internal development by the government and 
military.73 A problem concerning the adoption of new technology has already 
been encountered.
Governmental adoption of technology has been faced with a problem, 
which is related to the responsiveness of governments in general. At times new 
technology is evolving more quickly than the governmental ability to adopt it. 
This demonstrates a need to decide and act quickly in order to keep up with 
the latest technological developments; it is a question of agility. There are those 
who warn against the reliance by the IC on IT. Lowenthal characterises the 
IT Revolution as being a means and not an end to the IC. He sees it as being 
more of an aid to perform tasks more efficiently, such as information-sharing, 
collection and collation.74
Quiggin notes that OSINT “if it is done correctly, it is as rigorous and timely 
as any other intelligence source and is usually done at a fraction of the cost.”75 
Another advantage of OSINT is that it can be used to verify classified informa-
tion without endangering the sources. For example the 1998 bombing of the 
al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan.76 This is merely one example, of the 
many, where OSINT could have proved its value. Publicly available information 
on the plant was overlooked in favour of a held belief that it was producing 
chemical and biological agents for al-Qaeda.77 The case emphasizes the value of 
OSINT as a quick and cheap solution to a pressing problem.
Today’s intelligent targets are smaller, more agile and mobile, and time sen-
sitive. This must be reflected in the management and requirement systems.78 
The ratio of state secrets to open information was changing after the end of the 
Cold War. However, a deluge of OSINT changes the ways and means of collec-
tion. The emerging threats of the contemporary world are often asymmetric in 
nature. In this case, knowledge is power, and brute force alone cannot defeat 
the threat or release the populace from fear.79
73  Mark Lowenthal, op. cit., p. 307
74  Mark Lowenthal, op. cit., p. 308
75  Thomas Quiggin, op. cit., p. 157
76  Amy Sands, “Integrating Open Sources”, pp. 63-78 in Jennifer Sims & Burton Gerber 
(Editors), Transforming U.S. Intelligence, Georgetown University Press; 1st edition, 2005, pp. 70-
71
77  Jamie McIntyre & Andrea Koppel, US Missiles Pound Targets in Afghanistan, Sudan, 
http://edition.cnn.com/US/9808/20/us.strikes.02/, 21 August 1998 (accessed 28 August 2010)
78  James Monnier Simon Jr., “Managing Domestic, Military, and Foreign Policy Requi-
rements: Correcting Frankenstein’s Blunder”, pp. 149-61 in Jennifer Sims & Burton Gerber (Edi-
tors), Transforming U.S. Intelligence, Georgetown University Press; 1st edition, 2005, p. 150
79  Thomas Quiggin, op. cit., p. 231
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An example of collection and collation innovation occurred in October 2009 
it was announced that In-Q-Tel, the investment arm of the CIA had invested in 
Visible Technologies (http://www.visibletechnologies.com/), which is a “leading 
provider of social media analysis and engagement solutions.”80 Visible Technolo-
gies covers around 500 000 sites per day, listening to blogs and forums (Twitter, 
Flickr and YouTube for example), and trawling commercial sites with forums 
(e.g. Amazon) through a data-mining process. This venture seems to be an 
attempt by the CIA to be able to make use of open source information that is 
available on social networking sites (not Facebook though as this is a closed 
network).81
In a sector that is filled with sensitivities and secrets OSINT allows for 
greater flexibility. There are no secrecy issues, which is a distinct advantage 
when the IC has to deal with politicians, bureaucrats, foreign and domestic 
partners, and other agencies. There is a flip side to the OSINT coin. One of the 
problems identified is a growing reliance on the internet as a source of infor-
mation, with no checking of the source, and information reliability or credi-
bility. There is a tendency of analysts and policymakers becoming somewhat 
addicted.82
In 1996 the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence released a 
staff study – IC21: The IC in the 21st Century. It called for more ‘cooperative-
ness’ across the community and strengthened central management of the IC by 
giving the DCI additional administrative and resource authority. It proposed 
consolidating all technical collection activities into one large agency; refining 
the CIA’s “centre” concept; creating two deputy DCIs (one for analysis and one 
for community management, including collection). However, there have been 
no radical changes, most changes relate to the management of the CIA. The IC 
continues to have a “stove-pipe” collection focus.83
The CIA had already began to explore the possibilities of setting up a cen-
tre within the framework of the organisation that used OSINT after the 1998 
nuclear tests by India caught the IC off-guard.84 John Negroponte created the 
Open Source Centre (OSC) when he was the DNI. Management responsibility 
went to the CIA. Some criticised it for being old wine in new bottles. The DNI 
80  Please see the Visible Technologies news release on the strategic partnership - http://
www.visibletechnologies.com/press/pr_20091019.html.
To see the CIA blurb on Q-Tel go to - https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/additional-publi-
cations/in-q-tel/index.html. The In-Q-Tel website is found at http://www.iqt.org/.
81  James Quilter, CIA Invests in Social Media Monitoring Company, Brand Republic, 
http://www.brandrepublic.com/News/947002/CIA-invests-social-media-monitoring-company/, 
21 October 2009
82  Thomas Quiggin, op. cit., pp. 101-102
83  Roger George and Robert Kline, Intelligence and the National Security Strategist: En-
during Issues and Challenges, Lanham, Roman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006, p. 58
84  Scott Shane, Intelligence Centre Is Created for Unclassified Information, The New York 
Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/09/politics/09center.html, 9 November 2005
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through the OSC tried to demonstrate the increased reliance on Open Source 
Intelligence (OSINT), such as the President’s Daily Brief and NIEs.85
The US IC was formally established in 1947, after its necessity was under-
stood following the onset of the Cold War. There have been a number of struc-
tural/organisational changes that have been instituted from above. In August 
1960 the National Reconnaissance Officer was created by President Eisen-
hower. This meant that valuable intelligence assets would be jointly controlled 
by the Pentagon and the CIA. In 1996 the CIA was charged with the creation 
of NIMAC (National Imagery and Mapping Service, which has subsequently 
become the National Geospatial Agency (NGA)). The focus of these assets, as 
with the IC as a whole, is for supporting military operations.86 An early reali-
sation, judging from the events of 1960, demonstrates that stove-piping was a 
potential problem in this very young organisation, which necessitated organis-
ing the information collecting assets.
Information is the lifeblood of the IC. But what exactly is OSINT, and what 
is its role? Quiggin defines OSINT as being “an intelligence discipline that uses 
information of potential intelligence value that is generally available to the pub-
lic.” NATO use a very specific definition of intelligence and the role it plays, 
“information that has been deliberately discovered, disseminated, distilled, and 
disseminated to a select audience […] in order to address a specific question.”87 
OSINT therefore brings flexibility to the intelligence system, which is needed 
given the changes in the nature of the current threat. Robert Steele’s challenge 
to the US IC provided a clear example of the potential benefits to be derived 
from the ‘new’ form of collection, decisively outperforming the agencies in the 
time needed to gather sufficient information on a given case. According to the 
NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook:
OSINT is information that has been deliberately discovered, discriminated, 
distilled, and disseminated to a select audience, generally the commander 
and their immediate staff, in order to address a specific question. OSINT, in 
other words, applies the proven process of intelligence to the broad diversity 
of open sources of information, and creates intelligence.88
OSINT is not just a case of using the internet only. Deep web search tech-
niques are used, which goes beyond the capacity of most web users. Some 
examples of programmes that are used includes: Lexis Nexis or Dialog.89 The 
IT Revolution is a means and not an end for the IC. It is an aid to perform 
85  Mark Lowenthal, op. cit., p. 303
86  Thomas Quiggin, op. cit., pp. 103-104
87  Thomas Quiggin, op. cit., p. 157
88  NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nato/
osint_hdbk.pdf, November 2001, pp. 2-3
89  Thomas Quiggin, op. cit., p. 161
To see a more comprehensive description of use of OSINT please refer to NATO Open Source 
Intelligence Handbook, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nato/osint_hdbk.pdf, November 
2001, p. 1
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tasks more efficiently – information sharing, collection and collation. (Lowen-
thal, 2009: 308) There are a number of emerging prejudices about OSINT, 
which imply that it can be performed by anyone and anywhere. This is more 
of a reflection of ignorance of the processes involved in the collection of 
information.90
One of the events that saw an effort to promote and drive the use of OSINT 
in the US was the Aspin-Brown Commission of 1996. They criticised the IC for 
failing to make greater use of OSINT. The Commission was established by Con-
gress to review the IC’s post-Cold War performance. Their findings indicated 
that the IC was moving too slowly in providing analysts access to open source 
data bases, particularly important owing to the deluge of information on the 
internet, for example.91 The 9/11 Commission report of 2004 also mentioned 
the need to utilise OSINT more, to the extent of creating an open source centre 
in the CIA (but did not elaborate). In 2005 the WMD Commission released its 
report, and a similar recommendation to the 9/11 Commission, the establish-
ment of an open source centre within the CIA. The WMD Commission also 
criticised the IC for under using OSINT. One of the conclusions of the 2005 
report highlighted the problem.
Analysts have large quantities of information from a wide variety of sour-
ces delivered to their desktops each day. Given the time constraints ana-
lysts face, it is understandable that their daily work focuses on using what’s 
readily available — usually classified material. Clandestine sources, howe-
ver, constitute only a tiny sliver of the information available on many topics 
of interest to the Intelligence Community. Other sources, such as traditional 
media, the Internet, and individuals in academia, non-governmental organi-
zations, and business, offer vast intelligence possibilities. Regrettably, all too 
frequently these “non-secret” sources are undervalued and underused by the 
Intelligence Community.92
After the 9/11 Commission report in 2004, and before the WMD Commis-
sion report in 2005, Congress introduced an intelligence reform bill. One of 
the recommendations was for the establishment of an open source centre. The 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) saw 
the most extensive changes to the IC since 1947, and an emphasis on open 
source information.93 Thus there was a high level of political demand from the 
policy makers for establishing an open source centre, thus the change being 
imposed from the outside.
90  For instance see http://www.oss.net/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=2717 for 
Robert Steel’s criticisms of the current state of OSINT.
91  Richard Best & Alfred Cumming, CRS Report for Congress: Open Source Intelligence 
(OSINT): Issues for Congress, Washington DC, Congressional Research Service, 5 December 
2007, p. 9
92  The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Wea-
pons of Mass Destruction, March 31, 2005, p. 395
93  Richard Best & Alfred Cumming, op. cit., p. 11
82
It was decided to establish a National Open Source Enterprise, which was to 
embrace a number of key principles:
• the establishment of the position of Assistant Deputy Director of National 
Intelligence for Open Source with overall oversight responsibility of the 
open source effort;
• coordination by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 
for open source funding requests in the DNI’s budgetary submissions and 
allocations;
• the creation of a “Guild” of open source experts at an Open Source Cen-
tre and by ensuring that open source competency becomes an Intelligence 
Community requirement;
• a single open source requirements management system to balance resources 
and acquisitions against priorities;
• establishment of a single open source architecture to facilitate access to a 
wide range of potential consumers at federal, state, local, and tribal levels; 
and
• creation of an entity to develop and acquire cutting-edge technologies and 
processes that advances efforts to acquire and utilize open source informa-
tion.94
On 1 November 2005 the National Open Source Centre (NOSC) was offi-
cially established. Officially it was established by the DNI, administratively 
speaking it is under the management of the CIA and its organisation incor-
porated and augmented by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). 
According to a DNI press release, NOSC’s functions include the “collection, 
analysis and research, training, and information technology management to 
facilitate government-wide access and use.”95 This externally imposed change 
fits in with the type of change that is intended to erode rigid inter-organisa-
tional barriers in order to maximise the use of existing resources by pooling 
them together in a new structure.
NOSC provides information for all government agencies through access to 
the website www.opensource.gov. This information is in the form of transla-
tions and media transcripts from around the world, and other analytical prod-
ucts.96 This helps to solve the problem of analysts having to look for the needle 
in the haystack, by placing all of the information in one place and not in dis-
persed locations.
This is a positive aspect, and touching on the issue of structural change and 
innovation, there are other aspects that need to be taken into consideration 
too. One of those aspects is organisational culture. This is not a question of 
making the physical task of access to information easier for analysts, but the 
94  Richard Best & Alfred Cumming, op. cit., pp. 11-12
95  Richard Best & Alfred Cumming, op. cit., p. 12
96  Ibid.
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problem of the organisational attitude towards OSINT. Therefore some deeper 
searches need to be done. How does the IC, at the organisational level, value 
open source information? If it is undervalued or devalued, no manner of this 
type of change shall bring about the desired results of the policy makers.
Furthermore, Lowenthal identified one weakness of OSINT, which is that 
it is somewhat random with regard to its availability to all analysts.97 OSINT 
is about information, and getting the right information to the right people in 
a timely fashion. This raises the issue of enabling a free flow of information 
in and between the IC organisations, policymaker and the end user. When it 
comes to information sharing among the various agencies within the US IC it 
is policies and culture, rather than technological barriers exist to the effective 
transfer.98 There needs to be an increased emphasis on information sharing. 
This raises the question of which path to take in order to achieve this: develop 
policies that mandate information sharing and punish those who do not? In 
part this dilemma is answered by the organisational culture and organisational 
leadership, which is oriented towards secrecy in the case of the IC.
The UK efforts in the area of OSINT are less visible and more low-key. In 
the mid-1990s MoD created an Open Source office with Top Secret cleared 
librarians to better harness open source information and “grey” literature both 
within the domains of the MoD/Defence Intelligence Staff but also reachable 
from other parts of the UK Intelligence Community. The most important rea-
son though for the absence of new forms of cooperation is probably the already 
existing informal partnerships with UK universities and the long tradition of 
academic outreach here. The tough information requests and needs second 
opinions on assessments could most often be solved through well – often per-
sonal “school tie” related – networks between intelligence officials and scholars.
In a comparative view between the UK and the US, the UK tends to make 
use of civilian experts and to fine tune existing means and mechanisms. This is 
in line with Stadler’s first stated principle that is exploiting to the fullest extent 
innovations, to “exploit before you explore.” The US approach to OSINT was 
an imitation and is relying on a technological approach that has been supple-
mented with the use of experts in the Global War On Terrorism (such as the 
use of anthropologists). The longer traditions of the UK are reflected in their 
approach to intelligence.
The British also learned generations ago that obtaining pre-emptive infor-
mation does matter when it comes to national survival, as they tried to na-
vigate amidst the shifting alliances of European nations and their imperial 
ambitions. From time to time obtaining that advantage involved a degree of 
Machiavellian deception as well as skill and art, and even of cheating by way 
of seeing through the backs of the opponents’ cards.99
97  Mark Lowenthal, op. cit., p. 303
98  Mark Lowenthal, op. cit., p. 308
99  David Omand, Securing the State, London, Hurst & Company, 2010, p. 7
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OSINT is about the processing of information and not the processing of 
secrets. This has come about, as previously stated, as a result of the culmina-
tion of a number of circumstances and changes in the intelligence and threat 
environment. Therefore this raises a vital question; is OSINT an innovation or 
a necessity? In order to answer this question it is vital to revisit the input versus 
output argument, where NPM focuses (as does Stadler) upon the result rather 
than the process. The current threat environment that the IC needs to accu-
rately analyse and understand quickly, OSINT in this regard can be considered 
as being an innovation within the input part of the process. Given the nature of 
current threats, especially asymmetrical threats that evolve and emerge rapidly, 
OSINT can also be considered a necessity in this regard.
3.2. Counter-Terrorism
The issue of counter-terrorism had already begun to emerge as a priority for 
the IC by 1994-95 with the emergence of groups, such as al-Qaeda. In 1993 the 
attack on the World Trade Centre in New York was a hint of the ‘new’ type of 
global threat to come. This has been reinforced over the years with a string of 
attacks across the globe, and eventually bringing the threat to the rest of the 
world from 9/11, to March 2004 in Madrid and London in July 2005.
The opponent facing the IC is very adaptable and unpredictable. The 
dilemma facing intelligence agencies is that they need to be successful 100% 
of the time, which places a great deal of stress and burden. For if an attack is 
successful or some other kind of failure occurs, the legacy of years of success 
is soon forgotten. In terms of an event having a transforming effect upon the 
United States IC, the impact of the Iraqi WMD yielded a greater impact on the 
transformation of analysis than 9/11.100 This tends to support the saying that 
the greatest learning comes not from successes, but from defeats and setbacks.
One of the innovations from within the IC is the creation of the red cell/
blue cell concept. Originally the red cell was used during the period of the Cold 
War as a means to try and understand how the Eastern Bloc countries thought, 
thereby being able to anticipate the enemy. After the Cold War the red cell/blue 
cell concept has been adapted to a role in counter-terrorism.
9/11 proved to be an event that caused a significant amount of reflection 
upon the task of analysis. The United States as a leading player in the Global 
War On Terrorism not only needs to consider and understand what the enemy 
is thinking and doing, but also the thinking and capabilities of their own assets 
(and those of their allies). This needs to be done through expanding the world 
view of the organisation. A Cyber Defence Exercise in 2006 illustrates the 
potential roles played by the cells, in this case in training.
• Blue Cell participants included students of computer science and related 
fields at the nation’s military service academies. Their role was to defend the 
100  Mark Lowenthal, “Intelligence Analysis: Management and Transformation Issues”, pp. 
220-38 in Jennifer Sims & Burton Gerber (Editors), Transforming U.S. Intelligence, Georgetown 
University Press; 1st edition, 2005, p. 232
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military network.
• Red Cell participants played the aggressors. They came from the NSA and 
various service network security groups such as the Air Force Information 
Warfare Centre at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas, the Navy 
Information Operations Command at Fort Meade and the Marine Corps 
Network Operations and Security Command at the Marine Corps Base in 
Quantico, Virginia.
• White Cell participants, also seasoned network security professionals, acted 
as exercise proctors, referees and scorekeepers.101
Moving beyond the classroom and to a practical application of the red cell, 
further complexities get introduced to the equation. The testimony of Bogdan 
Dzakovich to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States in 2003 was very revealing of the role of the work of the red cell in not 
only understanding how the enemy thinks, but also in testing how blue forces 
react to breaches of security. The red team was established in the wake of the 
bombing of Pan Am 103 (before the end of the Cold War!) by the Presidential 
Commission who directed the FAA to develop “measures to improve testing 
of security systems.” TWA 800’s crash off New York and the 1996 FAA Reau-
thorisation Act (P.L. 104-264) further reinforced and defined the red team role. 
In particular, emphasizing that “… the Administrator (of FAA) shall conduct 
periodic and unannounced inspections of security systems of airports and air 
carriers to determine the effectiveness and vulnerabilities of such systems …”102 
These statements show that an awareness existed of the vulnerabilities, and an 
attempt was being made to plug them with the use of red cell strategy.
Dzakovich was extremely critical of the FAA though, which was increased 
after the 9/11 attacks. He went as far as to state in the Commission hearings 
that the FAA embarked upon a plan of deception to cover up their incompe-
tence and culpability in this failure.
What happened on 9/11 was not a failure in the system, it was a system de-
signed for failure. FAA very conscientiously and deliberately orchestrated a 
dangerous façade of security, ignoring the laws cited above. They knew how 
vulnerable aviation security was. They knew the terrorist threat was rising, 
but gambled nothing would happen if we kept the vulnerability secret and 
did not disrupt the airline industry.103
In spite of a number of warnings, in terms of events and whistleblower tes-
timony, there was no change within the FAA or any attempts to right the defi-
101  Todd Lopez, Military Students Get Lesson in Cyber-warfare, Security News, Search-
Security.Com, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid14_gci1186049,00.
html, 3 May 2006 (accessed 26 April 2010)
102  Statement of Bogdan Dzakovic, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States,
http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing2/witness_dzakovic.htm, 22 May 2003 (acces-
sed 26 April 2010)
103  Ibid.
86
ciencies. Outside agencies that are intended for oversight, such as the Depart-
ment of Transportation’s Office of the Inspector General either ignored or did 
not follow up on findings. There was a demonstrated tendency towards institu-
tionalised secrecy; it was organisation culture and psychology, rather than the 
innovation that ultimately resulted in the failure. The use of red cell/blue cell, 
if it is implemented and run properly, provides a safe environment in which to 
test and formulate strategies and responses to possible threats.
What are the experiences of other countries, when it comes to change and 
innovation in the IC, with regards to meeting terrorism? British counter-ter-
rorism (known as CONTEST – Counter-Terrorism Strategy) is based upon the 
principals of the Four Ps, according to the Office for Security and Counter-Ter-
rorism (British Home Office) the strategy has four key elements:
• Pursue - to stop terrorist attacks
• Prevent – to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting violent ex-
tremism
• Protect – to strengthen our protection against terror attack
• Prepare – where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact
These four areas of work complement and reinforce each another to reduce 
the terrorist threat to the UK and our overseas interests.104 British strategy in 
combating terrorism relies on a mix of reactive and proactive measures. The 
long experience of fighting terrorism, based on the lessons learned from the 
Northern Ireland experience seem to give an edge over their less experienced 
US counter-parts.
The bombings in the UK on 7 July 2005 caused the policy makers to under-
take a series of reviews of the performance of the UK IC, including the Com-
prehensive Spending Review of 2007 (CSR07 – led to an increase in funding 
available to the Agencies to just under £2 billion by 2010/2011).105 According to 
the Intelligence and Security Annual Report the focus is on the pursue aspect 
of CONTEST.
Structural re-organisation has been undertaken by the UK in order to max-
imise the performance of the IC, through avoiding such issues as stovepiping 
and organisational compartmentalisation. An example of this was the creation 
of the Internet Operations Centre (INOC) in 2008. INOC brings together all of 
the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) computer network 
operations capability into a single team in support of internet-related count-
er-terrorism operations. According to feedback, the result has been a success.106 
104  Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, http://secu-
rity.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/about-the-strategy1/four-ps/index.html, 14 
March, 2010
105  Kim Howells (Chairman), Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2008-
2009, Norwich, The Stationery Office, 2010, p. 4
106  Kim Howells (Chairman), op. cit., p. 8
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There are a number of similarities here with the changes and innovations 
undertaken within the US IC.
One of the initiatives that seem to have gained currency is the creation of 
joint task forces and centres in order to try and erase the institutional barriers 
that would otherwise exist. This is being done in both the United States and the 
United Kingdom. Some of the results of this new thinking and organisational 
structure include: Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), Terrorist Threat Integra-
tion Centre (TTIC - succeeded by NCTC in 2005), Joint Terrorism Analysis 
Centre (JTAC) and the US Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism 
(IICT). Interesting here is that JTAC was first in it´s kind of a real operational 
fusion centre and several years ahead of the US version NCTC became the 
model. The UK model has since also been followed by most other European 
countries like France, Netherlands, Denmark etc.
A recent article appearing in the Washington Post (see footnote 1) gave a 
hint of a new innovative focus in tactics used by the CIA in counter-terror-
ism, but at the same time highlighted some of the ‘old’ thinking that constrains 
the US IC. According to the CIA Director Leon Panetta there would be “more 
co-location of analysts and operators at home and abroad” over the next five 
years, and that the fusion of the two “has been key to victories in counterterror-
ism and counter-proliferation.” Yet simultaneously there was talk of protecting 
the CIA’s turf.107 This demonstrates a certain erosion of the intra-organisational 
walls, in having operators and analysts working together, but shows that the 
inter-organisational walls still very much exist.
3.3. Policy imposed innovations - ID 8 and PIU
In the wake of 9/11 and the Iraqi WMD debacle Congress and Blue Ribbon 
panels called for a broad based reform of the IC. The DNI pushed forward its 
own set of initiatives for a far reaching reform programme. A discussion arose 
about the necessity of creating ‘catalyst’ initiatives in order to be able to meet 
the IC’s daily challenges and demands. DNI Director Hayden addressed his 
workers on the planned changes.
We are going to establish a new venture where our officers will work with 
people from academia, the private sector […] to create new ways of doing 
business. Its mission will be to help us, CIA, tackle our hardest, most-en-
during, and over the horizon challenges […]
We want to encourage real innovation and creativity, so, in essence, we’re 
going to take this structure, and we’re going to liberate it from the mother 
ship […]We are going to let people we’ve assigned to do this explore new 
approaches, new tools, and new relationships.
It will be experimental. It will be directorate-less. It will be fully integrated. 
107  Greg Miller, CIA to station more analysts overseas as part of its strategy, Washing-
ton Post, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/29/AR2010042904355_
pf.html, 30 April 2010
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It will be self-organising. It will be autonomous.
It will design its own IT infrastructure. It will design its own HR manage-
ment framework and other business processes that it needs. They will not 
be required to mimic or to be constrained by long-standing practices here at 
the main campus […]
The idea is to give this venture the freedom to see what works, and to chal-
lenge some of the premises we have back here […] I expect it to make a few 
waves, but its kind of designed to do that.108
A proposal was made by the WMD Commission report in 2005109 to free up 
the access to and flow of information, for which it criticised the US IC. The phi-
losophy behind ID8 (derived from the word ideate – to create ideas) is that it 
operates in a ‘borderless’ open and sharing environment, where ‘real’ solutions 
are sought for ‘real’ problems. It came about as a result of a perceived IC failure, 
and the resulting political pressure to try and minimise the chances of that 
failure occurring again. Therefore this is an attempted form of change that has 
been initiated from beyond the organisational structure of the IC in the United 
States. The idea is that the organisational structure should be small in order for 
it to remain agile and innovative.
A reality since the 1990s is the growing capacity of the private sector, which 
can have more knowledge and expertise on a given issue of national security 
than intelligence agencies. It is an age of “distributed intelligence” rather than 
“centralised intelligence.”110 In an era of diminishing government finances and 
resources there is an increased need to cooperate with services and knowledge 
that are relatively expensive skill sets, which necessitates collaborating with pri-
vate enterprise and academia. As noted by Director Hayden, it is a novel and 
potentially controversial move for the IC (initially due to pre-existing mindsets 
and arguments).
The CIA’s ID8 programme was described by RAND Corporation’s Gregory 
Treverton as being born from a need to create an agile and adaptable organisa-
tion in order to effectively meet the new threats and challenges.
One CIA proposal, unhappily struck with the moniker ID8, would approach 
hard intelligence problems much as my own institution outside the govern-
ment, the RAND Corporation, does: It would first reach to the outsiders in 
academia, think-tanks, and Wall Street. It would work at the unclassified 
level, only classifying work if it absolutely had to.111
Treverton proposes further that organising by problem or mission as 
opposed to information source or analytic agency would bear results (espe-
108  Director Hayden address to the workforce, 2 October 2007
109  To access the unclassified version of this report, please see: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
wmd/index.html.
110  Thomas Quiggin, op. cit., p. 165
111  Gregory Treverton, Intelligence Test, Democracy: A Journal Of Ideas, www.democra-
cyjournal.org, Winter 2009, p. 62
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cially in breaking down barriers between collector and analyst).112 The current 
distinctions and separations that are built in to the current IC structure are 
actually an impediment, rather than an asset. He implies a potentially fruitful 
relationship between the IC and other institutions or spheres not usually asso-
ciating with each other.
Academic outreach is an innovation based upon the various constraints 
imposed upon the state in the contemporary political and economic context. 
In mid-2008 a DNI directive defined the term ‘outreach’ as being “the open, 
overt, and deliberate act of an IC analyst engaging with an individual outside 
the IC to explore ideas and alternative perspectives, gain new insights, generate 
new knowledge, or obtain new information.”113 This is a means to have access to 
specialised services and knowledge without the expense of maintaining them 
as an integral part of the organisation, especially when placed within the con-
text of the ideals of the New Public Management philosophy adopted by some 
governments.
The use of Outreach in the US IC is not a new concept or practice. An 
example of Outreach in the US can be found in the late 1940s, the CIA’s Board 
of National Estimates formed the Princeton Consultants. This was a group of 
distinguished professors who met with the Board in secret at Princeton several 
times in a year in order to draft intelligence estimates.114 Such collaboration 
between the IC and an external partner was rare due to the secretive nature of 
the IC, and demands a great deal of trust in order to be effective.
The final result has not been overly promising though, in spite of a lot of 
promise to begin with, organisational culture within the IC has proved to be the 
biggest obstacle. In the words of Patrick Neary, “ID8 hangs on by a thread.”115 
This fact demonstrates that there is much more work to be done on breaking 
down the rigid boundaries between the different agencies that makes up the IC.
In addition to understanding the theoretical approaches to innovation and 
policy by the academic community, given the nature of this work, it is critical 
to understand this problem from the point of view of bureaucrats and admin-
istrators within the government machinery. A hint at how bureaucrats and 
administrations in the UK addresses the problem of formulating and imple-
menting policy can be found in novel approaches to finding the ‘best’ ways of 
going about this task. In July 2000, the Policy Innovation Unit was established 
by the Northern Irish administration. The role for the Policy Innovation Unit 
(PIU) was described as being:
• improving the administration’s capacity to address strategic, cross-cutting 
112  Ibid.
113  U.S. Intelligence Community Directive 205, “Analytic Outreach”, http://www.dni.gov/
electronic_reading_room/ICD%20205.pdf, 16 July 2008
114  Gregory Treverton, Approaches to “Outreach” for Intelligence, Stockholm, Swedish Na-
tional Defence College, 2009, p. 6
115  Patrick Neary, Intelligence Reform, 2001-2009: Requiescat in Pace?, Studies in Intel-
ligence, Vol. 54, No. 1, March 2010, pp. 1-16, p. 14
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issues;
• promotion of good practice and innovation in the development of policy 
and in the delivery of the administration’s objectives, informed by best prac-
tice elsewhere; and
• the promotion of evidence-based policy making, including the dissemina-
tion of relevant information and research.116
Although this is at the regional level of government, the stated objectives 
give an insight into the larger world of policy making from a bureaucrat’s and 
practitioner’s point of view and approach to policy formulation or imitation. 
From the wording used to describe their function, the PIU seem to approach 
the idea of innovation as being some way of doing something, which currently 
does not exist here. So therefore innovation is not necessarily an idea, tech-
nique or technology that currently does not exist at all, but may be existing and 
just ‘imported’ as a means to solve a policy problem. This may be symptomatic 
of the idea ‘if it works over there then it should work here’ approach, which 
may not necessarily take into account local conditions that may necessitate 
some adaptation of the policy for it to be effective.
3.4. Approaching the new vulnerabilities in the Information Society
Foryst posits seven major characteristics of the US IC that seems to guide 
the result of the final intelligence product and could be constraining creative 
and imaginative thinking. She lists these as being: defensive thinking; stale 
assumptions; reactive posture; constrained imagination; no national strategy; 
constrained perceptions and; failures.117 What she argues for is a “Total US” 
approach to intelligence. The idea is to have the IC working in conjunction with 
each other (between agencies and departments) in order to improve the quality 
and relevance of the final intelligence product, to both the government and the 
wider community.118 A relevant point made by Foryst is the need to be aware of 
one’s own weaknesses and short comings and not only the object of intelligence 
gathering and their intentions and capabilities – sometimes also done within 
the frame of “net assessment”. This is an evolutionary process (as opposed to 
revolutionary process) with the new Homeland Security requirements for the 
IC.
This is in reality also a kind of critique to the first phase of US organizational 
responses to 9/11 with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security 
built on big chokes of other existing agencies with no coherent cultures. DHS 
116  Policy Innovation Unit, Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, 
Northern Ireland Government, http://www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/index/economic-policy/policy-
innovation-unit.htm, 21 July 2009
117  Carole Foryst, Missing from US Intelligence Analysis: The Concept of “Total US”, in 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, Philadelphia, Routledge, Volume 
22, Number 3, Fall 2009, pp. 396-420, pp. 398-400
118  Carole Foryst, op. cit., see especially pp. 415-418
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would probably be ideal to be in charge of “blue” vulnerabilities assessments 
which then should be interfaced with the IC:s “red assessments”.
The United Kingdom has managed to draw upon a wealth of experience in 
dealing with crowd and transport related disasters from the 1980s and 1990s, 
in thinking about the task of CIIP (Critical Information Infrastructure Pro-
tection). These lessons taught that no one single agency has the ability and 
resources to respond effectively to a disaster involving CNI.119 11 September 
2001 in the United States and 7 July 2005 in London, highlight the fact that 
‘conventional’ terrorism still poses a significant risk for society and the govern-
ment. But there have been other events, which demonstrate the emergence of 
a new threat (which was predicted some time ago as a possibility), with attacks 
on Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) in the UK. To illustrate the level 
of the problem there was a news report stated that in 2005, “nearly 300 UK 
government departments and businesses critical to the country’s infrastructure 
were the subject of Trojan horse attacks, many reportedly originating in the Far 
East.”120
An innovation to address this electronic threat was announced when MI5 
hired some 50 hackers that forms part of the newly established and top secret 
Cyber Operations Command. Jonathan Evans, the head of MI5, has made a 
number of public statements regarding the cyber threats faced by the UK. He 
has alleged cyber terrorist threats emanating from China, Pakistan and Russia.
Evans also alleges that messages to terrorists in Belmarsh Prison have been 
intercepted; stated in a report to the Security Minister Lord West that some 
1000 attacks were launched on Whitehall computers in the summer of 2009 
(other targets were air traffic control, power stations and the City of London); 
he sent a confidential memo to some 300 banks and accounting firms warning 
that they were already under attack by Chinese state organisations. Lord West 
has characterised these new government hackers as being “youngsters who use 
their talents to stop other hackers from closing down this country.”121 In this 
particular organisational innovation, human technological knowledge is used 
as a means to help defend the UK’s vulnerable Critical Information Infrastruc-
ture from attack. It also fits with the English saying that the best gamekeeper is 
a former poacher.
The issue of CIIP and Defensive Information Warfare raised a heightened 
interest in 1994-95, but was debated in its early forms in the UK already by 
1990. The developments are unfortunately not that publicly traceable as UK 
sorted these issues much to the domains of its intelligence community. NISCC 
119  Critical Infrastructure Protection and Crisis Management in Britain, IAAC Briefing 
Paper, No. 14, 8 January 2001
120  Fingers Pointed at Chinese Military After Hacking Reports, Sophos, http://www.sophos.
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was in reality a virtual coalition with a small staff of its own and technically 
dependent on the Central Electronic Security Group (CESG) – the information 
assurance branch of the UK signals intelligence agency GCHQ in Cheltenham. 
As NISCC was housed within in the British Security Service (MI5) it seemed 
natural that this organisational part later merged with those within MI5 that 
was responsible for physical protection, to a branch called Centre for Protec-
tion of National Infrastructure (CPNI) some years later. Now it seems that the 
Cyber-Protection parts of MI5 once again been reorganized to the new Opera-
tions Centre in Cheltenham. All of this points to a certain degree of organiza-
tional innovation or at least adaptability within the UK IC.
These changes in the UK reflect a new way of looking and assessing the 
effectiveness of governmental structures. A recent article in the British media 
outlet The Guardian Public showed the new criteria used by the Cabinet Office 
in its capability reviews of government departments (including the GCHQ). 
Those criteria are:
• Innovation;
• Collaboration;
• Value and delivery;
• Results.122
This restructuring and assessment of the UK capability when it comes to the 
Homeland Security/CIIP-affairs seems to fit with the notion of core govern-
ment businesses taking on a more ‘business-like’ approach to their tasks, which 
fits with elements of the NPM approach. It also fits with Stadler’s first principle, 
which is to try and get the best from the existing innovations before inventing 
new ones. These changes in the British and American system fit with what the 
US Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte characterised as being 
“institutional innovation” in 2006. He stated that it shall take time “remaking a 
loose confederation into a unified enterprise.” And that “institutional innova-
tions, most of which are system-wide procedural improvements” are intended 
to “optimise the community’s total performance.”123 It can also be seen as an 
attempt to try and redress the problem of the IC being a ‘Frankenstein’s mon-
ster’ – each part working fine individually, however dysfunctional as a whole.
3.5. Findings
These case studies represent an explanatory study where the main focus of 
the research is on the United States IC, examples from the UK serve to place 
the changes in the US IC into context. The specific context being the US is an 
example of a newly established IC and the UK as an example of an established 
122  Jane Dudman, Cabinet Office Updates its Capability Reviews, www.guardianpublic.
co.uk/capability-reviews/, 16 July 2009
123  Walter Pincus, Negroponte Cites ‘Innovations’ in Integrating Intelligence, The Washing-
ton Post, A07, www.washingtonpost.com, 21 April 2006
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IC. Does this affect, in addition to other factors, the approach to change and 
innovation? One thing that is in common with policy in both the UK and US 
ICs is that there is a tendency to be conservative about change, which is in 
agreement with Stadler’s fourth principle.
The introduction hypothesized that the United States should have the lead 
in innovation, which should be based upon their technological and resource 
base, over their European counterparts. An example of this is certainly demon-
strated by such innovations as In-Q-Tel. However, this is balanced by the 
experience, for example the British in Northern Ireland, which gives them an 
edge in organisational innovation. The Policy Innovation Unit gives an example 
of this kind of innovation, from an organisational sense. This seems to be an 
adaptation based on the more constrained financial resources available in the 
UK, where new technology is expensive and other means are attempted to try 
and get the best out of the existing system.
The general finding from these four cases is thus that while the Americans 
try to build new organizational layers on existing organisations to coordinate 
them, the British tend to build on the existing ones and force them to cooperate 
smother or in a new fashion. The British JTAC was the first real CT-fusion cen-
tre and was based on secondments from existing agencies, while the US NCTC 
was more seen as “a new kid on the block” – similar to DHS mentioned earlier 
– and early became involved in turf fights with other organisational elements 
who had overlapping missions still residing in the existing intelligence and law 
enforcement organisations. The greater amount of financial and technological 
resources available in the US allows the luxury to explore new innovations, 
rather than the British approach of exploiting existing innovations. The US 
when measuring performance, to an extent is still focused upon the issue of 
focusing upon inputs, whereas the UK is much more oriented to outcomes. 
This may be a reflection of the fact that NPM has been a key component of 
public management in the UK for some decades, but has not taken in the US.
This organizational adaptability can also be seen as a counterargument to 
the earlier assumption that the “young” US IC has a lead vs. the “old” European 
ICs when it comes to innovation, i.e. that US innovates and Europe imitates. By 
a ‘young’ US IC this refers to its creation in 1947 as opposed to European ones. 
For example the British IC has been established in a formal sense since 1909, 
but has existed since the times of Queen Elisabeth 1st. There is a link between 
the IC, the Presidential administration and academia in the United States. The 
US system is also guided by key personalities and clearances, and there is also 
movement of people between agencies whereas there are more established rou-
tines and traditions in Europe, and less movement between agencies. Addition-
ally, universities in the UK are more independent than in the US owing to their 
more favourable financial situation.
Reflecting upon the theoretical perspectives of this paper, which of them 
are present in these case studies? There are certainly some elements of the New 
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Public Management philosophy in the process of change and innovation in the 
IC. Although this is not uniform and it is in a number of cases not complete 
(in realising the goals of the policy toward the intended change or innovation). 
One of the greater impediments is the secretive nature of the IC, which means 
making the institutions more publicly accountable through reducing bureau-
cratic control is very problematic. Making the IC a money making enterprise 
has its problems too, especially considering the likely primary customer is the 
government. NPM is useful to a limited extent owing in no small part to the 
fact that the IC is not an open and competitive commercially-oriented environ-
ment. There is still a relative lack of civilian control and public transparency 
owing to the various associated sensitivities.
Having said this, the process of change and innovation through policy, as 
defined by Harrop is a three stage process – initiation, formulation and finally 
implementation. A number of reforms have stumbled through this process, but 
others get ‘stuck’ along the way, such as the ID8 proposal. Metcalfe’s points 
on the challenges facing governments in public policy management have been 
surfacing – the fast pace and type of change faced; and governments operate 
through networks of interdependent organisations (as opposed to independent 
ones in the business world). The IC has faced a very rapidly changing threat 
environment and the changes required to effectively meet these ‘new’ threats 
are massive.
Some techniques and methods have been borrowed from the business world, 
such as Stadler’s Four Principles of Enduring Success, whether this is intentional 
or a logical step is another question. The third and fourth principles are the 
most easily observed within the context of change and innovation within the 
IC. There is often a conservative approach when it comes to the nature and 
magnitude of change and innovation, which is often undertaken in small steps. 
The failures of intelligence in 9/11 and especially with regard to Iraq (weapons 
of mass destruction assertion), have brought about governmental commissions 
and inquiries to explore the root causes.
All of these above are contingent upon organisational learning though. 
These changes and innovations are born from the ability of organisations 
learning from their successes and failures and to initiate formulate and imple-
ment the appropriate policy for the required and intended practical outcome. 
However, the effectiveness policy is tempered by the political process as noted 
by Lovell, where negotiation and bargaining often waters down the original 
proposal.
Hedberg identified three triggers to learning – problems, opportunities and 
people. The cases here illustrate that these three triggers are valid in influenc-
ing change and innovation in the IC. The changing threat environment in the 
post-Cold War period has been a catalyst for making changes and innovations 
in the IC. The asymmetric threats that have emerged require a much quicker 
and accurate response. This has also given rise to opportunities, in this regards 
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OSINT is an opportunity. Making use of non-classified information has a num-
ber of advantages in collection and dissemination. It is much quicker and the 
lack of secrecy enables a more efficient spread. People have also proven to be 
decisive, someone that is prepared to take the risk in instituting innovation and 
change. President Eisenhower in the US in creating the US IC provides one 
example.
4. Conclusion and Summary of Findings
Governments are looking more and more to the business community for inspi-
ration and ideas on how to reform and reshape their way of doing business. 
NPM is one such idea that has gained currency in the Anglo-American world 
of public management. It emphasizes a leaner and more efficient way of doing 
business, where the final product is more important than the inputs. Moving 
on from the broader theory, Stadler moves into the specifics of organisational 
success. One of his four principles stresses the importance of utilising existing 
innovations to their fullest potential.
An observation and conclusion by a group of European researchers on insti-
tutional design in public institutions was that policy is being directed at sur-
vival, but a design that is intended for adaptation. “The best that designers may 
be able to do is to endow an organisation with sufficient flexibility to adapt.”124 
This provides a good explanation as to why changes are often made in small 
and incremental steps.
The UK IC shows a greater tendency towards utilising the philosophy and 
practice of NPM, when it comes to bringing about change and innovation. They 
also try to fine tune and improve existing assets and capabilities, which was 
proposed by Stadler. This seems likely to be a reflection upon the budgetary 
constraints faced by the government. Certainly this contrasts significantly with 
the US IC, which faced significant criticism in the Washington Post article for 
being bloated and inefficient. The US approach to change and innovation in 
this light seems to be instigated through the aid of significant cash injections, 
but the effort is poorly guided and coordinated. A tentative conclusion, which 
requires further investigation, is that governments that are more able and/or 
willing to invest in large budgets tend not to follow NPM than governments 
that are faced with budgetary constraints.
The lessons drawn from organisational learning demonstrate that the policy 
process of bringing about innovation and change is not necessarily a rational 
one, which applies the best remedy to the identified problem or error. It is a 
process that is watered down by bargaining and politics, especially in a sen-
sitive field as intelligence. A number of other factors in the organisation and 
124  Arjen Boin, Sanneke Kuipers & Marco Steenbergen, The Life and Death of Public Or-
ganisations: A Question of Institutional Design?, Governance: An International Journal of Policy, 
Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 23, No. 3, July 2010, pp. 385-410, p. 404
96
the state which it serves also play a part, especially the issue of personnel that 
constitute the IC, together with their interests and biases.
First and foremost in the contemporary world, the IC serves to realise the 
foreign policy interests of the state. Gregory Treverton puts this succinctly 
when he states that the IC is designed to serve American foreign policy. It also 
needs to adapt to a rapidly changing world.125 This means that the IC needs 
to transform in order to meet this changing environment in order to meet its 
objective of supporting foreign policy.
The debate on the reform of the intelligence sector has proven to be some-
what inconclusive to date. This is reflected by Lowenthal’s conclusion about 
intelligence reform. “The intelligence reform debate has an inconclusive aspect, 
which reflects both the difficulty of the issues and choices involved and the 
boundless enthusiasm of reform advocates, particularly those outside the intel-
ligence community”.126 One of the major dilemmas is that certainly improve-
ments in terms of better efficiency and new objectives or goals can be strove for, 
but just how this is achieved in practical terms is more elusive. Changes may 
also have the potential to do more harm than good too.
Therefore innovation offers a relatively good and lower risk means of 
improving the structure and the processes of the IC. These are often initiated 
internally and are intended to meeting a changed threat environment, for 
example. In terms of innovation, it can be used to affect organisational struc-
tures or processes. The opportunities and abilities to innovate are tempered by 
politics, priorities and resources.
One focus of this article has also been looking for similarities and differ-
ences between the United States and Europe. At a glance, one may expect that 
the United Kingdom may fall somewhere in between Europe and the United 
States due to their ‘special relationship’ with the United States. This involves 
understanding political priorities and perception of threat by not only the 
defence and intelligence sectors, but by the political decision-makers as well. 
The US has a tendency to use its advantage in terms of technological and 
resource superiority as a means and basis for innovation in the IC. The Euro-
pean IC, which has been established a lot longer than their younger US coun-
terparts, face an obstacle of having fewer resources and technological innova-
tions at their disposal. Instead there is a focus on organisational innovation that 
has been derived from experience, such as the British experience in Northern 
Ireland.
Overall though, it seems that the US IC have clear prerequisites for a greater 
adaptability and pluralism at large, but where change and innovation unfor-
tunately often seems to end up in a new organizational layer or entity without 
reducing any of the old ones causing coordination and efficiency issues. Some 
125  Gregory Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (RAND 
Studies in Policy Analysis), Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 20
126  Mark Lowenthal, op. cit., p. 311
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of those to US favourable factors/prerequisites here that could be mentioned 
are:
• Lower entry/exit-barriers on the labour market in general (“Hire and Fire”).
• The tradition of “Academic Outreach” which is coupled with a fluidity of sc-
holars moving between universities and think-tanks, the Intelligence Com-
munity and positions within the executive branch.
• Another reason for these lower barriers between the institutions above 
which also could be seen as reinforcing pluralism, is the system of personal 
clearances in US compared to the dominating system of clearances due to 
(a government) “position” within Europe. This means that you could have 
real access while working for an independent think-tank on a government 
sponsored study.
• Wealthy universities and tax-reduction on private economic sponsoring to 
non-profit organisations like think-tanks. Former key officials thus have an 
economic incentive to – maybe just for a while - take up a position outside 
government and still have an impact on government and intelligence as-
sessments. This doesn’t exist in Europe in general where the existence of 
independent think-tanks in this area is a rare phenomenon and the univer-
sities generally are “poor”. UK could here be seen as a possible exemption 
with wealthy universities and thus also with some tradition of “low-key” 
academic outreach as a lot of specialist are residing there. In other European 
countries a scholar could double his/her salary by joining their national In-
telligence Service, which not exactly is promoting pluralism in the sense 
above.
A final word on bringing together the concepts of innovation and organi-
sational learning in terms of the lessons learned and applied through policy is 
the question that further needs to be asked. The question is not about whether 
the innovations or change have improved and reduced the chances of an ‘error’ 
occurring again in the future. There are a lot of compromises that occur along 
the way of the policy process, including political priorities and political com-
promise, and the availability of sufficient resources to realise what is planned.
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Abstract
This paper examines the phenomena of information- and cyber terrorism 
- within the greater framework of “functional terrorism” (means/methods) – 
with definitions, cases, trends etc. The thesis established here is that the trends 
of traditional (kinetic) terrorism and information terrorism will likely merge, 
despite the fact that an information terrorism act has yet to be executed. The 
question in focus is thus not “if ” but “when,” which this paper tries to elaborate 
on. The paper concludes with some remarks on indications and warnings as 
well as on actions and policies that might be taken to counter information- and 
cyber terrorist planning and attacks.
Keywords: Homeland Security, (Defensive) Information Operations, 
Terrorism, Infrastructure Warfare, Information Warfare Techniques, 
Counter-Intelligence
Introduction: Information Terrorism – When And By Whom?
The convergence between terrorism and information operations is a hotly 
debated issue. Even if we haven’t seen such actions executed yet, the imminent 
issue is not “if ” but “when.” When will terrorists move beyond mere physical 
acts of mayhem and destruction towards exploiting our societal vulnerabilities 
in our modern information society in efforts to cause chaos, panic and eco-
nomic paralysis? If this occurs, what is the likely time-scale when an attack will 
take place? Will it occur within one year, five years or within the next decade?
Judging exactly when a terrorist group may suddenly transform and take the 
leap between using cyberspace as a force-multiplier mechanism for enhanced 
command, control, communication and information-gathering purposes into 
an offensive cyber weapon is still relatively unchartered territory. There is cer-
tainly a trend of “known” incidents that seem to suggest that terrorists are mov-
ing in this direction. What is clear is that cyberspace has fundamentally shifted 
the security landscape, both in terms of our capabilities and vulnerabilities as 
increasingly networked societies. This complicates our ability to map calibrated 
threats onto vulnerabilities.
A next line of inquiry is what asymmetric entities among existing terrorist 
organisations might become the first actor to use information weapons or to 
attack the vulnerabilities of modern information society?
This debate is unlikely to be settled soon as different schools of thought 
among the research community hold different arguments and empirical evi-
dence. This paper seeks to illuminate the complexities in understanding a 
potential leap towards convergence and it offers a potential roadmap towards 
necessary measures to bolster investigative and enforcement mechanisms 
within the international community.
Before proceeding to the substance of the paper, it is necessary to focus on 
and clarify definitional aspects to set the parameters of this paper. The focus 
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here is on advanced non-state actors who have both a motivation (and capa-
bility) to strike against National Critical Information Infrastructures. Critical 
Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) is the core of a broader concept 
encompassing Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), which, for the purposes 
of this paper can be further divided into five areas:
• Continuity of government. Defined as the information structure which sup-
ports the national decision-making processes and how it’s communicated 
(television and radio broadcasting structures, etc.)
• The Power Sector
• The Telecom/ISP Sector
• The Financial Systems (mostly in private hands)
• The Air Traffic Control System (within the larger Transportation Sector).
The common denominator for all these aforementioned areas is that an 
attack against these may yield disastrous effects in milliseconds in comparison 
to a biological or chemical agent (the poisoning of a water reservoir), which 
can take hours or days to produce an effect.
Information-/Cyberterrorism – Fact or Fiction?
An underlying rationale for this paper to merge the field of terrorism studies 
within the realm of Information Operations (IO)127 was to fundamentally ques-
tion the relevance of the connection between traditional terrorism and cyber 
terrorism. In many ways one can liken this question to the parallel scholarly 
debate that existed in the 1970s and 80’s attempt to connect the seemingly par-
allel universes of terrorism128 and CBRN weapons. Most academics discounted 
127  Information operations (definition): The integrated employment of the core capabilities 
of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, 
and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, 
disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our 
own. Also called IO. (US DoD JP 3-13)
128  Definitions on terms used by the author specifically for the purpose of this article 
derived from the Pollard/Devost-matrix on page 3.
Information-attack (means)
Attack or manipulating by using infologic, electromagnetic, cognitive or physical means in order to 
achieve a certain purpose.
Information Terrorism*
An act of terrorism conducted through information-attacks.
Cyber Terrorism*
An act of terrorism conducted using infologic means and methods.
*Terrorism is defined in accordance with the EC framework and is normally regarded as activi-
ties related to non-state actors and defined as below.
In order to be labeled acts of terrorism, crimes (such as homicide, manslaughter, kidnapping, sabo-
tage etc.) should meet the following criteria:
1. The act should seriously risk damaging a state or an interstate organization.
2.The purpose with the act should be:
 a) To inflict serious fear among population or sub-population, or
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this possibility on the grounds that most terrorist groups were inherently 
conservative and had a built-in desire for cost-efficiency to rely on the bullet 
and the bomb due to its ready availability, organizational and financial rea-
sons, national contexts and fear due to backlash from their own constituencies 
and states, as well as a lack of scientific expertise necessary to move in this 
direction.
In struggling to control the forces of globalization in an age of al-Qaeda and 
the proliferation of CBRN material, the conventional wisdom among security 
officials and academics has been to question when rather than if transnational 
terrorists will strike against a major western capital with the ultimate ”weapon 
of mass disruption.”
As CT expert Dr. Neal Pollard points out in an interview, both CBRN and 
Cyber/Electromagnetic-dimensions offer technological opportunities for 
terrorists to increase their capability, given such groups overcome technical 
hurdles and intent converges with capability.  However, the pursuit of CBRN 
provides groups with additional risks and opportunities for interdiction by CT 
efforts, as cyber is pursued as both a tool and a weapon.  In addition, increased 
effectiveness allows groups to deny opportunities for interdiction.129
The revolution in information technologies has opened up almost infinite 
constellations of possibilities in connecting the realm of post-modern terrorism 
with cyber terrorism.130 In understanding the parameters of this scenario it is 
useful to divide the many components of information/cyber terrorism into a 
critical infrastructure threat matrix131 to underscore the spectrum of combina-
tions possible in attack mode and targeting on the physical or digital levels.
This critical infrastructure matrix illustrates that an attack could assume the 
form of either cyber terrorism, information terrorism or an information attack. 
In terms of definition, information attack (as a means) denotes “an attack or 
manipulation by using infologic, electromagnetic, cognitive or physical means 
in order to achieve a certain purpose.” Conversely, information terrorism is 
defined as “an act of terrorism conducted through information-attacks” and 
cyber terrorism denotes “an act of terrorism conducted using infologic means 
and methods.” As such, in this typology the wider term information terrorism 
includes multiple components and combination such as electronic warfare, 
kinetic attack, denial and deception, pure computer network attack, and the use 
 b) To blackmail public or interstate organizations to commit or not to commit to a cer-
tain behavior,
 c) Seriously destabilize or destroy the critical political, constitutional, economic or social 
structures within a state or within an interstate actor.
129  Interview with Neal Pollard (JD), adjunct professor at Georgetown University, on 
September 11, 2007
130  See: John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Information-Age Terrorism”, 
Current History, April 2000: pp.179-185.
131  Matt Devost and Neal Pollard, Terrorism Research Center, McLean, Va., originally 
developed this framework.
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of more exotic technologies such as directed energy weapons or electromag-
netic pulse weapons.
In regard to this threat matrix, the question remains - Is there a credible 
or even likely connection between terrorism and information/cyber terrorism 
beyond the vulnerability of our critical infrastructure? A major study in 1999 
by the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (CSTIW) at the 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, entitled Cyberterror: Pros-
pects and Implications, concluded that the technological barriers were too high 
and that “terrorists lacked the human capital needed to mount a meaningful 
operation.”132 Other studies have similarly concluded that cyber terrorism is 
unlikely to be a future threat and not an immediate issue. These assessments 
may have been realistic at the time, but suffered from methodological weak-
nesses as to the selection of the groups and understanding of the changing 
nature of terrorism itself.133
132  Dorothy E. Denning, “Is Cyber Terror Next?” Social Science Research Council/After 
Sept.11
133  In fairness to the Naval Postgraduate School, whose CSTIW scholars and academic 
work regularly provides the direction of cutting-edge research often many years ahead of others 
on a multitude of issues, the conference participants recognized the limitations of the study due 
to the limited sample of groups included. See: David Tucker, “The Future of Armed Resistance: 
Cyberterrorism? Mass Destruction”, Final Report on a Conference Held May 15-17, 2000 At The 
University Pantheon-Assas (Paris II).
Physical Digital
Target
Tool
Physical
Digital
(a) Conventional Terrorism
(Oklahoma City Bombing)
(b)  IRA attack on London 
Power Grids, July 1996
(c)  Spoof Air Traffic 
Control to crash plane.
(d)  “Pure” Information 
Terrorism (Trojan horse in 
public switched network)
Infrastructure Threat
Matrix
Cell (d) the most difficult to detect and counter
Critical Infrastructure Threat 
Matrix          
Source: Pollard/Devost, Terrorism Research Center 1999
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Understanding the transformation of possibility into reality in the cyber ter-
rorism realm requires an in-depth understanding of the relationship between 
motivation and capability. This convergence has been complicated not only by 
the phenomenon of al-Qaeda itself and the next generation of terrorists with 
new digital expertise and weapons, but also the fuzzy boundaries between 
crime and terrorism and the availability of free-lance advanced hacking and 
computer expertise. There are four principal examples that point towards a 
trend of increased convergence - though yet far from fully developed - between 
terrorism and information/cyber terrorism:
First, the Provisional Republican Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland planned 
in July of 1996 to blow up six electric switching stations (pumping stations and 
gas plants outside the London security “ring of steel”) as part of their Mainland 
terrorist campaign. In this foiled plot, the six-member cell had 37 explosive 
devices under construction, which would have caused serious cascading effects 
by disrupting the power supply of London for an extended period of time.134 
Furthermore, this had been preceded by a sustained PIRA campaign to use 
hoax calls to disrupt infrastructure services.
However, this incident is far from unique, as other terrorists have long tar-
geted key components in the critical infrastructure elsewhere. In fact, the U.S. 
Department of Energy estimated in 1997 that saboteurs worldwide attacked 
over 20 000 electric power targets over the past ten years.135 A majority of these 
incidents were not terrorist-related, though some were major terrorist/insur-
gent groups who have specialized in disrupting electricity pylons and substa-
tions as well as oil pipelines.
In March of 2000, a second major incident implicated Aum Shinrikyo when 
Japanese police discovered that software used to track 150 police vehicles had 
been developed by the cult and that they were in possession of classified track-
ing data on 115 police vehicles. Furthermore, the Aum cult (now renamed 
Aleph) owned computer software development companies that had developed 
software for at least 190 Japanese firms and 10 government agencies providing 
210 different types of software systems.136 Aum was so embedded that a mem-
ber was involved in the development of the key command and control system 
of the Maritime Self-Defence Force – a system controlling information on the 
movements of warships and aircraft.137
A major fear spread that the Aum cult placed malicious codes into its soft-
ware to allow remote access to facilitate attacks. Even a declassified CIA docu-
ment submitted to a special Senate hearing in April 2002 identified the cult as 
134  See: Patricia Irwin, “How deregulation increases network vulnerability”, Electrical 
World, October 1997.
135  Ibid.
136  “Defense Agency orders software-makers to be ID’d”, Mainichi Daily News, May 16, 
2000.
137  “Cultist worked on MSDF system”, Asahi News Service, April 14, 2000.
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having the potential to mount a cyber terrorist attack on the United States.138 
These cyber capabilities were compounded by the fact that software develop-
ers of Aum had siphoned off information about Japan’s nuclear programme, 
including nuclear fuel suppliers, research and transportation of nuclear mate-
rials while they had compiled an extensively detailed personnel information 
database of 75 researchers dealing with nuclear matters.139
These AUM-affiliated computer firms also earned the cult around $65 mil-
lion per year through the sale of computers.140 Even software, based on a game 
teaching math was developed and designed to attract high school students to 
the cult’s apocalyptic theories about the end of the world.141
A third example is related to al-Qaeda’s expertise in the cyber-domain both 
as an advanced intelligence tool and even displaying hacking expertise in terms 
of distance reconnaissance of critical infrastructure targets. As demonstrated 
by Dr. Magnus Ranstorp,142 the matrix of Islamist fanatics underneath al-Qae-
da’s umbrella was extremely well versed in computer skills to enhance their 
C3I-capabilities.
Al-Qaeda also used Information Technology offensively. In a small al-Qaeda 
notebook found in a Mujaheedin training camp in Afghanistan in December 
2001, an al-Qaeda reconnaissance team outlined their ability to retrieve a U.S. 
diplomat’s movements by breaking into his e-mail account and retrieving his 
bank statements. In addition, al-Qaeda has also displayed an interest in carry-
ing out reconnaissance on critical Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) systems inside the United States. This advanced cyber capability is 
expected not to diminish as the private sector has identified Pakistan, Iran, 
Egypt, and Indonesia (bordering Russia and China) as virtual hotbeds of infor-
mation warfare and hacking talent.143
A fourth (and by no means final) example of increased terrorist interest in 
offensive cyber capabilities relates to the report issued by the Russian Federal 
Security Service (FSB) alleging that the Chechen field commander Khattab had 
a cell that specialised in efforts to hack into the computer systems of 10 major 
European banks towards the end of 2001. In this detailed plot, Khattab’s cell 
sent out a skilfully forged commercial offer via e-mail from the Bank of Ireland 
138  “CIA said Japan’s AUM cult poses cyberterror threat”, Japan Economic Newswire, Oc-
tober 29, 2002.
139  “Cult Siphoned Nuclear Data”, Asahi News Service, March 29, 2000.
140  Calvin Sims, “Japan Software Supplier Linked to Sect”, The New York Times, March 2, 
2000.
141  “AUM computer firm used games software to lure new followers”, Mainichi Daily 
News, April 25, 1995.
142  Magnus Ranstorp, “The Virtual Sanctuary of al-Qaeda and terrorism in an age of glo-
balization”, in Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello, International Relations and Security in 
the Digital Age (Routledge, 2006).
143  See: David Rennie, “U.S. warns of cyberwar threat to security”, The Daily Telegraph, 
August 23, 2002.
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with a highly advanced “Trojan horse” (Back Orifice). The complexity of the 
concealment was unique with “a triple-layer pseudopolymorphic shell.”144
These converging trends in the direction of advanced hacking or cyber ter-
rorism seem to indicate that these groups are more advanced than generally 
recognised and fall in between the capability categories of advanced-structured 
and complex-coordinated, developed by the Naval Postgraduate School’s 1999 
study on the prospects of terrorist organisations pursuing cyber terrorism.145 
This and other studies have not taken into account the potential for GPS-
guided explosives146 or even more exotic technologies harnessed by terrorists 
such as High-Energy-Radio-Frequency (HERF), Transient Electromagnetic 
Devices (TEDs) and Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons (suitcase type, 
“can-bombs” etc.) or the even more sophisticated Directed Energy Weapons 
(DEW). If, for example, an Airbus could be made to crash over Schipol airport 
by terrorists through a DEW/EMP-attack and be filmed by a TV-camera – or a 
cellular camera - it would naturally produce a 9/11-effect with dramatic human 
and societal consequences.
Some critics may argue that this scenario represents a distant future and 
improbable threat. And they may be right. However, any such probability 
assessment must be balanced against the availability of this type of technol-
ogy for sale on the underground market place. The Swedish Defence Research 
Agency (FOI) discovered in 1998, a Russian suitcase bomb emitting short, 
high-energy microwaves. It was developed by a Russian Technical Institute and 
was for sale for $100.000 to any interested buyers.147
Similarly, TEDs can be built on a very low budget in a matter of weeks by 
someone with an electrical engineering background and, if hooked up to sat-
ellite-dish television antennas, be operated out of a minivan or a house. This 
methodology would reduce logistical footprints and could hypothetically bring 
down an airplane and damage different sectors of IT-dependent information 
systems.148 Even a failed attempt, if disclosed in public could produce highly 
damaging psychological cascading effects.
These scenarios become even more menacing when one considers that 
EMP or Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) are part and parcel of the security 
threat matrix in NATO intelligence briefings, though it is unknown whether 
the terrorists would possess the technical expertise to launch such an attack. 
144  “Chechen rebels trying to hack into European bank accounts”, Izvestiya, September 18, 
2002.
145  For further discussion of these categories, see: Dorothy Denning, Cyberwarriors: Ac-
tivists and terrorists turn to cyberspace, Harvard International Review, Summer 2001, Vol. 23, 
No. 2; Pg. 70-75
146  In 1995, Dr. Magnus Ranstorp teamed up with two other academic colleagues with 
physics background and developed a study in two weeks on the potential for GPS-guided ter-
rorist weapons. This study was never published for security reasons and on the advice from 
military officials.
147  See: Svenska Dagbladet, January 23, 1998.
148  James P. Lucier, “E-Zapper could break the bank”, Insight on the News, May 25, 1998.
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It is expected that any deployment of EMP would occur in conjunction with a 
kinetic attack.
Perhaps this worst-case catastrophic scenario will hopefully never develop 
nor materialize in the near future. But consider the ease to which it is possible 
to harness a wealth of publicly available open-source information in cyberspace 
that exposes vulnerabilities in any state’s critical infrastructure protection. A 
prominent case in hand of the power of open-source intelligence is Sean Gor-
man’s PhD research at George Mason University that single-handedly mapped 
out America’s fibre-optic system and the layered connections to every business 
and industrial sector of the economy. In Gorman’s case, Richard Clarke, the 
White House cyber terrorism chief, underscored the national security concerns 
by advising that “he should turn it in to his professor, get his grade – and then 
they should burn it.” 149
For terrorists, cyberspace has emerged as a force-multiplier in intelligence 
gathering and target-acquisition from afar. Equally, the availability of com-
mercial imaging satellite products to global citizens illustrates the changing 
dimensions of information and security, enabling terrorist groups to have a 
global intelligence capability – even from space.150 The critical ingredient both 
for the intelligence analysts and the terrorists is not to gather information in 
today’s networked society and increasingly borderless world, but to transform 
it into a weapon of knowledge. As such, mapping and assessing this process of 
transforming information into knowledge, inside the inner vortex of a terrorist 
group’s compartmentalized decision-making process is more difficult than ever, 
especially with the potential to harness cyberspace as an offensive weapon.
It goes far beyond categorizing terrorist groups into simply following the 
principle of “the path of least resistance,” especially when considering the 
amplifying effects of cyber-attacks in conjunction with a kinetic attack. Just as 
the bomb designer is more critical for a terrorist group than a bomb maker, it is 
necessary to contemplate the almost infinite recruitment possibilities of terror-
ists of IT specialists through moles inside corporate and government organiza-
tions, free-lance politicized hackers, or even state-sponsored cyber terrorism.151
The blurring boundaries between terrorism (politically/religiously moti-
vated) and crime (economically motivated), both ordinary and organized 
across the globe make this scenario even more probable and difficult to detect 
and control, especially as cyberspace affords a high degree of anonymity for 
both criminals and terrorists.152 How does one detect the identity of a cyber-at-
tack at the other end and how does one respond in real-time if the cyber intru-
sion is routed through multiple countries?
149  For details, see: “The cybercommando”, Vancouver Sun, July 19, 2003.
150  “Private eyes in the sky”, The Economist, May 6, 2000.
151  See: Eric D. Shaw, “A Limit to Cyberrteror”, Information Security, September 2002.
152  According to Mi2g, Brazil tops the list of countries with hackers and criminals in the 
cybersphere, see: Tony Smith, “Cybercrime’s superlab: Brazil”, International Herald Tribune, Oc-
tober 29, 2003.
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This potential situation is even more complex when one considers that the 
distinction between military and civilian targets will blur in future conflicts, 
especially as the latter civilian commercial entities are extremely reluctant to 
report any intrusions and attacks due to negative effects on consumer confi-
dence and potential economic losses. The cost of losses from and protection 
against these threats are staggering in scale and scope.
The worldwide collective economic damage from overt and covert digital 
attacks during 2006 is estimated at $52 billion.153 The rising transnational con-
nections between digital “warriors” and their rising sophistication in attack 
mode, have contributed to CEO’s and board-makers within S&P500 and FTSE-
100 companies seriously contemplating insurance against a $100 billion global 
cyber catastrophe.154
Here one could ask if companies are doing enough, and in particular if the 
insurance industry is paying enough attention to the risks involved. The insur-
ance industry could be the key to foster a better due diligence culture within 
the whole private sector. Especially in Europe, the insurance companies remain 
very conservative and reactive - they do not bother “as it has not happened yet.”
The issue of increased vulnerability of critical infrastructure from the poten-
tial consequences of a revolution in information technology is not a new one. 
Back in 1997, the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) simulated a terrorist 
attack with 35 terrorists, who managed to hack into “Department of Defense 
networks, ‘turn-off ’ sections of the power grid, ’shut down’ parts of the 911 
emergency service.”155
In more recent times, an array of simulation exercises such as DPH (Digital 
Pearl Harbor) by the U.S. Naval War College; SECTOR5 (Summit Exploring 
Cyber Terrorism); and a host of other national and international forums have 
underscored our inherent collective vulnerabilities. More recently in the post 
9/11 environment, security officials worry about the change in discourse within 
al-Qaeda’s leadership, emphasizing the intent to cause massive financial disrup-
tion over the desire to cause human casualties.156
Most terrorist groups today have long seized on the opportunities accorded 
by the information revolution through an established multiple web presence. 
This is especially true as they have gained access to a platform for uncensored 
propaganda for skilful perception management. IT is an ideal auxiliary recruit-
ment tool for reaching out to an infinite audience and talent pool of potential 
recruits and as a new form of auxiliary fundraising.157 Some of these terrorist 
153  CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, Computer Security Institute 2006
154  See press release at Mi2g website at www.mi2g.com.
155  Dickon Ross, “Electronic Pearl Harbour: Should we be more worried about terrorists 
using digital weapons rather than chemical and biological attacks.” The Guardian, February 20, 
2003.
156  Dan Verton, “Experts: Don’t dismiss cyberattack warning”, Computerworld, November 
18, 2002.
157  Among the best sources for the modalities of terrorists’ use of cyberspace is the col-
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groups have been engaged in quite advanced forms of ”e-jihad” against their 
enemies, providing a virtual dimension to their fighting on the ground. What 
is much less obvious in many cases is hard evidence of how far down the road 
they have gone in seriously investigating the potential use of cyber space as an 
offensive instrument.
One underpinning overall assumption in this context is that terrorists 
groups and qualified non-state actors such as al-Qaeda are moving up the 
ladder of the “learning curve.” Mortar techniques proliferated from PIRA in 
Ireland to the FARC guerrilla in 2001, due to a “mobile training team,” which 
quite soon resulted in raising the effectiveness of FARC attacks against the 
Colombian troops158. Another more recent example is the spreading of IED 
techniques from the insurgency in Iraq to Afghanistan and other locations. The 
Internet is further enhancing the speed of the terrorists’ destructive knowledge.
Thus, it is not from a “mathematic-logic” standpoint inevitable that infor-
mation terrorism as described will occur. However it does not seem like an 
unnatural path for qualified non-state actors to move in this direction in the 
future. Consequently, the combination of these factors means that nations can-
not afford to ignore these developments.
Conclusion
What To Do? – Some Recommendations
If these concerns described earlier are not to be dismissed, what can govern-
ments and the international community do to counter this spectrum of threats? 
It seems also that the one-year timeframe for executing information terrorism 
seems more likely than the ten-year view according to the previous discussion. 
Hence, according to the author’s view there are three issues that need attention:
Whose laws apply?
On January 19, 1999, the website of the East Timor-movement (the ”.tp”-do-
main) based on a server in the Irish Republic was “shot down” with a DDOS-at-
tack.159 The host of the server, Connect Ireland, suspected the Indonesian State 
Intelligence Service and filed a lawsuit against the Indonesian government. It is 
unclear who was responsible as it later “faded away” and no action was taken or 
reported. A principal problem underscored with this example is what kind of 
law applies in this situation? Is it the Irish law as it concerns the integrity of the 
Republic? Or is it a civil law case and “a matter of “due diligence.” If this attack 
was routed through other countries and violated their cyberspace, what are the 
legal consequences or have they not yet been anticipated?
lection of essays in Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (eds.), Terrorism and Counterterro-
rism: Understanding the new Security Environment (McGraw Hill, 2004).
158  http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/208552.pdf , R. Kim Cragin ... [et al.] “Sha-
ring the dragon’s teeth: terrorist groups and the exchange of new technologies” MG-485, RAND 
Corporation, 2007, p. 84
159  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/263169.stm
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If an attack is politically motivated on the sender’s side it will still probably 
appear as a criminal act at the receiver’s end. Thus, there is generally a wide 
gap between the intent behind the act and the laws to counter those acts on the 
other end. i. e. the laws not updated for this kind of sovereignty breaches in the 
Information Age.
Need for regimes and Rules of Engagement (ROE) for Law Enforcement 
Agencies to be able to trace back in near real-time.
One issue on the defensive side of international co-operation is the need for 
improving the possibilities of making “trace-backs” in near real-time. If an 
attack on a Swedish information system originates in another country, it would 
take several days for the subject of the attack, e.g. a telecom operator, to learn 
more about the whereabouts of the perpetrator. They would have to contact the 
Swedish police, who in turn would make contact with the police in the coun-
try from which the attack had come and request assistance from the telecom 
operators concerned in that country. Therefore, it is important for Sweden to 
provide active support for international agreements and regulations designed 
to facilitate rapid tracing across national borders. In the latter case, the rele-
vant G-8 committee has produced recommendations in this direction with the 
endorsement of the Council of Europe.
At the 53rd meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in December 
1998, a resolution (UNGA 53/70) proposed by Russia was – after some modi-
fications from US and other countries - unanimously adopted to the effect that 
the threat to civil information systems, for example from terrorists and crimi-
nal groups, should be heeded by the international community and cross-border 
measures should be implemented. In the continuing discussion on this topic 
prior to following year’s General Assembly, the need for bilateral as well as mul-
tilateral (UN, Interpol) contacts emerged.
There is a proposal called the “Stanford Treaty” which appeared in the year 
2000 from the former legal adviser to the Reagan administration, Abraham 
Sofaer from Stanford University and Sy Goodman from Georgia Tech160, which 
made a reference to the hijacking problem within the airline industry in the 
1970s. The way to reduce the scale and scope of this problem was through a 
UN-resolution, which created a universal treaty, and every state that wanted 
an international carrier to land on their airports had to comply with the new 
safety and security procedures regulated in this treaty. To implement and audit 
this scheme a small “watchdog,” the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO), was set up under a UN mandate, and the problem was drastically 
reduced over time. Could a parallel procedure or body be established for over-
sight of cyberspace violations?
160  Abraham D. Sofaer and Seymor E.Goodman: A proposal for an International Con-
vention on Cyber Crime and Terrorism, Center for international Security and Cooperation, 
Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, August 2000.
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The Stanford Treaty advocates a similar kind of treaty with an oversight 
body to create a universal mandate (UN or the International Telecom Union in 
Geneva) as the more security related closed relationship between certain coun-
tries (“five-eyes” etc.) do not have the necessary outreach to all 192-plus coun-
tries. The international community has to deny “safe havens” for rogue actors 
everywhere. If some countries, in for example the sub-Saharan region, do not 
have the available means on their own to have enough Information Assurance 
in the Telecom/ISP networks, maybe the World Bank or the International Mon-
etary Fund could support them to raise the security bar. With such a treaty 
combined with an oversight body, it might be possible to start discussions on 
Rules of Engagement for near real time trace backs in other states’ telespace. 
This would be a real enhancement of “collective security” in cyberspace.
Better watch-systems and CT-approach
In an insightful and comprehensive White Paper from Naval Postgraduate 
School in October 1999 some military students under supervision of Dr. John 
Arquilla analysed in depth the means, motives and probabilities for different 
terrorist organisations to be successful in going the cyber terrorism path161. 
Here was also a list of different activities that could serves as Early Warning 
indicators for the IC and CT-authorities. What needs to be added here is the 
dimension of Electro Magnetic Weapons. A need to watch for “trial and terror” 
patterns on training with digital or electro-magnetic weapons, or reconnais-
sance actions by terrorist suspects against air traffic control systems, or other 
vital national information infrastructures should be carefully logged. Any pro-
liferation noted of Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) techniques should also 
immediately raise concerns.
161  US Naval Postgraduate School, White Paper, Center for Irregular Warfare and Ter-
rorism, “Cyberterror: Prospects and Implications”, Monterey, Ca., October 1999; p. 114-115
111
Article 4
The Trojan Horse in the 
Information Age
First published 2006 in
COUNTERING TERRORISM AND WMD
by Routledge162
(Ed. Peter Katona, John P Sullivan, Michael D Intriligator)
162  This text was to a large extent previously published in Axess no 5, 2002.
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When the husband and wife futurologists Alvin and Heidi Toffler described 
the conflicts in the Third Wave – the Information Age – in War and AntiWar 
(1993) they argued that while the aims of a war or military campaign had not 
changed, the method of waging it had. A new form of warfare – Information 
Warfare – with a whole new doctrine had seen the light of day.
This change can be described in a simplified way as the difference between 
the theory of the nineteenth-century German strategist Clausewitz (that “war is 
merely a continuation of politics with different means”, and that, consequently, 
war and peace are two clearly distinguishable conditions), and the theory of the 
Chinese strategist Sun Tzu (500 BC that “the highest art of war is not to win a 
battle but to win without battle”).
In the latter case, the boundaries between peace, crisis and war are dis-
solved. It is a matter of retaining “the monopoly on formulating the problem”, 
of getting one’s adversary to behave as one wishes, perhaps primarily by influ-
encing his will, but if this fails one must also be able to threaten and meet his 
objective capacity in a credible way.
What, then, are information operations and information warfare? In 1998 
in the United States, the original concept of information warfare (IW) was 
given the new designation of information operations (IO), primarily because 
the private sector and civil authorities did not want to talk about warfare in 
peacetime. IW was then given the more limited meaning as “information oper-
ations during crisis and war” and primarily within a military framework. Like 
NATO, Sweden has adopted this change; the most semi-official definition can 
be found in the Swedish government’s information technology bill of March 
2000 (1999/2000:86, p. 36):
Information operations are combined and coordinated measures in peace, 
crisis and war to support political or military goals by influencing or ex-
ploiting the information and information systems of the adversary or other 
foreign player. This can occur by using one’s own information and informa-
tion systems while these assets must also be protected. An important ele-
ment is the attempt to influence decision-making processes and decision-
making.
There are both offensive and defensive information operations. These are 
carried out in political, economic and military contexts. Examples of infor-
mation operations include information warfare, mass-media manipulation, 
psychological warfare and intelligence operations.
Defensive information operations are coordinated and integrated measures 
in times of peace, crisis and war as regards policy, operations, personnel and 
technology to protect and defend information, information systems and the 
ability to make rational decisions.
Other closely related concepts are also used to describe partial methods of 
information operations. “Overarching information security” – also including 
policy, organisation etc. - is the IT-based defensive component and is collec-
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tively termed Information Assurance (IA). Perception Management is the cog-
nitive form of exerting an influence, with psychological operations (“PSYOPS”) 
as its most organised sub-category. In the context of civil preparedness, there 
is much talk of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). Within the Swedish 
Armed Forces, the current reorganisation into a network-based defence (NBD) 
represents a new way of leading military units in which information can be 
converted into armed response, almost in real time. (
The most spectacular sub-category of information operations is offensive 
computer network attacks (CNA) in which info logic weapons such as com-
puter viruses, Trojan horses, logical bombs and denial-of-service attacks 
attempt to attack specific information systems. Likewise, electromagnetic pulse 
(EMP) and high power microwave (HPM) weapons – for instance hidden in 
a briefcase – can without smoke, sound, light or smell, knock out or (at close 
range) even melt the electronics in vital information systems.
•
The effect, which such attacks could have on such targets as financial systems, 
has led official Russian representatives to draw comparisons with nuclear 
war and demands from nations, such as the US, that these systems should be 
included in arms control. The use of military computer network attacks should 
also require the same high decision-making level as the use of nuclear weapons. 
The comparison with nuclear war, however, falters in one important respect; 
since nuclear war was “threshold raising” in that both superpowers had a 
mutual, destructive second-strike capacity – the so-called balance of terror.
Today, when the “enemy” exists not only in one direction and conflicts are 
more multifaceted, with military, economic and religious elements, the ano-
nymity involved in computer network attacks becomes “threshold lowering”. 
How can a state retaliate if it cannot clearly identify the sender?  On the other 
hand, what might someone be capable of doing, even against one’s best friend, 
if there was no risk of discovery?
The other “sensitive” extreme in the spectrum of information operations is 
psychological operations with media manipulation and perception attacks. In 
the Western society with its strong media institutions it is almost anathema to 
assert that states should in some way use these methods other than at a rela-
tively low military level.
The fact that Sweden’s total defence approach provides this country with an 
agency, which in peacetime makes plans for psychological defence – though 
only in the event of crisis and war – arouses a delight mingled with terror 
among the defence planners of other nations. In the US, CNN and other insti-
tutions would start talking about a “Big Brother” society if the media there felt 
themselves likely to be influenced by a similar institution in any formal sense.
A proposal last autumn (2001) to create a special authority within the Penta-
gon to shape the strategic media image also had to be withdrawn after a media 
backlash. At the same time, the technical possibilities of virtual image manip-
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ulation (morphing) are almost unlimited, something, which can be seen in the 
Hollywood, films Forrest Gump and Wag the Dog. Since “seeing is believing”, 
this can be a very effective weapon. The TV pictures showing hostages being 
executed in Iraq is also a very powerful message. The increased role of PR agen-
cies in creating public sentiment, above all in third-party countries, in favour 
of one side of a conflict, by such methods as planting video sequences in news 
programmes was manifested at the start of the conflict in Bosnia. Representa-
tives of the Serbs in Bosnia employed the Saatchi & Saatchi agency, while the 
Muslim side had their own PR firm. If in a corresponding way (for example 
during a crisis situation in the Middle East) a morphed video sequence were to 
be shown in which Israeli units were apparently bombing and burning down 
Mecca, this could have instant and irreversible effects on events before there 
would be time to make any denials.
A BBC Panorama programme, aired on April Fools’ Day in 1963, purported 
to show the “spaghetti harvest” in Italy.  The scenes of elderly Italian ladies 
sweeping soggy spaghetti into wicker baskets might have been faintly ridicu-
lous but many people were convinced!
Particularly in peacetime, perception management and psychological oper-
ations are, like the intelligence services, “an extremely forbidden necessity” for 
the strategist who wishes to succeed. The line drawn between these methods 
and general diplomacy and politics can become blurred, as can the same line 
drawn vis-à-vis economic contexts, in which false press releases, the spreading 
of rumours, etc. can have a manipulated speculative effect on stock markets. 
This fact means that it is as important to be aware of, and have the means to 
discover and check, the sources of such information as it is to have hacker-de-
tection systems and firewalls in computer networks.
•
To sum up, information operations are characterised by the fact that there are 
no demarcation lines regarding their use in the scale of conflict made up by 
peace, crisis and war. These operations can be implemented in political, eco-
nomic and military contexts. There is always a strategic purpose even if imple-
mented at a low level within an organisation. This means that an information 
operation must have the support of, and be synchronised at, the highest pos-
sible level: for a state at the highest security policy level, and for a company in 
the CEO’s immediate circles. We cannot make a distinction between offensive 
and defensive expertise and capability: if you have one, then you have the other. 
The weapons can be cognitive, infologic, electromagnetic and kinetic; it is the 
purpose that is the decisive factor.
The asymmetry which characterises terrorism – it is no longer merely states 
which threaten states but also separate individuals/groups (e.g. bin Laden vs. 
the US) – is even more obvious in the field of information operations, since a 
single individual can theoretically cause serious IT attacks which affect import-
ant societal infrastructures. The media’s role and what is known as “the CNN 
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effect” reinforce this asymmetrical element. How much was the effect of the 
events of September 11th magnified by the fact that we could from early on 
and repeatedly with our own eyes follow the course of events and see the planes 
explode into the two towers of the World Trade Center? Would it have been 
equally traumatic if we had only heard about the event?
In the light of this, a crucial question has been how we can define the civ-
il-military relationship in order to map out the relationships of responsibility 
within the civil services of different countries. One first important decision for 
the majority of defence forces in the mid-1990s was to define what was then 
called information warfare as either an operational- or an intelligence-oriented 
matter.
The Swedish armed forces, like the US and Germany, chose to regard this as 
an operational matter, i.e. as a weapons system, which a nation should be able 
to use in the same way as, for example, tanks and an air force to protect the 
country and ensure its survival. Others, including France and the UK, regarded 
the issue more as an intelligence matter. Consequently, completely different 
systems came to govern developments and influence what could be openly dis-
cussed. This has contributed to the fact that the EU has difficulty in addressing 
these issues. Even within NATO the discussion is limited because of differing 
national agendas.
•
To put it simply, based upon what the Swedish authorities have already pub-
lished, we can talk about the following four dimensions of information warfare:
Defensive information warfare (IW-D), in which primarily the armed 
forces adopt measures even in peacetime to protect their own systems in the 
event of crisis and war. All countries talk about this.
Offensive information warfare (IW-O), in which the armed forces during 
crisis and war must have knowledge of such methods to uphold the nation’s 
sovereignty and survival. Only a few nations have spoken openly about this: the 
US, Germany and Switzerland.
Defensive information operations (IO-D) can be regarded as a “total 
defence in cyberspace”. Since this can also occur in peacetime, as well as in 
times of crisis and war, it is an issue for the national  authorities in which 
the armed forces can only play a supporting role. It is perhaps only Switzer-
land and, in some cases, the US – though not when it comes to psychological 
defence – who openly declare their ambitions in this field.
Offensive information operations (IO-O) represent the most sensitive of 
these four dimensions and for which state authorities are unwilling to comment 
publicly since these are best classified as skilled intelligence operations.
Since the threat against national infrastructures has nevertheless been 
observed in all nations, particularly after September 11th, the term Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) has become the concept which most closely 
corresponds to IO-D, and which is used to denote protection against this kind 
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of civilian threat. In recent years most Western nations have seen the construc-
tion of new cross-sectoral management structures to better handle the neces-
sary cross-sectoral problems.
Thanks to the legacy of its “total defence system”, Sweden has an advan-
tage that has not been fully exploited. This concept demands a highly holistic 
approach in the preparedness of both civil and military organisations in Swe-
den as the only way in which a small country might have any real opportunity 
of withstanding an attack from a much more powerful adversary.. In addition 
to military defence, the system encompasses an integrated defence against 
economic, psychological, security and infrastructural threats. Even in peace-
time, the different sectors of society, both government and private, have been 
required to look towards this overall defence goal.
The problem with this model is that it is not intended to operate during 
peacetime and only come into effect in the event of national crisis or war.  We 
are now faced with potential attacks which can occur at any time, and most 
likely in times of peace. This leaves room for conflicts of expertise (and inter-
ests) between different sectors – a situation which paralyses and delays objec-
tivity and the necessary organisational, structural and operational changes. 
Sweden is still investing approximately SEK 40 billion in military defence, with-
out knowing if we can, or are allowed to use such vital resources for peacetime 
non-military threats. It is imperative that we do not “throw the baby out with 
the bath-water”, but rather try to retain the holistic approach that characterised 
Sweden’s highly agile and successful total defence legacy, by developing new 
peacetime structures.
Within the defence establishment, information warfare has caused some 
perplexity and anxiety, particularly when it comes to the fundamental axi-
oms of military theory. Firstly, the boundaries between tactical, operational 
and strategic levels are becoming increasingly blurred.163 If a leaflet, supplied 
by a military PSYOPS-platoon within the SFOR force in Bosnia, comes under 
the cameras of CNN and ends up on the desk of the American President, it 
is definitely no longer a tactical issue. A tactical manoeuvre by units against 
an important network or telecommunications node must be synchronised at 
the highest level so that the effects do not exceed the intended ones (“cascad-
ing effects”), and, at the same time, not reveal or impede its own intelligence 
capability. Secondly, it has been discussed whether the Swedish philosophy of 
military leadership with its emphasis on assignment control has been a hin-
drance.164 This leadership philosophy has been a hallmark of delegated deci-
163 Tactical measures involve direct battle planning in near time (hours–days); operatio-
nal planning occurs at the higher levels of staff and concerns the entire geographical area of 
operations with a longer time perspective (days–weeks); whilst strategic planning occurs at the 
national headquarters and Ministry of Defence level (months–years).
164 Assignment control means that subordinate commanders can fairly freely solve the 
tasks given them by superior commanders with the allocated resources and with few other rules 
of conduct. Command and control involves control in detail.
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sion-making (“auftragstaktik”) within most of the Swedish armed forces, but is 
less well suited to these contexts, since very strict command and control proce-
dures are the only possible way of managing IO/IW during the early stages of 
conflict, which is when information warfare is most effective.
•
What, then, does the threat scenario look like today? The traditional for-
mula of intelligence analysis, “Threat = Intentions × Resources”, should in the 
Information Age be expanded to “Threat = Intentions × Resources × Vulnera-
bility”. A country with heavy IT dependency (like the United States) is naturally 
more vulnerable than an underdeveloped country that lacks societal IT struc-
tures (such as Somalia). On the side of the perpetrators, distinction should sim-
ilarly be made between states, terrorists, criminals and individuals (hackers).
One basic difficulty for a defender is to reliably know the identity of the 
attacker in the event that this is concealed or that the address is false (spoofed). 
Despite bold rhetoric about hitting back, it can be hard to guarantee that one 
is not actually attacking a hospital and putting vital life-support systems out of 
action. Which state department takes responsibility is often confused and can 
lead to delays in launching an effective response: if the attacker is a nation state, 
it would be the job of the armed forces; if, however, the attacker is a criminal or 
a terrorist, it would be the business of the police. But how do we know? Before 
we have figured it out, the question has probably become obsolete….
When it comes to individual countries, the US has the largest – and openly 
acknowledged – military capability in this area, but even nations like China 
are investing a lot in both doctrinal and structural development, setting up 
a special reservist organisation for information warfare. A semi-official trea-
tise, Unrestricted Warfare (1999), written by two Chinese colonels described 
the intention to use both “soft” PSYOPS methods and “hard” network attacks 
against, above all, the US. The aim was to particularly exploit the United States’ 
Achilles heel in the form of the population’s low tolerance for casualties: for 
example, it was believed that a terrorist attack against a military base with a 
resulting large number of dead soldiers would create pressure on the American 
government to withdraw from most conflicts which do not affect the American 
homeland. In many other countries, information operations are regarded as an 
intelligence matter and not as operational, which limits the amount of public 
knowledge.
We have not yet seen many cyber-attacks launched by terrorist groups. In 
a 1996 paper, Dr. Andrew Rathmell of King’s College, London, compared the 
willingness of the Muslim organisation Hamas and the IRA to use infrastruc-
tural attacks and IT weapons. He found that the IRA had sent people from 
their attack units on computer courses and had located crucial electricity nodes 
in London for a coordinated attack against commerce and the economy. Yet 
they had desisted. Why? His conclusion was that within traditional terrorist 
structures like the IRA, with its hierarchical organisation and its blue-collar 
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leadership, there existed a greater resistance to using these methods despite 
their effectiveness – they wanted things to go “bang”. In contrast, Hamas, with 
its academic leadership and its network-oriented organisation might be more 
inclined to use cyber-weapons and infrastructure attacks.
 Al-Qaida has begun to use IT methods to communicate secretly, but there 
are examples of more offensive use. In the tapes used for internal training 
found in Afghanistan 2002 signs of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 
(IPB) were found for attacks on major power grids, dams etc in western USA.
The AUM sect in Japan, in addition to using poison gas in the Tokyo under-
ground system, was also involved in developing both biological weapons and 
manipulating the software of government information systems. It turned out 
that a software company controlled by the sect had been responsible for pro-
gramming the positioning system, which the Japanese police used for their 
vehicles and police officers. The sect probably knew exactly where the police 
were at any given moment.
A most crucial question today is when the trend of exploring infologic and 
electromagnetic methods or/and aiming for infologic and information infra-
structure targets on one hand, will transform to execution of real attacks with 
high amplitudes. It is no longer a question of “if ”– it’s about “when”, but  is it 
within one year, five years or ten years? Some otherwise conservative security 
services have estimated the shorter term here.
A scenario could be if some terrorists with HPM-weapons could disturb the 
Air Traffic Control on the ground or the wireless flight data hubs inside the air-
plane. If you got an Airbus to crash over Los Angeles or Amsterdam with 400 
causalities and on the same time had a TV-camera - or an new cellular with a 
camera – sending out images of that catastrophe from ground, I would argue 
that this would create a 9/11-effect.
When it comes to serious crime involving IT elements, there are not many 
publicly acknowledged examples because it is in the very nature of this crime 
that the number of unrecorded cases is very high. There is only one known 
computer attack against a financial institution – against Citibank in 1994 when 
the Russian leader of a qualified hacker group, Vladimir Levin in St. Peters-
burg, succeeded in extracting $400,000 – but he had been close to getting $70 
million. Citibank reported the crime to the FBI, upon which Citibank’s com-
petitors announced to their own customers and the world: “We haven’t had 
that problem.” The immediate effect was that Citibank’s four largest customers 
withdrew about $1 billion each. The incentive for companies to talk about sim-
ilar events since then has not increased, even if rumours of successful com-
puter-based coups and extortion against banks is occurring with much greater 
frequency.
When it comes to individual hackers, the most expensive attack to date was 
the “Love” virus in Spring 2000. Originating in Manila in the Philippines, this 
virus caused damage worth an estimated $90 billion to information systems 
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around the world. In Sweden we were helped by the time factor, even though 
the airline SAS and others suffered. Asian companies discovered the virus first; 
American anti-virus companies then had the night in which to find counter-
measures, which Swedish companies could then use before booting up their 
systems in the morning. A number of IT security experts and administrators 
pointed out at the time that if this was what two young people could do in five 
hours, what might a nation achieve with specially targeted viruses or by releas-
ing some kind of mass virus close to the intended target?
•
How, then, should we view IT weapons? Can they be a force for good, in the 
hands of the democracies or are they always likely to be the weapon of choice 
of the “bad guys”?  As with all weapons, they are merely tools for the conduct of 
international affairs and these weapons will mirror the purposes for which they 
are launched. One major problem for the international community is the ability 
to intervene in international conflicts before they escalate to an unmanageable 
level. At the same time, more and more countries are concerned about their 
own losses in such conflicts. The American hesitation to send ground troops to 
the Balkans is one example of this. Thus, demand has recently arisen for a more 
flexible “toolbox” with more alternatives than the traditional military use of 
force using, for example, “smart sanctions” and conflict-prevention measures.
An article by an American military lawyer drew attention to Article 41 of 
the UN Charter, which proposes breaking off postal links and telecommuni-
cations with the aim of maintaining international sanctions. He constructed a 
scenario involving an application of IT weapons in accordance with Article 41 
to maintain (what were in reality ineffective) sanctions against Rhodesia in the 
1960s.
In this scenario, a unit would be able to identify, by means of a needs anal-
ysis, critical telecommunications nodes and knock them out. This would result 
in major communications blackouts, which would effectively maintain the 
sanctions. This action would be done within the broader concept of “use of 
force” and not within the narrower (and harder to decide on) “use of armed 
force”. Even in the case of other international interventions, there would prob-
ably be a need for the UN-appointed military commander to have a more flex-
ible toolbox.
Humanitarian aspects also indicate the need for an overhaul of international 
law. In a conflict involving an internationally sanctioned intervention such as 
the one in Kosovo in 1999, it is currently in accordance with international law 
to bomb a bridge on which there is a military truck even if twenty civilians also 
on the bridge are killed. In contrast, it is probably in conflict with the current 
interpretation of international law to cut off a civilian telephone line in the 
same area, even if that would have had a far greater effect on the war efforts of 
the Milosevic regime. International law and the laws of war are still based to 
a great extent on the legacy of experiences from the Napoleonic wars and are 
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thus scarcely suited to the Information Age. The issue will be how the UN can 
develop broader Rules of Engagement (ROE) that can be implemented through 
the national command structures of individual nations.
•
To sum up, in the light of possible conflicts and threats in the Information 
Age, we can perceive changes in four important dimensions. Firstly, there is 
no longer any very clear difference between public and private dependencies. 
Reciprocal dependencies are at stake; and here the realisation that the state 
bears a responsibility for the commercial infrastructure must have an effect. 
The state had no formal responsibility for the banks during the crisis of the 
Swedish krona in 1991, but there was no other authority that could take the 
responsibility, and the state’s role as “insurer of the last resort” then became 
obvious even in Sweden. Since such situations cannot be ruled out, we must 
also be able to plan for them.
From an Information Assurance standpoint the role of the Insurance and 
Reassurance Industry is crucial. If we can get their active involvement in 
developing insurances for the new risks -  - with low probability but with huge 
consequences and thus no actuary data – we could promote more sound Risk 
Management procedures within the private sector. When the costs for vital 
IA-measures reach the CEO-level instead of the CIO within a company, the 
foundation of the critical infrastructures would be much safer and reliable. It 
will be a self-regulating mechanism based on market values and incentives. 
That also implies that the role of government – with the taxpayers money - only 
need to support measures for strengthening the private sector against effects 
that are beyond the business optimum, or where the knowledge of those threats 
primarily is out of bound for the private sector and more of a government issue 
for the Intelligence Community.
The role of Information Sharing is also critical. When it comes to develop 
Private Public Partnerships and the necessity of creating Information Sharing 
Analysis Centers (ISAC), there should be an impartial broker (“priest”) to 
whom the companies with trust can perform their “confessions”. This is accord-
ing to my view the reason why Global Integrity had such a success running the 
financial ISAC, compared to some others where different industrial associations 
are in charge. In the latter category there are often a sense that one’s competitor 
would take gain of vulnerabilities which reduces the willingness to share.
Secondly, the relationship between civil and military authorities has 
changed. “During the Cold War, the civil defence was supposed to support the 
military defence – now it is the reverse.” This statement was made by the for-
mer Norwegian Prime Minister, Kåre Willoch, who some years ago headed the 
Vulnerability Committee specially appointed by the Norwegian parliament. The 
final report contained demands for major structural changes to the Norwegian 
political establishment. In Sweden we have so far been hampered by what is 
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known as “the Ådalen syndrome”,165 which has maintained a very strict reg-
ulatory framework when it comes to the use of military resources (c.f. Posse 
Comitatus). In 2003, however, a new committee of inquiry suggested that it 
must become easier to use these resources on the condition that the use of force 
was excluded.
Thirdly, it is no longer possible to rely on any division of the conditions of 
peace, crisis and war when it comes to the relationships of responsibility for 
meeting the new threats. Flexible coordination between the police and the mil-
itary must be established similar to that of the US, whose new Department of 
Homeland Security appears to have an increasingly strong mandate. In Sweden, 
for example, a civilian (police) command should be able to request the NBC 
unit which is currently being built up within the Swedish Armed Forces to han-
dle this kind of terrorist event.166 Training of these cross functional groups will 
require priority.
Fourthly, there are no borders in cyberspace. Since the link between grand 
strategy and the economy has become increasingly strong, threats, in particular 
anonymous IT attacks from other nations, can occur against economic players 
in another country. International security measures must therefore be devel-
oped by means of collaboration between as many countries as possible and at 
all levels. Legal and technological regulations must be harmonised so that a 
cyber-attack can be traced and stopped almost in real time.
It is impossible to make any distinction between offensive and defensive 
“capability”. It is only the hard-to-access “motives” which can provide guidance. 
Since technological equipment is extremely useful for both peaceful and antag-
onistic purposes (“dual-use”), so in principle every young computer “geek” 
can, with completely legitimate motives, acquire the necessary equipment. This 
means that demands for arms control in the IT sphere are no longer applicable 
and that prospective enemies must be identified from a far larger arena than 
has previously been the case.
The realisation that cross-sector threats demand cross-sector solutions must 
also influence the design of any national defence strategy in the field of infor-
mation operations.
The dramatically increased need for a rapid connection between “threat” 
and “planning” can – if the will exists – be handled within our Swedish sys-
tem. A first step has been taken with the establishment of the Swedish Emer-
gency Management Agency, but further changes are also needed to overcome 
the stovepipe structure of government and achieve a more horizontal, layered 
structure. This is as much a cultural issue as it is one of technology. Changes 
165  In 1931 a strike in the district of Ådalen led to battles between the demonstrators 
and military forces in which five civilians were killed and five wounded. One result was the es-
tablishment of a national police force and a ban on the use of the armed forces against Swedish 
civilians. (Ed. Note).
166 The NBC unit is a military unit, which will be established to handle (limited) attacks 
involving nuclear/radiological, biological and chemical weapons.
122
can and should be developed through the collaboration of civilian, military and 
police authorities and, above all, in conjunction with the private sector.
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Abstract
This paper seeks to explore if and how think tanks (TTs) influence the pol-
icy process. On the one hand there are theoretical explanations that have been 
offered by the academic community, which is a hot and varied debate. On the 
other hand, is how practitioners view the issue. A theoretical overview is pro-
vided, which is complemented by the distribution of a questionnaire to experi-
enced practitioners. The United States is chosen as the case study, and a ques-
tionnaire was circulated among experienced and senior practitioners. Think 
tanks often set about creating their own opportunities to influence the policy 
process. The ability to exert an effect is influenced not only by what they do, but 
also the reputation and brand of the organisation. Five think tanks emerged, 
among the opinion of the experts, as the most influential (CSIS, Brookings, 
CFR, RAND and CSIS). A clear majority of the respondents thought that think 
tanks influence security policy, but this influence is indirect.
Key words: Think Tanks, influence, security policy, United States, policy 
process
Introduction
There are a number of academics that say think tanks have little or no influence 
on public policy.167 Dror rated the performance of think tanks as being rather 
disappointing in terms of their ability to influence policy. Do the findings of 
the questionnaires in this research confirm that result? In an era of increasing 
budget constraints upon governments around the world, which has resulted 
in diminishing state budgets and cut backs in the state machinery, has exerted 
effects upon the state’s ability and role in policy identification, formulation 
and implementation. Traditionally, policy has been perceived by some as the 
domain of states and governments. However, these changes have seen this for-
mer monopoly of the state eroded.168 This situation creates the opportunity for 
alternative actors to play a greater role in the identification and formulation of 
policy.169
Think tanks are one such actor, which try influence government policy. This 
article shall focus upon the role of think tanks within the security policy envi-
ronment in the United States. More specifically the actors are National Security 
Council, Department of State, Department of Defence, and additionally the 
167  Yehezkel Dror, “Required Breakthroughs in Think Tanks,” Policy Sciences 16, 1984, pp. 
199-225; Richard Higgot & Diane Stone, “The Limits of Foreign Influence: Foreign Policy Think 
Tanks in Britain and the USA,” Review of International Studies 20(1), January 1994, pp. 15-34.
168  R Kent Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks,” P.S.: Political Science and Poli-
tics 22, September 1989, pp. 563-579; Geoff Mulgan, “Thinking in Tanks: The Changing Ecology 
of Political Ideas,” The Political Quarterly 77(2), April-June 2006, pp. 147-155, p. 18.
169  R Kent Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks”; Murray Weidenbaum, The 
Competition of Ideas: The World of the Washington Think Tanks (New Brunswick (NJ): Transac-
tion Publishers, 2011).
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Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice when it comes to 
Strategic Counter Terrorism Policy. Under these Cabinet Departments should 
also be added their relevant agencies. It has been hard to find any overview of 
think tanks influence in general. John Kingdon had a somewhat larger cate-
gory of “researchers, academicians and consultants” when he did his study on 
Non-Governmental Actors influence on US political decision making.170
Given the current critical juncture of the above mentioned changes in gov-
ernment and the state of global affairs/relations, understanding who and how 
security policy is influenced is crucial.  Just how they do achieve this has been 
the cause for some heated debate. This is influenced by how academics and 
practitioners view the security policy environment in the United States, such 
as whether it is a closed or an open system. And whether the policy system is 
open to pluralistic sources of input or is an elitist project.171
In a number of regards the US policy environment is rather a special and 
specific environment. The findings of an article, which appeared in the Journal 
of Policy Studies in 2010 (Nicander),172 seemed to indicate a faster degree of 
change in US Security Policy – from identifying a possible new threat paradigm 
until legislating and implementing preventive and protecting measures within 
the society.
There are issues and processes that make the understanding the issue of 
influence on foreign and security policy even more critical is the extremely 
volatile nature of international politics within the current frames of the Global 
War On Terrorism and the Arab Spring. It is critical to get the right policy to 
address the right problems. Understanding how policy is influenced is the first 
modest step in this direction.
This paper forms part of a larger project concerning bureaucratic ability to 
adapt or change to circumstances in the security policy environment. Other 
aspects are analysed in different papers, but it is the intention of this article to 
broach the following problematic question, what influence (direct or indirect) 
do the relatively independent/bipartisan think tanks have within the security 
policy domain in the US? This question immediately imposes upon a scholar 
the necessity of defining influence and discusses ways and means of measuring 
it. This shall be done from the point of view of an academic’s theoretical lens 
as well as from the point of view of a practitioner. By setting about answering 
the research question in this manner, contradictions between the theoretical 
(academic) and practical (policy makers/practitioners) shall be exposed. The 
170  John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd Edition, (New York: 
Pearson, 2011), p. 54.
171  Donald E. Abelson, Capitol Idea: Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy (Montreal: Mc-
Gill-Queens University Press, 2006); R Kent Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks”; 
Murray Weidenbaum, The Competition of Ideas: The World of the Washington Think Tanks; Eric 
Swank, “Clinton’s Domestic Policy Makers,” Journal of Poverty 2(1), 1998, pp. 55-78.
172  Lars Nicander, “Shielding the Net – Understanding the Issue of Vulnerability and 
Threat to the Information Society,” Policy Studies 31(3), 2010, pp. 283-300.
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primary intention is to generate an overview and learned discussion on the 
aspect of assessed or perceived influence. As such, this does not mean that 
influence needs to take place, but what strategies and tactics academics, policy 
makers and practitioners believe are successful. Given the size and nature of 
think tanks in the United States, if there is no influence found in this specific 
environment, it is less likely to be found elsewhere.
After the theoretical definition and framing on how the term Think Tank is 
understood in this context, follows a description of what makes the US Think 
Tank environment special and its unique character in relation to think tanks in 
other countries. This is followed by a review of the states of theories on the role 
of think tanks in general and some relevant schools of thought. A questionnaire 
was distributed to establish the views and experience of established profes-
sionals working in the field, in order to understand the practitioners’ lens and 
understanding of the issue. Respondents were chosen on the basis of the length 
of service in think tanks, government and academia, in order to offer useful 
insights by experienced people that have served in all of the parts that poten-
tially contribute to the policy process. The outcome of this questionnaire was 
then compared with the theory findings, how the Think tanks operate and also 
on their influences in Congress. Information gleaned from the questionnaires 
was enhanced with a qualitative approach based on in-depth interviews173 with 
those who agreed to be contacted further (from the pool of those that had 
received and responded to the questionnaire) to give a more comprehensive 
understanding of the ‘insider’s perspective’.
Theoretical and Analytical Framework
The General Role and Character of Think Tanks
In brief, a Think Tank can be described as an organization that fills the gap 
between knowledge and decision making. According to a more detailed defini-
tion, think tanks are defined as: Think tanks are public policy research, analysis 
and engagement institutions that generate policy-oriented research, analysis 
and advice on domestic and international issues that enables policymakers 
and the public to make informed decisions about public policy issues. Think 
tanks may be affiliated or independent institutions and are structured as per-
manent bodies, not ad hoc commissions. These institutions often act as a bridge 
between the academic and policymaking communities, serving in the public 
interest as an independent voice that translates applied and basic research into 
a language and form that is understandable, reliable, and accessible for policy-
makers and the public.174
173  The 18 respondents – interviewed through personal meetings (F2F), through Skype 
and by phone - have been renamed to R1 through R18 because of confidentiality issues, quotes 
from all respondents have not been used to highlight claims in this article but will be forwarded 
in upcoming articles on the same subject.
174  James G. McGann & Erik C. Johnson, Comparative Think Tanks, Politics and Public 
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Think tanks can be classified in several different ways.175 According to one 
model, they can be classified according to their degree of independence from 
the state. However, usually think tanks are classified according to their primary 
mission and focus, usually labelled as either   ‘university without students’, ‘con-
tract researchers’, and ‘advocacy centres’.  A fourth category is sometimes used 
in the United States, so-called ‘vanity/legacy centres’, a category that is usually 
associated to a former president and his ‘presidential library’.
The first category, ‘Universities without students’, is considered to be the 
most independent and usually has more than fifty employees. Often, research-
ers and scholars who are trying to get away from teaching and administra-
tive duties gravitate towards this type of employment. Other groups that are 
attracted to this type of work consist of conservative scholars who think that 
the academic world is too radical and leftist as well as former diplomats and 
civil servants who lack a traditional academic background (i.e., they do not 
have a PhD).  The typical products (’output’) that this type of Think Tank pro-
duce are primarily aimed at decision makers, and usually consist of rather 
detailed monographs of primary research. The Brookings Institution (Wash-
ington D.C.), the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Washington 
D.C.), Council of Foreign Relations (NYC), and the Hoover Institution (Stan-
ford, CA) are well known examples of this category of think tanks.
The second category ‘government contractors’ are formally called Federally 
Funded Research and Development Centres (FFRDCs)176, and usually operated 
within in the security and defence sector. These institutions usually has spe-
cial access and operate ’in-house’ with the customer in order to solve a specific 
problem. This category of think tanks depends upon their size and having a 
substantial amount of customers in order to maintain their balance and integ-
rity. Both RAND (Santa Monica, CA) and Urban Institute (Washington D.C.) 
falls in to this category; however, the latter only deals with issues related to 
welfare and the organization of society on a local and regional level.
There is an additional category of independent think tanks, ‘advocacy cen-
tres’. This type of Think Tank is usually ideology oriented and advances various 
policies and policy solutions based upon a certain political philosophy. Often 
the conservative Heritage Foundation (Washington D.C.) and American Enter-
prise Institute (Washington D.C.) are labelled as being advocacy centres, but 
a better example is actually the libertarian Cato Institute (Washington D.C.). 
The line between ’advocacy oriented’ think tanks and what in Scandinavia is 
referred to as PR and lobbying firms is somewhat more fluid. This is the main 
Policy (Northhampton (MA): Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005); James G. McGann, Think Tanks 
and Policy Advice in the US: Academics, Advisors and Advocates (New York: Routledge, 2007).
175  R Kent Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks.”
176  FFRDCs conduct research for the United States Government. They are administered 
in accordance with U.S Code of Federal Regulations, Title 48, Part 35, Section 35.017 by univer-
sities and corporations. http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/ffrdclist/gennotes.cfm och http://www.nsf.
gov/statistics/nsf05306/
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reason why this paper is focused on the independent think tanks that primarily 
work with security policy decision making.
The Think Tank industry was developed in the United States during the sec-
ond decade of the 20th century, about the time of the Great War (1914-18). 
Since then, this industry has been through several periods of change. Today 
there are more than 6000 think tanks in more than ninety countries; the largest 
concentration – approximately 1700 - is found in the United States.177  This 
is a rapidly growing industry. According to Weaver,178 “think tanks are more 
numerous and probably play a more influential role in the United States than 
in most other western democracies.” Following from this assumption, if Think 
Tank influence on policy can be found, it is more likely to be found through a 
study on Think Tank influence on policy in the United States.
A number of works have been written on the think tanks strong position in 
the United States compared to Europe; a usual explanation to this phenomenon 
is that the think tanks in some aspects compensate for the lack of a culture of 
strong political parties that is common in most European countries179. Due to 
the balance of power between the American president and the Congress - and 
the fact that American political parties mostly function as election machines 
– the members of the Congress have a greater need for qualified knowledge 
and information; in addition to this, they also have more freedom compared to 
most European members of parliament. Gray180 states that US think tanks are 
able to inform and influence policy due to two primary reasons. Firstly, their 
views are deemed legitimate by officials. Secondly, that staff of think tanks are 
well qualified and may in fact also be former officials. Today, the leading inde-
pendent Think Tank in Europe in widely believed to be the German Stiftung für 
Wissenschaft und Politik (SFW).
Theories on Think Tanks
There are a number of scholars who are most active in the research field of 
think tanks, such as Donald E. Abelson, James McGann, Diane Stone and 
Andrew Denham. Abelson has also written a case study on two security policy 
situations - the ABM/SDI-decision and the global war on terror GWOT – in 
order to analyse the role of think tanks in these events even though these situ-
ations could be analysed in several different ways. Murray Weidenbaum (Com-
petition of Ideas 2011) argues that Abelson’s “description of think tank activity 
is useful,”181 even though this particular concept cannot explain it completely. 
177  James G. McGann, 2012 Global Go to Think Tanks Report and Policy Advice (Philadel-
phia: University of Pennsylvania, 2013), p. 24.
178  R Kent Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks,” p. 570.
179  See among others Kent Weaver, The changing world of Think-Tanks, page 570 in PS: 
Political Science & Politics, 1989
180  Colin S. Gray, “‘Think Tanks’ and Public Policy,” International Journal 33(1) Opinion 
and Policy, Winter 1977/1978, pp. 177-194, p. 190.
181  Murray Weidenbaum, The Competition of Ideas: The World of the Washington Think 
Tanks, p. 58.
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A number of theoretical attempts have been undertaken to try and capture the 
nature and essence of organisational influence on the policy process.
According to Abelson there are four separate schools of thought that can be 
used to analyse and conceptualize think tanks. The elitist182 school argues that 
think tanks are an integrated part of the power structure in the United States in 
the form of knowledge banks and talent pools for future presidential adminis-
trations.  Unfortunately, these thoughts are often paired with another approach, 
influenced by Marxism. According to this approach, the role of think tanks is 
to support and advance its donors direct economic and political interests.183 It 
is reasonable and possible to support the former approach without at the same 
time accepting the latter, as has been emphasized Abelson. This is also the main 
reason according to Abelson, the reason this school of thought sometimes is 
perceived as being imprecise, contradictory and has a slight dichotomy to its 
nature.
The pluralistic184 argue that think tanks are a part of a strong pluralistic 
American tradition in which this type of organization only forms a small 
part of the body that shapes the American decision making; this is made up 
of unions and a number of different organizations that promote and protect 
various interests. Ultimately, it is the state that will deliver some form of ver-
dict or decision regarding a certain interest (i.e. in the form of its congress and 
administration).
The statist185 school use an approach that is based upon the vision that the 
state completely and independently formulates political goals that it tries to 
achieve despite national and international resistance.  Decisions and policies 
on foreign policy are shaped by its most important actors, the President and 
the Secretary of State. That is, foreign policy and issues on national security 
are controlled by the White House and the State Department.  This approach 
may imply that think tanks play a rather modest role. However, the importance 
of the ‘the revolving door’ with experts who are recruited from think tanks to 
closed, policy making environments or vice versa, is of great importance. Both 
the White House and the State Department depend upon advisers and experts; 
182  Joseph G. Peschek, Policy-Planning Organisations: Elite Agendas and America’s Right-
ward Turn (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Thomas R. Dye, Who’s Running Ame-
rica?, 4th Edition (Englewood Cliffs (NJ): Prentice-Hall, 1986); G. William Domhoff, “Social 
Clubs, Policy Planning Groups, and Corporations: A Network Study of Ruling-Class Cohesive-
ness,” Insurgent Sociologist 5(3), 1975, pp. 173-184; John S. Saloma (III), Ominous Politics: The 
New Conservative Labyrinth (New York: Hill & Wang, 1984).
183  G. William Domhoff, “Social Clubs, Policy Planning Groups, and Corporations: A 
Network Study of Ruling-Class Cohesiveness.”
184  David Newsom, “Foreign Policy and Academia,” Foreign Policy 101, 1995-1996, pp. 
52-67.
185  Theda Skocpol, Government Activism and the Reorganisation of American Civic De-
mocracy, Paper given at the conference The Transformation of the American Polity, (Cambridge 
(MA): Harvard University. 3-4 December 2004); Stephen Krasner, Structural Conflict, (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1985).
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it is a logical conclusion that think tanks are in a position to influence the deci-
sion making process.
The institutional186 school use an approach that analyses think tanks and 
their individual researchers as parts of a policy and expertise network, and 
how they cluster in different decision making situations. The benefit with this 
approach is that scholars can get a deeper understanding of the ’sub govern-
ment’ by analysing primary sources such as transcripts of meetings, protocols, 
and other documents that have been used. However, the lack of other sources 
creates a picture that can have some limitations. This school of thought is also 
known for its discussion on ’agenda setting’187 and its focus on the phase in 
the decision making process where different institutions and interests gather in 
order to promote their ideas.
In reflection, it can be said that no one single school of thought or theory 
can explain the role of think tanks in the policy making process; an integrated 
approach is often necessary unless one is studying a specific situation. As an 
example it can be said that the static approach might be the most useful in 
order to explain the decision making process before the invasion of Iraq 2003; 
in this case a group known as the ’Vulcans’ (e.g. Wolfowitz and Cheney) all 
had links to the same Think Tank (in this case PNAC). This particular group 
of people formed a very tight and closed group that had strong connections to 
President George W. Bush.  An example of an integrated approach could be to 
apply Weidenbaum’s opinions on Abelson’s theoretical arguments.
Weidenbaum (The Competition of Ideas, 2011) partly supports this position 
and underlines the difficulties to measure with any degree of reliability and 
validity the influence of think tanks on the policy process. Instead, he promotes 
the idea of the indirect influence of scholars; they compile and analyse material 
that otherwise might be difficult to access. A group of particularly important 
recipients are staffs that work for members of the U.S. Congress, and especially 
those who work for various Congressional committees.
In addition, Donald Abelson has (2005) made a number of interesting 
observations regarding the American think tank environment. Two trends 
stand out. The first observation Abelson made was that “many contemporary 
institutes have made and continue to make a concerted effort to influence pub-
lic opinion and public policy. Rather than debating the advantages and disad-
vantages of various domestic and foreign policies from the comfort of their 
186  Hugh Helco, “Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment,” In Anthony King 
(Ed.), The New American Political System (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 
1978); Evert A. Lindquist, “Think Tanks or Clubs? Assessing the Influence and Roles of Ca-
nadian Policy Institutes,” Canadian Public Administration 36(4), December 1993, pp. 547-579; 
Diane Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process (Portland 
(OR): Frank Cass, 1996).
187  John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies; Denis Stairs, “Will and 
Circumstance and the Postwar Study of Canada’s Foreign Policy International Journal,” Canada’s 
Journal of Global Policy Analysis 50, March 1995, pp. 9-39.
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book lined offices, think tanks, particularly those advocacy-oriented, prefer 
becoming active participants in the political arena” (preface). In other words, 
there is an attempt to influence the public debate regarding specific issues, and 
by doing so having an indirect influence on policy.
The other, and perhaps more relevant observation is linked to the role think 
tanks play by being able to influence the public debate and discourses on pol-
icy issues by developing certain strategies in order to be competitive on the 
‘idea and influence market’. Think tanks have very shifting internal and exter-
nal resources (e.g. access to media). The historian James Smith has noted that 
“think tanks have become all too savvy at competing in the market place of 
ideas”.188 The ability of a Think Tank to promote itself and transfer its ideas 
in a wider, public context is because of this a key factor for its influence. This 
idea was expressed by most of the second round interviewees, who noted it is 
not only about having good ideas, but letting others know you have them. A 
selection of quotes includes:
• “Traditional publishing […] new social media, you have to be innovative 
with Facebook, Twitter, the whole list of things. Blogs potential, I notice a 
lot of think tanks that are very active, their scholars have blogs. Television, 
debating on television, media strategy, magazine, periodicals, influential 
sort of opinion in your field. All those things. You have to use everything 
these days” (R17189, 120703, Skype).
• “I think getting time with the senior director at the NAC is extremely hard. I 
do not think you can assume that is your principle audience unless the idea 
has already been highlighted with an op-ed or some other media event that 
would grab the attention of a senior director” (R15190, 120702, telephone).
• “Media savvy?” “Exactly, that is the way they put it. They get their views 
out very quickly, whenever there is an event in the world or some new de-
velopment where their expertise would be sought. So those are some of the 
reasons.” (R17, 120703, Skype).
These quotes demonstrate the way that think tanks try to stand out in a 
crowded marketplace if ideas. It is about getting your ideas and capabilities 
out in the public to be noticed, and with luck to gain some traction. Abelson’s 
categorization of think tanks from four theoretical approaches has been ana-
lysed by Weidenbaum regarding their relevance and substance. Firstly, elite 
organizations that depend upon experts and close ties to policy makers do so 
in order to support their sponsors’ political and economic interests.  Due to the 
188  Donald E. Abelson, Capitol Idea: Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy, preface.
189  R17: Senior counsel and co-author to the 9/11 Commission, former CIA officer, con-
sultant to Homeland Security projects and Bipartisan Policy Center, CT advisor to the State 
Department and to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 25 years of experience within the US Security 
Policy environment and US Government.
190  R15: Adjunct professor at Georgetown University, former career intelligence analyst 
at the CIA, former National Intelligence Officer, over 30 years of experience within the US Se-
curity Policy environment and US Government.
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fact that this school of thought houses two hypotheses that are often wrongfully 
associated with each other – the talent pool for coming administrations on the 
one side and the purpose of supporting its sponsors on the other side – makes 
it rather difficult to analyse which hypothesis a study actually uses. Due to this 
methodological problem, Weidenbaum rejects this categorization made by 
Abelson, even though the latter has publicly stated that he does not support the 
hypothesis that is influenced by Marxism.
The interviewees all separated the two parts of this thesis insofar as that they 
agree that think tanks are acting as talent pools for administrations. However, 
reject the notion of partisanship, which they believe ruins a Think Tank’s brand 
and reputation and is therefore counter-productive. Thus the networks are vital 
as is the idea of objectivity.
• “Somewhat the revolving door, I think on a lower level it tends to be dyna-
mic” (R3191, 120413, telephone).
• “There are a lot of senior experts, senior fellows that tend to be there [at 
think tanks] when they are not in government, there are different adminis-
trations” (R18192, 120705, F2F).
• “The most important factor is objectivity and being able to speak truth to 
power” (R1193, 120406, telephone).
• “If you are trying to gain trust and credibility, objectivity is a critical piece. 
But I think that there are so many disincentives to objectivity that it is al-
most impossible to maintain it” (R4194, 120416, telephone).
The last quote was interesting insofar as it notes that objectivity is desired, 
but the environment makes it very difficult to maintain. Secondly, think tanks 
can be regarded as just one of several actors in a constantly growing and 
“crowded marketplace of ideas”. This position is supported by Weidenbaum. 
Thirdly, think tanks play a modest role in the shaping of policy compared to 
the administration’s power and resources. Weidenbaum partly supports this 
approach, adding that this influence can be of a vital and strategic character at 
certain moments. He does not express any direct opinions that are limited to 
191  R3: Senior Risk Management scientist in the DHS Science and Technology Directo-
rate, former Federal On-Scene Coordinator for several major incidents, 7 years of experience in 
the central government and 30 years of experience in the Coast Guard.
192  R18: Served as a soldier, a lawyer, a professor, and a diplomat, and has worked for the 
White House, the Pentagon, the World Bank, the United Nations, and a large international law 
firm. Currently a senior fellow and adjunct professor at Georgetown University with a total of 
15 years of experience within US Security Policy and US Government.
193  R1: Former Chairman of the Department of Grand Strategy and Mobilization at NDU, 
served in the US Air Force including two tours to Vietnam, adjunct professor at Georgetown 
University and over 40 years of experience from within the US Security Policy environment and 
US Government.
194  R4: Cultural anthropologist, who works on defense and national security issues, has 
held positions at a variety of Think Tanks, including RAND and Institute for Defense Analysis, 
former Scientific Advisor to the United States Army Human Terrain System with a total of 13 
years of experience from within the US Security Policy environment and the US Government.
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the White House and State Department within the framework for this school 
of thought.
The fourth school of thought, according to Abelson, think tanks have differ-
ent mandates and operate under different circumstances. Weidenbaum argues 
that this is how think tanks operate in very special circumstances that decides 
whether or not a Think Tank will be involved in the policy making process. 
Finally, it has to be emphasized that the scholars who are active within this 
field of research concur, regarding the difficulties of measuring influence; the 
main reason for this being the lack of hard data regarding the decision mak-
ing process itself.  Weidenbaum’s opinions are well suited to develop Abelson’s 
thoughts on the influence the independent think tanks have regarding security 
policy.
Other significant scholars –McGann, Stone and Denham come to mind – 
use other approaches in order to explore and analyse this field rather new and 
uncharted field of research. McGann has studied a number of key factors (polit-
ical, economic, and policy related) that affects the possibilities of think tanks 
to offer independent advice and analyses. He used enquiries with employees 
within the business as respondents in an early research project. This resulted in 
a divergent interpretation regarding what role different groups believed think 
tanks should play. One such role was to predict the need of policy development 
before these needs became obvious, and started to have their own life, some-
times fuelled by special interests.
McGann started to cooperate with Erik C. Johnson in 2005, and wrote a 
comparative study that measured thirteen indicators of influence in policy-
making in different countries such as: political freedom, the political system, 
number of years as a democracy, number and size of political parties, the type 
of civil society, freedom of the press, economic freedom, GNP per capita, the 
public sectors demand for independent policy analysis, the size of the popula-
tion, philanthropic culture, the number of public and private universities and 
their degree of independence, the degree of internationalization and global 
integration (pp. 1-2).  This detailed account show a diversity of possible routes 
of influence, and the think tanks possibilities to survive and influence the pol-
icy making process.
Stone and Denham made another comparative study of think tanks in 2004. 
They also made the conclusion that the interpretations and opinions regarding 
the Think Tank’s role and influence is diverse; some largely overestimate the 
influence, while other downplay it, sometimes describing it as being non-ex-
istent. Stone and Denham appear to lean towards the latter, that the think 
tanks have almost no influence on the state’s development of policies. They 
state “it is rare to find uncontested examples of a one-to-one correspondence 
between a think tank report and a policy subsequently adopted by government. 
[...] Instead, they (the various authors in the book) develop wider and more 
nuanced understandings of think tanks’ policy influence and social relevance 
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in their roles as agenda-setters that create policy narratives that capture the 
political and public imagination.” (p. 11). The value and usefulness of think 
tanks can be described and interpreted in a more indirect context rather than 
in direct, causal effects, according to their research.
Two other scholars have conducted research on this matter and have made 
similar conclusions. The British scholar Geoff Mulgan noted in an interesting 
article from 2006 (Thinking in Tanks: The Changing Ecology of Political Ideas) 
how the changing political ecology influence think tanks. The meaning of his 
observations  –  who are made in an European context, primarily the United 
Kingdom -  is that it can be the Think Tank’s ability to adapt to new circum-
stances on the political market that are decisive for success and the exploitation 
of new possibilities.
Ken Weaver at Brookings wrote in 1989 an article (The Changing World of 
Think-Tanks) who tried to describe the growing number of think tanks, and 
especially the relatively new category of  ‘advocacy tanks’,  who has emerged 
by the side of the two older and more established types ‘Universities without 
students’ and ‘non-profit contractors’. It is especially the Heritage Foundation’s 
aggressive marketing that has captured the interest of Weaver; apparently their 
reports are marketed as being so short that “the decision makers can read them 
in a limousine ride from National Airport to Capitol Hill”.195
Weaver argues that think tanks have different purposes and roles. Firstly, as 
a source for policy specific strategies and action plans; secondly, as a source of 
and as a tool for evaluation of policy proposals; thirdly, as a tool for evaluation 
of government programmes, fourthly, as a personnel provider (‘government in 
exile’); and finally, as experts in general. What is so specific about the American 
system according to Weaver is that it allows for a specific Think Tank influ-
ence due to the balance of power between the Congress and the administration, 
a relatively weak political party system, and a diverse and available body of 
administrative elites.
An additional factor that Weaver puts forward is the American culture of 
philanthropy (and the system for tax reductions) for individuals and corpora-
tions who support research; this is considered to be a key factor for the growth 
of think tanks in the United States. Weaver finally notes that there is no single 
definition or methodology that can be applied in order to explain what a think 
tank does, how it operates and is financed; what can be said is that the Amer-
ican Think Tank environment is unique, and that the American experiences 
of think tanks cannot be transferred without adaption to other countries and 
contexts.
Higgot and Stone196 have argued that think tanks have evolved over time, 
and in doing so, may have lost some of their ability to influence policy. They 
195  R Kent Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks,” p. 567.
196  Richard Higgot & Diane Stone, “The Limits of Foreign Influence: Foreign Policy 
Think Tanks in Britain and the USA,” p. 34.
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describe the ‘old type’ of think tanks as being innovative and visionary, being 
idealistic and club-like in nature. These think tanks relied on scholarship to 
inform policy. The ‘new’ variants are much more activist-like and ‘hyper-ac-
tive’ in their nature. As such they are more political and instrumental than the 
earlier form of think tanks. Barley’s197 research also implies an increasing level 
of vested interests being involved in influencing think tanks and their output, 
Wisensale’s work198 produces similar results with think tanks purposing a polit-
ical as opposed to scholarly approach to their work on influencing policy. Yet 
the increased number of think tanks does not necessarily translate into influ-
ence. There are a greater number of conservative think tanks in the US, which 
possess a greater deal of resources than their liberal counterparts. But this has 
not greatly increased their influence in proportion to the increased organisa-
tional number and resources.199
It is interesting to note that a number of respondents (a minority) that 
thought that think tank influence were marginal. Although this is not part 
of what is being addressed in this article, it does need to be mentioned. In 
terms of effect on security policy decision making, 34 per cent of respondents 
said there was some and three per cent said that there was none (60 per cent 
answered yes, definitely). These figures approximately corresponded with the 
perceived level of trust and credibility of think tanks. 34 per cent said there was 
a neutral level, five per cent thought that the level of trust and credibility was 
low or very low. Those who saw think tanks having less influence in the future 
tied much of this to two primary reasons: 1) the lack of funding (including 
from private foundations), and 2) owing to the existence of too many think 
tanks with too much overlap in a crowded field.
Convergence Between the Four
There are six points of convergence regarding the think tank phenomenon that 
can be distinguished between the four scholars Abelson, Weidenbaum, Weaver 
and Mulgan (the latter operates in a British context).
1/ The market for ideas has become increasingly crowded. 2/ A stellar rep-
utation is the key to survival and success regarding influence and finances. 3/ 
There exist no single model for the classification of a think tank; different mod-
els and versions exists side by side in a heterogenic policy making environment. 
4/Think tanks must be able to attract media and the decision makers in order 
to survive and operate. This can only be achieved if the think tank has access to 
excellent personnel and activities of a high standard. 5/Think tanks are a hybrid 
197  Stephen R. Barley, “Building an Institutional Field to Corral a Government: A Case 
to Set an Agenda for Organisation Studies,” Organisation Studies 31(6), 2010, pp. 777-805, pp. 
791-792.
198  Steven K. Wisensale, “The Family in the Think Tank,” Family Relations 40(2), April 
1991, pp. 199-207.
199  Andrew Rich, “US Think Tanks and the Intersection of Ideology, Advocacy and Influ-
ence,” NIRA Review, Winter 2001, pp. 54-59, p. 59.
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between the academic and the political world. 6/Think tanks do not usually 
have the objective to influence specific legislation but rather to call for attention 
and generate a public debate about general policy options.
A preliminary positioning in a matrix
The think tank’s 
role in the 
Policy process Indirect influence Direct influence
Cl
os
ed
Schools
The static school
“Non-profit” consult (e.g. RAND): 
are rewarded government 
projects for policy support. They 
have to be chosen due personal 
contacts or their ability to 
market suitable projects.
Schools
The elite school
Advocacy Tanks: have a very 
specific agenda, aiming at 
influencing the policy process 
in order to support their own 
agenda and a specific issue. Their 
influence is based upon party 
politics and their connections to 
the ruling elites.
Scholars
Abelson: Think tanks are elitist 
organisations but are responsive 
to the demands of the market 
(this is also linked to the 
argument of “modest” influence).
Scholars
O
pe
n
Schools
The pluralistic school
Universities without students: 
open competition among 
think tanks in their struggle for 
attention and influence.
Schools
The institutional school
Scholars
Weidenbaum: Think tanks need 
to compete with each other 
in order to get attention and 
influence. However, they have 
to be careful and not get too 
deeply involved in the decision 
process; such an involvement 
could jeopardize their status 
as non-profit, which governs 
taxation.
Scholars
Mulgan: an open process based 
upon competition. The think 
tanks need to be involved in 
politics, ideologies, and practical 
policy implementation. The 
think tanks aim at breaking the 
public sector’s monopoly on 
policy support.
Weaver: The American political 
process gives think tanks 
influence, at the same time the 
public sector’s monopoly on 
policy support has been gone 
for a long time.
An open system refers to one that is receptive to outsider or external input. A closed system is not open to 
input from anyone that is not part of the in-group.
In practice, the different theoretical approaches have a tendency to overlap, 
and the line between the different schools of thought is perhaps not as distinct 
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as the matrix indicates. For example, the pluralistic school does not hinder that 
the power groups in in the static school also can be observed within the frame-
work of the pluralistic school.
Understanding Influence
To begin with, some framing of the term ‘influence’ is needed.  Robert A. Dahl 
defines it as “a relation among human actors such that the wants, desires, pref-
erences, or intentions of one or more actors affect the actions, or predisposi-
tions to act, of one or more actors in a direction consistent with – and not con-
trary to – the wants, preferences, or intentions of the influence-wielder(s)”.200 
He then narrows down the different ways of understanding influence, where 
the notions of distribution, gradation, scope and domain can serve as guides to 
the observation and analysis of influence.
Yet the problem is that a precise and reliable measurement of different 
actors’ influence – especially weighing the scope and domain - does remain dif-
ficult in theory as well as in practice, however the centrality of influence seems 
clear to all political observers. The questions posed by Dahl relating to this 
study are highly relevant: What persons or groups have the greatest effect on a 
legislature tax measures? Who tends to initiate proposals, to win others over to 
them, to carry them through over opposition, to defeat or sidetrack proposals 
over others? Why do some policy questions never become public issues?
Dahl also refers to Jack Nagel’s discussion on causality here. The latter states 
that direct influence means influence in a specific decision-making process 
– either in choosing some alternatives or rejecting one or more alternatives. 
Indirect influence is here more connected with how often think tanks are con-
sulted or constitutes a part of the decision makers’ reference framing. Influence 
is often understood as a “causal connection between an actor’s preference on 
an outcome and maybe also the form of the outcome”.201 Influence is tied to the 
ability of an individual or organization to persuade its target audience.
The basis of persuasion is not based on ‘forcing’ a viewpoint or course of 
action upon another. But it is to present information in such a manner as to 
convince them to freely choose a particular point of view or action. Important 
within this context is that persuasion is influenced by moral components – 
choosing to engage in morally beneficent actions and choosing to refrain from 
morally reprehensible ones, for example.202 This implies the weighing of moral 
judgements based upon symbolism and values.203 Perloff defines persuasion as 
“a symbolic process in which communicators try to convince other people to 
200  Robert Allan Dahl & Bruce Stinebrickner, Modern Political Analysis, 6th Edition (Up-
per Saddle River (NJ): Pearson Publishing, 2003), p. 17.
201  John H. Nagel, The Descriptive Analysis of Power (New Haven (Connecticut): Yale 
University Press, 1975), pp. 29 & 55.
202  Richard M. Perloff, The Dynamics of Persuasion: Communication and Attitudes in the 
21st Century, 4th Edition (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 11.
203  Richard M. Perloff, The Dynamics of Persuasion: Communication and Attitudes in the 
21st Century, p. 12.
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change their attitudes and behaviours regarding an issue through the transmis-
sion of a message in an atmosphere of free choice.”204
Persuasion involves five different components to it. 1) It is a symbolic pro-
cess, 2) involves an attempt to influence, 3) people persuade themselves, 4) 
involves the transmission of a message and 5) requires free choice.205 In terms 
of impact, persuasion can be used for three broad effects. One effect is to shape 
attitudes and opinions on something. A second use is to reinforce attitudes 
and opinions in an audience. The third effect is to change attitudes and opin-
ions.206 This now needs to be tied back to think tanks and how they embark 
upon attempting to persuade (and influence) policy makers.
Weidenbaum (2011) studied the influence of think tanks in Washington 
DC from a more general perspective. He finds that this influence is generally 
underestimated and he is somewhat critical of the present schools of research 
in this area. Interviewees (in the second round) seemed to be split about the 
influence of think tanks on the policy process. The different camps agreed that 
influence did in fact occur, but for quite different reasons. One camp spoke of 
broadening the dialogue and debate on an issue or policy, and another that 
think tanks were used as a kind of ‘rubber stamp’ for a pre-determined policy.
• “I think think tanks influence policy by presenting new ideas so that they 
help to further the debate. They also help influence policy by actually doing 
the work the government officials very often do not have the time to do 
themselves, they are busy working on so many issues, that think tanks help 
to bring a knowledge that would otherwise not exist in government” (R9207, 
120517, Skype).
• “They can be tremendously influential but sometimes only because the con-
clusions or the think tanks are the way of validating the policy” (R13208, 
120615, Skype).
There are at least three problems that make measuring of influence prob-
lematic: Different channels for influence, the existence of counteractive lobby-
ing and the fact that influence can conducted at different stages of the policy 
process.209 Thomas Medvetz - an institutionalist – argues that maybe the most 
204  Ibid.
205  Richard M. Perloff, The Dynamics of Persuasion: Communication and Attitudes in the 
21st Century, pp. 12-15.
206  Richard M. Perloff, The Dynamics of Persuasion: Communication and Attitudes in the 
21st Century, pp. 24-25.
207  R9: Founder and Director of Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, lec-
turer in CT and US foreign policy, Senior Fellow at John Hopkins University, and nonresident 
Senior Fellow at George Washington University, a total of 14 years of experience from within the 
US Security Policy environment.
208  R13: 37 years of government service including Assistant Inspector General for Securi-
ty Oversight, Senior Advisor for Policy to the assistant Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary 
of State, and Director for Intelligence Policy.
209  Andreas Dür, “Measuring Interest Group Influence in the EU: A Note on Methodo-
logy,” Forum Section European Union Politics 9(4), 2008, pp. 559-576, p. 561.
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important effect of Think Tank influence is not to promote own proposals, but 
to ensure that inferior alternatives are weeded out, which makes it even harder 
to state causality.210 Sun Zhiru and Zhang Zhiqiang211 propose that a quanti-
tative text analysis can be undertaken to measure influence. This is done by 
comparing a Think Tank’s policy position with the final policy output. Their 
argument is that this allows for assessing the preference realisation of think 
tanks in the decision-making process.
Think Tanks must compete with one another in an increasingly crowded 
marketplace of ideas, which demands innovative strategies in order to attract 
the attention of policy makers. The main methodological element of this 
research approach was a two tier questionnaire to respondents with an ‘insid-
er’s perspective’ on the US think tank environment to possible derive their role 
and influence. In this article the focus is on the outcome of the quantitative 
part and also an overview on think tank influence in Congress. The research 
question is thus narrowed down to “What think tanks are most influential in 
the US security policy domain”, which is based on the assumption that they do 
exercise significant influence.
Empirics and Analysis of the Influence of Think Tanks - Two Ap-
proaches
Questionnaire With an Insider Perspective (Quantitative)
An important basic assumption for this questionnaire for both active and 
retired public officials was to find out whether or not think tanks were per-
ceived as having any influence on security policy, and who the most success-
ful think tank are. The result was later on used in order to identify common 
denominators.
The questionnaire was emailed to approximately 270 respondents in the 
United States; thirty-five of them answered. One major reason for the lack of 
response was that the DoD, the State Department and the such have very pow-
erful firewalls that does not allow emails from overseas that could be charac-
terized as bulk e-mails. Several of the respondents were ’friends of friends’, who 
do not know me personally and due to this could not verify me as the sender. 
I also tried to use a digital signature on my e-mails in order to prove my ’bona 
fide credentials’; however, that created even more problems with the firewalls. 
An additional second round, of in-depth interviews with 18 of the original 35 
(that agreed to be contacted further) took place via Skype and via telephone. 
The questions in the second round were designed to tease out answers raised by 
the initial questionnaire.
210  Thomas Medvetz, Think Tanks in America (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2012).
211  Sun Zhiru & Zhang Zhiqiang, Measuring Think Tank Influence Using Quantitative 
Text Analysis (International Conference on Information, Business and Education Technology: 
Atlantis Press, 2013).
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The 35 senior respondents were highly qualified. On average, they had 
served for twenty-two years within the administration, working with security 
policy; due to their experience they had the right background as customers to 
think tanks. 18 of the respondents accepted to do a qualitative interview during 
the second phase of my project.
The most striking finding was that 94 per cent of the respondents thought 
that think tanks have influence and an impact on decisions regarding security 
policy in the United States. 60 per cent of the respondents believed that think 
tanks are held in high esteem regarding security policy. 77 per cent thought 
that think tank work as a ‘talent pool’ for coming presidential administrations. 
The result was somewhat equivocal regarding the argument that think tanks are 
a part of the policy generating environment in which the best ideas becomes 
successful on an open and free market, which implies that other factors such as 
networks, media policy and so forth, plays an important role. Due to this, it is 
logical that 80 per cent of the respondents believe that the primary strategy for 
success for think tanks are based upon networking; 77 per cent of the respon-
dents think it is important for the think tanks to carefully consider at which 
phase they should start to find a place in the policy process.
The study showed that the most important level for influencing the decision 
makers are the congressional staffers on Capitol Hill and the so-called GS-15 
(directors within departments and agencies) – not  the politically appointed 
Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries. In other words, the highest politi-
cal level – ministers, senators and members of Congress – appears to be rather 
uninteresting as recipients of the work and efforts of think tanks. An answer 
as to a possible avenue for influence at the level of Congressional staffers and 
GS 15-level officials is found in some recurring answers given by the respon-
dents. Of particular interest is that these staffers may integrate think tanks find-
ings into governmental analysis. Therefore this may affect the perceived level 
of trust and credibility by senior policy makers in the material, owing to the 
source (seemingly governmental as opposed to think tanks). The importance of 
establishing personal networks in order to influence decision-making was also 
highlighted as being of critical importance for think tanks in a study by Rich 
and Weaver.212
The five most important ‘bipartisan’ think tanks that work with security pol-
icies are according to the respondents the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS), Brookings, Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), RAND, and 
the new Centre for New American Security (CNAS). Therefore, the importance 
of other significant actors such as the Heritage Foundation are downplayed, 
mostly due to the fact that they have a tendency to develop towards becom-
ing an ‘advocacy centre’, with a considerably conservative bias rather than as 
independent experts. All of these think tanks are primarily active within ”The 
212  Andrew Rich & R. Kent Weaver, “Think Tanks in the US Media,” The Harvard Inter-
national Journal of Press/Politics 5(4), 2000, pp. 81-103.
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Beltway” in Washington D.C., with the exception of  CFR, which is based in 
New York.
Another finding of interest is that 77 per cent of the respondents antici-
pate that the influence of the think tanks will remain unchanged. Such a result 
would indicate a very stable system that is also rather closed due to already 
existing structures, which makes it difficult for new actors to gain access to the 
system. CNAS is only six years old and rather modest for its size, but might be 
an exception; it appears as CNAS is able to compensate its small staff with a few 
highly qualified key people and relevant networks.
Think tanks influence in the U.S. Congress
When the respondents in the first round of interviews rated the think tanks 
that work with security related issues, five think tanks emerged as being espe-
cially noteworthy, also known as ‘The big five’ (CSIS, Brookings, CFR, RAND, 
and CNAS). In order to verify these ratings, an analysis was done in order to 
find out how often these actors could be noticed in relevant congressional hear-
ings and sub-committees (budget, foreign policy, defence and justice) during 
the period 2007-2012.
This analysis showed that in the House of Representatives, ‘the big five’ were 
involved in some capacity on ninety-three occasions; fifteen other think tanks 
were involved on eighty-eight occasions. This is even more obvious in the Sen-
ate – who is supposedly less polarized, and operates with a longer time frame 
– ‘the big five’ were involved on fifty-eight occasions; the other fifteen were 
involved on twenty-one occasions. Usually, three outside experts are called to 
a congressional hearing in order to highlight the issue. Two of these are nomi-
nated by the majority and minority side; the third person is usually an indepen-
dent expert, and it is here that think tanks play a role by providing fact based 
recommendations.
It is the responsibility of the individual members of Congress and the staff 
on the committees to inform themselves regarding different issues, especially 
issues regarding security policy that might be difficult to gain access to. The 
main reason for this is that the American political system lacks a parliamentary 
political system as opposed to the rest of the Western World. There are still 
voices such as Michael Rich (the director of RAND) who are concerned that 
the members of Congress becomes increasingly polarized, and rather uses their 
conviction than empirical facts; if facts happen to support one side, the other 
side feel a need almost by default to be against it.
The verification of the influence of ‘the big five’ became interesting and use-
ful discovery process in preparation for the following qualitative interviews, 
and especially to investigate what characterizes them.
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Analysis of the Discrepancies Between the Answers from Scholars 
and Practitioners
It can initially be noted that the framework provided by the previously men-
tioned scholars (McCann, Weaver, Stone, Denham, and Johnson) were not so 
useful for the focus of this study. Denham and Stone rejects completely any 
form of influence in the government’s policy development; a position that 
turned out to wrong in this context. The indirect influence they advocate must 
be interpreted as being done by public opinion and media in this case.
Abelson on the other hand, appears to be correct regarding the important 
role that think tanks play, even though this role might be difficult to concep-
tualize. The answers indicate that it is to some degree by a combination of the 
elitist and institutional schools that describes the role of the think tanks best. 
The elitist school is, however, too complex as a model, since it is possible to 
accept the thought that think tanks form a talent pool for coming administra-
tions while at the same time rejecting the thoughts that are inspired by Marx-
ism, i.e. think tanks primarily exists to support the interests of its donors (e.g. 
Domhoff). Abelson rejects the latter position, but admit that the theoretical 
concept of four schools is not complete; his description of them is actually lim-
iting, which has been pointed out by Weidenbaum.
A significant discrepancy compared to Abelson’s findings is that 77 per cent 
of the respondents think that the White House and the State Department are 
not the two most important actors regarding security policies. This could indi-
cate that this role is either played by other institutions and power centres on a 
high level that has acquired an increasingly independent role, e.g.  DoD and the 
CIA. It could also indicate that the decisions are done on a lower bureaucratic 
level (e.g. by the existence of so-called gatekeepers). This could explain why 
think tanks rely so much on networking with these gatekeepers.
An alternative and perhaps more realistic explanation could be that think 
tanks exercises influence on security policies and decision making; however, 
this depends more on their networks than the value of producing policy rele-
vant analysis. This explanation confirms Weidenbaum’s conclusions.
Conclusion
The assumed role and influence of think tanks in the United States in general – 
and on the field of security policy in particular – is unique. This source of com-
petence and expertise appears to fill a stabilizing function and lubricates the 
ties between politics and administration, which is important since the United 
States lacks traditional political parties unlike other Western countries. There is 
also a rather unusual tradition in the United States where the financiers of most 
think tanks traditionally avoid influencing their work, opinions, and marketing.
This phenomenon has been analysed by using some of the more well-known 
theories and approaches on this field of research. The result of this has been applied 
on a questionnaire given to respondents who have been working within the Amer-
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ican administration with security related issues for a considerable time. The role of 
think tanks in a security context has been limited to an American context in my 
study. From the questionnaires, the findings and indications are:
1. Think tanks have (assumed) influence over the decision making process re-
garding U.S. security policy (94 per cent).
2. The most important think tanks are thought to be CSIS, Brookings, CFR, 
RAND, and CNAS. Indirect influence such as networks, appearance in Con-
gress, and other methods that are difficult to measure must be taken into 
account. The overrepresentation of ‘the big five’ in a congressional context 
is worth noting.
The common denominator for four of ‘the big five’ is that they are perceived 
as being bi-/non-partisan, politically mainstream, have a solid financial basis, 
have recruited highly respected employees (scholars, secretaries of state, diplo-
mats), and have been operating for at least forty years. CNAS is an exception; 
it is considerably smaller, and was created as late as 2004. Despite this, CNAS 
became highly influential – for example within the Obama-administration - 
and is considered to be independent even though former employees in some 
cases have been perceived as being on the right side of the political spectrum 
(e.g. David Petraeus).
There are four conditions that are necessary to emphasize if one should try 
to summarize the very specific American environment for think tanks. First of 
all, the American political system does not have the traditional political parties. 
This leads to a need for knowledge that is relevant for policy in a long term 
perspective. Second, the existence of a political ‘spoil-system’ makes it possi-
ble to change civil servants every fourth year: this means that approximately 
1000 politically appointed civil servants may have to leave their position every 
fourth year, which generates a need to re-create institutional knowledge, often 
by using think tanks. In addition to this, the employees that have to leave their 
positions are available for recruitment. Third, the American system is known 
for its philanthropy and generous taxation benefits.
A fourth factor that does not appear in my work but still deserves to be 
mentioned is the question of access and information availability on equal 
terms.  The United States has a rather young intelligence community, with a 
culture of “academic outreach” and the secrecy legislation that goes along with 
this.213 A consequence of this is that the employees of think tanks have the same 
access to information as civil servants in the projects they are working on. Due 
to this, it is not possible to sort out their recommendations just by labelling 
them as ‘uninformed’, as sometimes happens in Europe.
The assumption on the role of think tanks in the creation of security policies 
is that they do play a very important role, and enjoy a great level of trust and 
confidence within the American bureaucracy. It can also be said that it is not 
213  Lars Nicander, “Understanding Intelligence Community Innovation in the Post-9/11 
World.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 24(3), 2011, pp. 534-568.
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enough to just present the best proposals and ideas; their influence is depend-
ing on their networking skills. In addition to this comes the indirect influence 
think tanks can have by being a base for a ‘government in exile’. Another factor 
for success that can be identified is where in the policy process a certain Think 
Tank choses to focus on.
Another interesting observation is that the most important recipients 
and consumers of Think Tank products are the people just below the politi-
cally appointed level, the ‘machinists’ so to speak in the political system. This 
group of people must be able to quickly deliver accurate information to their 
superiors.
The need and demand for the services of think tanks are believed to remain 
at the same level for the foreseeable future; this also applies to the structure of 
independent think tanks that has been studied within the framework of this 
study (CSIS, Brookings, CFR and RAND). The reason for this is primarily that 
it takes considerable time to create a trusted brand. In this context, it is worth 
noting that the newcomer CNAS became the fifth member of this club in only 
six years.
This review leads to the conclusion that Weidenbaums’s ‘overlap’ on Abel-
son’s theoretical approach regarding the pluralistic school appears to be the 
most developed theory for an analysis of the think tank phenomenon. Weiden-
baum’s studies in other fields of research support this argument. Other theories 
are of a lesser interest based upon the empirical findings in this study. How 
this influence is being created and evaluated would make an excellent topic for 
further research.
Two hypotheses – based upon the pluralistic school – appear to be of impor-
tance for a more penetrating analysis against the background of what has been 
discussed above. First, an important factor for success is independence and 
integrity. Second, think tanks create their influence and impact to a high degree 
by using indirect methods such as networks and networks contacts.
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LARS NICANDER
The Recipe for Think Tank Success: The
Perspective of Insiders
Think tanks have, over time, been able to gain considerable success in
influencing the security policy process in the United States. Success can be
understood as the ability to influence the policy process at some stage and
in some manner—anywhere from identifying a ‘‘problem’’ or opportunity
to implementing policy. The role of U.S. think tanks, in theory and
practice, and whether think tanks had a significant influence in the U.S.
national security domain, was previously discussed in these pages.1 The
outcome was a clear ‘‘yes,’’ and the five highest ranking think tanks were
highlighted.
The focus here is on the why and how on the issue of influencing policy.
Several experienced experts in the field had their viewpoints recorded
through a series of questionnaires and interviews. A number of strategies
and tactics became apparent—revolving doors and networks, publishing
and marketing, niching and branding, reputation and profile. The extensive
material collected from the experts provides a useful insider perspective
that contributes to developing the understanding of how think tanks gain
influence in policy.
Increasing budget constraints and demands for tax decreases have resulted
in reductions to state budgets and forced the making of cuts in the state
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machinery of numerous governments around the globe. Scholars like Geoff
Mulgan thus imply that the perceived traditional government monopoly on
policy advice has been broken.2 In turn, the ability to identify, frame, and
implement policies has been affected. This tendency has thereby created
opportunities for non-state actors to position themselves in questions of
policy identification and formulation.3
Think tanks fall into the category of non-state actors trying to affect
governmental policy development. Even though the concept of think tanks
originated in Europe, with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) as
the oldest, dating from 1831, United States think tanks now occupy by far
the most prominent place when influencing political decisionmaking,
particularly in areas related to security policy. Also, they tend to be
concentrated in Washington, DC, where the majority of the world’s think
tanks are located,4 as are those most heavily funded.
Given these current critical changes, understanding how security policy is
influenced is crucial. The ways in which think tanks set out to influence
policy are diverse.5 The manner in which this influence emerges and is
interpreted has been subject to intensive debate among scholars, centering
on whether the system is closed6 or open,7 and whether the policy process
is open to plural sources8 of input in contrast to elitist projects.9
The focus here is on the role of think tanks within the federal security
policy environment of the United States, more specifically, on the National
Security Council (NSC), Department of State (DoS), Department of
Defense (DoD), and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Also
involved are the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the
Department of Justice (DoJ), in regard to domestic security and
counterterrorism. Additionally, other relevant agencies10 are included, as
are the congressional committees linked to these areas.
The results cited here, coming from a follow-up series of interviews to
questionnaires that were previously distributed to a group of highly
experienced individuals working within the U.S. security and foreign policy
environments, provide unique insider perspectives. They also suggest
strategies and trends that could become theoretically relevant if and when
integrated into the wider academic discussion and debate on think tank
influence.
THINK TANKS AND THEIR IMPORTANCE
Considerable debate takes place on the nature of think tanks and how they
should operate. From a theoretical perspective, think tanks are viewed in
different ways. John Hamre, President of CSIS, noted four different
categories of think tanks: (1) architects; (2) general contractors; (3)
suppliers; and (4) artisans.11 Kent Weaver, however, notes only three broad
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categories of think tanks: (a) historically: universities without students and
non-profit government research contractors; and (b) a ‘‘new’’ third model,
advocacy tanks.12 These last organizations combine strong policy, partisan
or ideological bias with aggressive salesmanship in order to influence
current policy debates. Effective ‘‘spin’’ on existing ideas, and their
accessibility to policymakers drives their success.13
Think tanks are certainly diverse; Murray Weidenbaum noted five
different aspects:
1. Think tank personnel function as both academics and activists at the crossroads
of politics and academia;
2. Major think tanks are neither completely conservative nor completely liberal;
3. Differentiation between think tanks and universities is substantial, based mainly
on the education of students versus the influencing of public policy;
4. Competition among think tanks is pervasive; and
5. Think tanks make a special contribution to public policy and provide a policy
forum featuring knowledgeable and experienced people.
According to Geoff Mulgan, to succeed, think tanks need a subtle
understanding of several domains—politics, ideas, and practical policy
implementation.14 Power is derived from being able to straddle these
domains. Think tanks, in some regards, can be considered a hybrid of the
political and academic environments.
Think tanks can perform a number of different roles. According to Kent
Weaver, they are (1) a source of policy ideas; (2) a source and evaluator of
policy proposals; (3) evaluators of government programs; (4) a source of
personnel; and (5) outlets for punditry.15 In order to survive in a
particularly competitive environment, think tanks need three essential
elements: (1) some form of demand for their knowledge and services,
especially from political circles; (2) the ability to secure funding from
sympathetic donors in order to employ people and run programs and
activities; and (3) talented individuals to do the thinking, some of whom
may be en route to a political or academic career. This means that they are
able to convert political access in to money, money into ideas, and ideas
into legitimacy (and attract ambitious contributors by doing so).16
At times a lack of clarity can develop between think tanks and lobbying
organizations. Gateway House, the Indian Council on Global Relations,
has stated that the difference between the two is found in the think tank’s
mandate: ‘‘Unlike that of a think tank, a lobbying organisation’s mandate
is to influence a policy outcome for a particular interest group. A think
tank’s mandate is merely to create innovative policies and hope to
influence the policy outcome.’’17 Another view was expressed by the
National Centre for Policy Analysis: ‘‘In recent years, there has been a
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proliferation of groups who openly advocate public policy changes (usually
on a single issue). These groups, however, are not incubators of news
ideas. They are better thought of as lobbyists for ideas.’’18 Think tanks
and lobby groups may differ in their ability to create new ideas for policy
challenges, rather than merely advocating certain ideas and policies on
behalf of interested parties.
Another significant difference between think tanks and lobby groups in the
United States arises in the legal framework that regulates them. Think tanks
are deemed non-partisan, non-profit, research and educational
organizations. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) therefore categorizes
them as 501(c)(3) tax exempt organizations. To gain this status, the IRS
requires an organization to refrain from attempting to influence legislation
as a substantial part of its activities adding that ‘‘it may not participate in
any campaign activity for or against political candidates.’’19 While this
does not mean that think tanks do not attempt to influence policy, it does
mean that doing so needs to be done indirectly.
But things are changing, and the seemingly clear-cut legal and functional
lines between think tanks and lobby groups can sometimes become rather
blurred. In 2014, the New York Times reported on the attempts of various
foreign countries (including Qatar, Norway, and the United Arab
Emirates) to buy influence via think tanks.20 A concern, expressed by a
lawyer expert on the Foreign Agents’ Registration Act (FARA), the
statute that governs Americans lobbying for foreign governments, was that
‘‘think tanks have this patina of academic neutrality and objectivity, and
that is being compromised.’’ This concern demonstrates the value and role
played by a think tank’s brand and trust in influencing policymakers.
In several regards, the U.S. policy environment is somewhat unique
compared to other Western countries. Earlier findings indicated a higher
propensity to change—from identifying possible new threat paradigms to
legislation, as well as implementing preventive and protecting measures
within society—in U.S. security policy compared to other countries.21 Kent
Weaver has explained the U.S. situation as being determined by domestic
structural and political factors related to the division of powers between
the President and Congress, weak and relatively non-ideological political
parties, and the permeability of administrative elites.22
The unique role of think tanks as a means to both influence and hasten the
degree of change is a timely and relevant area of study. Explaining why and
how think tanks have become successful in terms making an impact upon the
U.S. policy process provides additional insights to the existing literature on
American security policy decisionmaking.23
In his study of non-governmental actors that influence on U.S. political
decisionmaking, John Kingdon24 included a somewhat larger category of
participants, among them ‘‘researchers, academics and consultants.’’
THE RECIPE FOR THINK TANK SUCCESS 741
AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 29, NUMBER 4
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [Å
bo
 A
ka
de
mi
s B
ibl
iot
ek
] a
t 2
2:1
8 1
3 J
un
e 2
01
6 
KEY CONCEPTS
Integrity
Independence and integrity appeared to be central issues in the initial
distributed questionnaire as explanations for why a think tank scored high
in the rankings given by the respondents. This implies that the conclusions
arrived at by the producers of reports should be independent with regard
to a think tank’s management, board, and funders, and that the reports
and recommendations should be formulated without consideration of the
current political situation.
The five highest ranked think tanks are all found to be independent or
‘‘bipartisan’’: the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), the
Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), RAND
Corporation, and the Center for a New American Security (CNAS),
wherein Democrats and Republicans can professionally work with the
same frame of ideas. Other think tanks, featuring a more outspoken policy
agenda (e.g., the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute,
the Cato Institute), are considered to be ‘‘advocacy centers’’ that focus on
influencing discussions at a later stage of argumentation, rather than at the
earlier stage of policymaking, and seek to generate alternatives.
In this study, RAND has a special status as an independent consultancy,
partly inside the American defense system’s operational analysis structure,
while nonetheless succeeding in keeping to its credo of ‘‘speaking truth to
power.’’25 Doing so is possible, in particular because RAND is not
dependent on only one customer, having instead hundreds of opportunities
within the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) domain. Half of RAND’s
revenues derive from sources outside the defense community, primarily
those within the health sector. This means that RAND is able to balance
its customer base, not having to become dependent on a single customer.
RAND can thereby stand strong against customers who consider the
conclusions in a commissioned report to be unacceptable or unpleasant,
and is generally judged impartially as an independent stand-alone think tank.
Network
The joint perception seems to be that the essential way for a think tank to
achieve influence is through the use of indirect methods rather than such
tangible products as reports and various publicity materials. Several
different pathways can be taken to reach influence, but the ‘‘revolving
door’’ seems to have a special status. Primarily, this refers to the usual
flow of politically-appointed civil servants in U.S. administrations,
especially during shifts in the presidency when approximately 1,000
officials may have to leave their positions (the ‘‘spoils system’’). Many of
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these individuals end up at think tanks, depending on their insight and
knowledge. Politically expert staff members tend to follow them to these
institutions.
In reverse, think tank personnel who have beenworking long-termon a certain
issue become attractive for a sympathetic new administration. When in office
they tend to turn to their former workplaces for advice or to commission
reports. No formal connections exist between those working at a think tank
and a government department, but, think tanks constitute both pools of talent
and places to store talented researchers and experts. This example of John
Hamre was offered by one of the respondents in the interview round:
I will give you a non-classified example. John Hamre was asked to go to
Iraq and take a look at what was going on. And he wrote a report back.
Now, if he was not President of CSIS, he might still have been asked since
he had been a former deputy secretary of defense. But he was the
President of CSIS; it was kind of a CSIS effort, because he had the
CSIS supporting him, but CSIS in that case almost became an adjunct
of the government. (R6, 09-05-2012, F2F)
Another approach, like the CFR’s, is to have a ‘‘Fellow system,’’ with
approximately 1,000 members and recurring seminars organized for this
selected elite, many of whom have held important positions within various
administrations. When in government, the former Fellows tend to take the
CFR analyses and assessments into consideration, as well as commission
CFR with important studies.26
METHODOLOGY
Method and the Respondents
As a follow-up to a previously completed set of quantitative interviews, a
round of qualitative interviews was conducted during the spring and
summer of 2012. In this round of interviews, eighteen experienced
respondents participated, all of whom had been involved with think tanks
on several different occasions and in different capacities: ten had been
employed by think tanks; eleven had been customers of think tanks; eleven
had interacted with think tanks in different projects; and four had been
temporary researchers, interns, or the equivalent. On average, the
respondents had spent 28 years in the U.S. security policy environment.
The set of individuals judged as most interesting to measure policy
influence seemed to be the eleven respondents who had engaged with think
tanks as customers, but the views of the other seven from the group of
eighteen were also taken into consideration. This set of eleven respondents
possessed an average of 32 years’ experience in the sector, and their
background spanned from a former deputy undersecretary of defense for
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operational planning to individuals responsible for threat assessments at the
National Intelligence Council (NIC) and advisors on the National Security
Council (NSC) within the White House.
The total number of respondents, particularly in the first round of the
study, which saw a mere 35 out of 350 sent out questionnaires answered,
implied that the reply results had to be further refined. The low response
rates were due to computer firewalls and other electronic safeguards that
prevented the intended recipients from receiving the questionnaire. This
necessitated a change in strategy from an originally-intended large scale
response to one that identified the important and relevant questions and
topics to be broached in the first round, to be followed up in a second
round with a more focused set of questions to willing participants from the
original respondents. Of the initial 35 respondents, eighteen participated in
the qualitative interview, a number deemed positive. Because these
eighteen27 respondents held unique insights into the system, the qualitative
aspect can be assumed to outweigh the relatively limited number of
participants.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IN THE FIRST ROUND (QUESTIONNAIRE)
The main method of approach in the first study was a two-tier questionnaire
sent to respondents with an ‘‘insider’s perspective’’ on the U.S. think tank
environment seeking to clarify think tanks’ role and, above all, their
influence on policy. Direct influence is understood as impact on a specific
decisionmaking process, either in choosing or rejecting one or more
alternatives, while indirect influence is understood as referring to how
often each respective think tank is consulted or constitutes a part of a
decisionmaker’s frame of reference. According to Jack Nagel, influence is
often understood as a ‘‘causal connection between an actor’s preference on
an outcome and maybe also the form of the outcome.’’28
The questionnaire’s first part posed a quantitative round of questions, as
well as conducting a general survey of the influence on target audiences
derived from the central research question: Do think tanks have a
possibility to influence the security-related decisionmaking process?
In the second part of the questionnaire, the research question was limited
to: Which think tanks are most influential in the U.S. security policy domain?
This limitation presupposed that at least some think tanks were assumed to
exercise signif icant influence over the policy process. The high
acknowledgment rate in the first survey’s key question pertaining to
whether think tanks had any significant importance on U.S. security policy
planning and decisionmaking was opened up in the second survey, asking
how the think tanks had achieved this significance. Exploring this angle
further would be done through a series of interviews.
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One scholar stands out, offering the closest theoretical explanation to the
patterns emerging from analysis of the first questionnaire. Murray
Weidenbaum found that this external influence is generally underestimated,
and raised some criticism against existing schools of research in the area.
In using the pluralistic school as a basis, he offered five conclusions
regarding how think tanks function in dealing with various issues:
1. Think tanks are both academics and ‘‘activists,’’ standing between the research
community and politics.
2. The larger think tanks are neither purely conservative nor liberal.
3. The difference between universities and think tanks is fundamental through the
focus on educating students versus influence in political and policy formation.
4. The competition among different think tanks is palpable.
5. Think tanks constitute a particularly important contribution to political and
policy development (in the U.S.) through offering a policy forum with
competent and qualified expertise.
He also tackled issues of organizational structure and work production
processes as additional reasons for the ability of think tanks to project
influence on the policy process, with influence often varying according to
policy domains. Three significant reasons for think tank influence are:
1. Think tanks can gather groups of experts faster than can universities and civil
services to focus on relevant and time critical action and response, e.g., crisis
management.
2. Think tanks can penetrate policy processes faster than academic organizations
through constant presence and networks in the policy environment. Private
publishing opportunities shorten the time span between preparation and
publication of new knowledge.
3. Think tanks can accelerate the review processes regarding the research they
sponsor through less bureaucratic procedures than at universities and in
government. An in-depth interview can shed light on other more important
specific aspects. This can include the think tank’s base of knowledge and
expertise, acting as its ‘‘niche’’ in the decisionmaking process, as well as its
knowledge in certain geographic areas.29
Think tanks currently possess numerous advantages over other types of
organizations that work within the sphere of knowledge production:
‘‘Institutionally speaking, the think tank stands between the university and
government.’’30
But academia has been criticized for failing to bridge the theory-policy gap:
‘‘One of the primary obstacles to building this bridge is the lack of systemic
data about when and how academic social science is useful to
policymakers.’’31 The issues of policy relevance, academic ‘‘ivory towers,’’
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and their relatively slow speed has put academic institutions at a
disadvantage when compared to think tanks.
SECOND ROUND INTERVIEWS: THE WHY AND HOW
Purpose and Approach of the Study
The first round of questionnaires ended with two specific elements
identified—integrity and network—being defined as key concepts for a
think tank to become successful. Studying why and how came next
through interviews featuring an ‘‘insider’s perspective.’’ Among the
variables considered in the study were:
. The unique non-parliamentary system in the U.S. that both permits and requires
alternative hubs of knowledge outside the, in this case, relatively weak and
streamlined administrative apparatus.
. The political ‘‘spoils system’’ in the administration which entails insufficient
continuity and demands quick results.
. The economic strength founded on a philanthropic culture and tax benefits for
donations to think tanks.
. The meaning of, in comparison to the rest of the world, the unique rules of
confidentiality in this specific security political related area, which permit think
tanks to use the same qualified information in their assessments as do the
governmental agencies.
Six substantive questions were asked to all respondents. (A summary of the
questions posed and the aggregated responses, as well as the full account of
the respondents comments can be found in Annex 1 and 2 at http://bit.ly/
YhXY1v.) The research question is: Why and How ‘‘the Big Five’’ think
tanks mentioned earlier, gain influence?
INTERVIEW32 SUMMARY OF IN-DEPTH RESPONSES: THE WHY
Of the six substantive questions asked to all respondents, the most significant
responses to the five ‘‘why’’ questions are considered here;
The first set of questions focused on the five most highly-ranked think
tanks: Please state the reasons why you think that these think tanks are
more influential than other organizations? What is it that separates and
makes them better than their competitors?
In response to these questions (see Table 1), the emphasis was on the high
standard in terms of reports=studies, objectivity (16=18) and independence,
networks—especially toward the administration (‘‘revolving door’’—13=18)—
and a good positioning (i.e., either a niche strongly towards a specific set of
questions—seven responses or, as the larger think tanks, the possession of
qualitative skills for dealing with a wide range of issues). Several comments
746 LARS NICANDER
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [Å
bo
 A
ka
de
mi
s B
ibl
iot
ek
] a
t 2
2:1
8 1
3 J
un
e 2
01
6 
touched upon the think tanks themselves, and what aspects separate them from
the rest in terms of their capacity, abilities, and products.
Having a good reputation for quality of their products (11=18) and balance
in what think tanks produce ranked highly among the respondents. One
respondent noted that ‘‘they have long established reputations for many
years and they produce high quality work and have high quality people’’
(R3, 13-04-2012, telephone). An established track record was an important
factor for a few of interviewees (6=18). The issue of the ‘‘revolving door’’
arose on a number of occasions, among the comments on the issue were:
Three reasons: the first is that they have resources; they have more
resources than other institutions. The size, they are much larger and
cover a wider variety of topics. And then third, perhaps most
important, is that they are able to capture a very senior level of former
government people. (R9, 17-05-2012, Skype)
I think the staffing tends to be pretty dynamic. In particular, when
administrations change, there is always a move—seems to be a move—
from think tanks into government and government back to think
tanks. (R3, 13-04-2012, telephone)
The thing about RAND that is interesting is that it is a kind of a holding
tank for people who are rotating through the government. People will
take a job at RAND and then when the party that they are aligned
with comes into power they go back into government, and usually at
the appointment level. (R4, 16-04-2012, telephone)
Table 1. Highlights of the Survey on Think Tank Influence
Reason Times mentioned
1. Why are these five think tanks more influential?
Network=revolving door 13
Quality of products 11
2. Which values and policy platforms are more likely to gain trust and=or
influence?
Objectivity=courage 16
Reputation 12
3. Which issues or areas are more open to input from academia and think tanks?
Regional questions—China, Middle East, EU, etc. 12
Strategy formulation—transatlantic relations, UN, etc. 10
4. Successful strategies and tactics?
Niching 10
5. Failures of strategies and tactics?
Numerous incorrect judgments=poor quality 9
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Staffing was an important factor for nearly half of the respondents (8=18) in
two ways: one, to attract senior staff that possess a high profile and a good
reputation, and at the lower levels of staffing, different factors are at play—
generating new ideas, being energetic, and ‘‘hungry.’’ These people give
energy and drive to a think tank. The revolving door was important for two
main reasons: to circulate staff between the think tank and government
(hence developing a knowledge of government practice and influence) and
to expand the network of individuals within the think tank. The size of an
organization and its access to resources were also considered important.
The second set of questions focused on issues of trust and influence: Please
state which values and policy platforms expressed by think tanks are more
likely to engender trust and=or influence within U.S. security policy. In
your opinion, how large is the role of reputation and brand in levering
influence? Are other factors more important?
Respondents to these questions indicated that reputation, though
undefined, is extremely important (12=18). The main factors were
objectivity and independence (‘‘no extremists’’) in the reports and in the
personal behavior of the representatives at various events (16=18). Several
respondents noted that the successful think tanks are in the ‘‘mainstream’’
with views based on the U.S. Constitution’s values. Some expressed the
opinion that personnel should be in agreement with basic U.S. values for
security policy and related interests, but might perhaps agree to disagree
on how to achieve them. Examples included:
I think with the exception of CNAS, which is rather new, the others have
been around for a long, long time. And the fact that they have been
around for a long time I think is an indication of the quality of their
work, the reputations of the people that are on the staff of those think
tanks. So when you put together top notch people and they turn out
really, really good, insightful work that influences policy that means
that they are going to be around for a long time. CNAS is the only
outlier to those five because they are so new, and the fact that they are
up there in that top group is an indication that they aggressively want
to get really, really good people. (R11, 25-05-2012, telephone)
Presence in DC—otherwise no impact; Non-partisan (CFR, CSIS,
Brookings); Independent—especially on funding; Liberal=centrist
values; Pro-free trade (‘‘non-extremist’’); Thoughtful conclusions. (R5,
26-04-2012, Skype)
Many respondents referred to the importance of networking, brand, and
reputation (12=18) in attracting attention and getting the think tank to the
‘‘doorstep’’ of policy influence. Brand and reputation were seen as
influenced by such factors as staffing, product quality (5=18), and
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organizational longevity. They emphasized that offering a good quality
product was necessary for a think tank to get any further: ‘‘The
networking and reputation may get you in the door. But if you do not
have product you cannot do anything once you are there’’ (R3,
13-04-2012, telephone). Brand was construed by several interviewees as
being the recognized products of a think tank’s staff. Those without
professional quality products run the risk of having their brand and
reputation damaged, perhaps permanently.
The third set of questions explored the issues and topics that were open
and closed to think tanks: Within the security policy domain, are there
specific issues or areas that are more open—or closed—to input from
academia and think tanks? If so, please state which issues and areas, and
why they are more—or less—accessible to influence?
In reply to these questions, regional issues—China, Pacific, Iran, Russia,
Europe, the Middle East (‘‘Arab Spring’’)—dominated (12=18), as did
matters concerning strategy formulation (e.g., transatlantic relations and
UN policy—10=18) . Funct ional threats , such as cyber (6=18) ,
non-proliferation, and defense formation (4=18), were also mentioned.
Some noted that think tanks having qualified expertise, known to the
political administration (the ‘‘revolving door’’) and individuals who know
where to find relevant information (4=18), receive more opportunities to
increase their influence. This aspect was mentioned because most
administrations do not have the time or expertise to think long-term in
these areas. Similarly, area ‘‘stakeholders’’ in Congress or in the
administration (2=18) are relatively few.
Think tank policy areas less likely to achieve influence concern bilateral
relations with different countries and issues connected to domestic politics.
Examples include the question of Israel (5=18), Saudi Arabia relations,
materials procurement, and ‘‘privacy’’ issues related to Homeland Security.
Also, classified areas, such as intelligence questions (5=18) and operational
war planning (4=18), are seldom engaged in by the institutions themselves,
although staff experts can be contacted on an individual personal basis.
Responses included:
Generally speaking, I think that regional issues tend to be more open to
influence and more open to input from academia and the think tank area
than the more functional issues. US policy toward the EU, US policy
toward Turkey and its initiatives [ . . . ] Climate change or currency
development [ . . . ] or trade [ . . . ] those are functional issues, those are
everyday as open as regional issues. But there are more functional
issues like intelligence and counterterrorism [ . . . ] A lot of people will
pay lip service to what think tanks say on counterterrorism, but the
fact of the matter is the government creates its policy in a vacuum in
terms of intellectual contribution. (R2 09-04-2012, Skype)
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I think strategy formulation is more open to influence than is strategy
execution. (R3, 13-04-2012, telephone)
Well, Arab-Israeli conflict issues. For example, if a think tank is going to
produce a study that is very critical of US allies, they will not want to
hear about it. Like Israel. (R14, 26-06-2012, F2F)
Areas related to intelligence and defense, often requiring a security
clearance, are somewhat restricted. In addition, some no-go areas exist,
among them criticism of key allies such as Israel (described by one
respondent as ‘‘the kiss of death’’). However, another respondent (R17,
03-07-2012, Skype) noted that think tanks are open to considering almost
anything, with the primary factor being the ability to locate a funding
source for the project. Respondents also noted that issues defined as being
hot and=or sensitive tended to change over time and administrations.
The fourth question dealt with identifying strategies and tactics used by
think tanks: What strategies and tactics are likely to bring success for a
think tank seeking to influence security policy? Please state any examples
of good practice that illustrates this point.
This question identified the role of ‘‘niche’’ as having the highest importance
(10=18), defined as either having a sufficient breadth of expertise to make
cross-sectorial studies (CSIS, Brookings, CFR, RAND) or to focus on such
specific policy-relevant subjects as cyber (ACUS) or COIN (CNAS). Quality
of personnel (8=18), with a mixture of senior high-profile individuals and
skilled younger and fearless researchers, is also considered a success factor.
Likewise, access and networking are ranked high, followed by speed and
relevance, so as to not fall behind in the ‘‘important’’ issues of the day—
(4=18), as well as governance and proper funding (3=18).
Well, a first thing is having high profile leadership, no question about
that. Secondly, having a board that consists of people who are either
very rich or well connected to the government or both. Okay, you go
into CSIS’s board room, you see the names and pictures of the board,
those are two critical elements. High profile leadership and an
essentially high profile board allow them to raise more money, it
allows them to do government work if they want to, and that gets
them going. Now, some think tanks are more media oriented than
others. (R6, 09-05-2012, F2F)
Building relations with government [ . . . ] Get a reputation through hiring
senior government people. Be agile, timely and relevant. [ . . . ] All top five
[think tanks as good examples of this]. (R5, 26-04-2012, Skype)
One of the identified areas was the need to create an environment that
encourages people from industry, government, and academia to meet
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face-to-face at specific events that provide an atmosphere for highlighting
products and ideas as well as networking. Both areas have been earlier
noted as being essential for any potential influence by the think tanks on
governmental policymakers. Being able to move staff between think tanks
and government gives another edge in the influence stakes.
Tangible and useful products in hardcopy are still seen as relevant. These
products need to be able to grab the attention of a target audience by being
new and innovative. According to a few interviewees (4=18), the format
should be both visually attractive and concise. Several respondents mentioned
the need for a think tank to have a presence in today’s social media (though
not excluding traditional mass media, such as print and broadcast) in order
to attract attention to what it does and can offer to a potential customer.
The focus of the fifth question was to identify sources of possible failure to
influence security policy: What strategies and tactics are likely to result in
failure to influence security policy? Please state an example of such a case.
In terms of ‘‘fatal’’ errors and paths to failure in the fifth question, the
responses were somewhat mixed, but highlighted were repeated errors of
assessment (9=18), as well as too narrow perspectives (5=18) that result in
unrealistic outcomes. Lack of stamina on certain subjects=issues was also
emphasized.
Yes, being spectacularly wrong. But you have to be spectacularly wrong
in close proximity to whatever is being proved wrong. [ . . . ] Getting it
wrong over and over again. There are many examples of being on the
wrong side of an issue that no one agrees with you on, if you cannot
find any constituency to believe in your ideas you are not going to
have any influence. (R2, 09-04-2012, Skype)
Focusing on yesterday’s issues, not recruiting new blood at the highest
level. Being excessively national and not having an international reach, I
think is important. The big guys all have international advisory boards
of one form or another. [ . . . ] So you have to have an international reach
and if you do not you are going to fall behind. (R6, 09-05-2012, F2F)
Exactly, indiscretion. Lack of reliability in handling sensitive matters.
[ . . . ] Failure to meet deadlines, that is important especially that there
are many issues that are perishable. [ . . . ] Delivering a poor quality
product, if you produce something that is not up to a high standard, it
is going to be one that could harm your reputation, but two, it would
fail to influence anybody because they will say I have not heard
anything from this. (R17, 03-07-2012, Skype)
These tactical and strategic errors invariably involve a think tank’s
developing a bad reputation=brand in any one or a combination of areas
that ultimately affects its viability and potentially its very survival. Being
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repeatedly wrong or providing poor recommendations or policy was a
negative, as were products that were either faulty or even non-existent
despite lots of talk. Also considered a drawback was the failure to hold or
plan activities. Also cited, too, was a lack of expertise in key areas or not
staying abreast of important developments. Having staff with a poor
reputation, due to failure, faulty analysis, or not coming up with new and
interesting ideas were obvious shortcomings.
Overall, the values of objectivity and integrity, of both personnel and
product, ranked very high among the responses. One respondent stated
that maintaining an ideal objectivity and integrity was very difficult in the
‘‘real world.’’ Thus, at times a tension seems to exist between the ideal and
actual worlds.
In the area of product, the framing of an issue was considered important.
Several areas were identified, among them: being objective, the quality of
analysis, finding and establishing a niche, being proactive, the speed
(timeliness) and relevance of work, providing useable material that
supports policy, and presenting new and innovative ideas on problems that
the government does not have time to focus on.
When broaching the issue of product and self=institutional promotion,
being available for interviews in the mass media and being seen as present
and quoted there; being available and accessible to the Congress; creating
key events (conferences, workshops, etc.); and the ability to bring key
stakeholders together, as well as an early focus on policy formation,
together create valuable avenues for think tank recognition.
While these answers provide an interesting variation of responses to the why
questions, unifying and making sense of this information is necessary in order
to generate a clearer understanding of the broader picture. One factor that
stands out is the issue of brand—a think tank’s reputation and how it is
again perceived by officials and policymakers. Reputation and perception
are generated by different means, among them consistently the quality of
both personnel and products. These factors, both intangible and tangible,
are in turn influenced by a think tank’s strategies and tactics.
TACTICS AND STRATEGY: THE HOW33
The rich trove of information collected from the responses details the
considerations and tactics used by think tanks in their drive for influence.
Next considered are the different elements that think tanks incorporate in
their quest for success. Those identified, in answer to the how questions,
are marketing, the role of the niche, channels of influence, and issues
pertaining to target audience. The sixth and final question was ‘‘How do
you think think tanks influence policy?’’ In this open-ended question, the
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focus was on quality and objectivity among personnel, as well as in reports
and assessments. Some of the comments follow:
They give policy-makers a forum to speak in and articulate ideas. [ . . . ]
The second way is you actually infuse the policy process with ideas and
options, you can provide options, decision makers love options, the
more the better, the fewer the worse. [ . . . ] And thirdly, they ensure
influence by providing a justification for directions the administration
already wanted to go. (R2, 09-04-2012, Skype)
I think think tanks very often have the capacity to set the way in which
the issues are framed. [ . . . ] I think that a think tank has the capacity to
influence policy through analysis and production of reports. But even if
you create a report you know you have to have someone in power to
listen. And so that is the most important way that a think tank
actually influences policy, by gaining access. [ . . . ] So much of that
access is informal. (R4, 16-04-2012, telephone)
The product is still more important than the network, as the position of
staff director at NSC is much more important than being a senior scholar
at an established think tank. [ . . . ] The most important strategic issue
today is how do we deal with an expanding China? (R1, 06-04-2012,
telephone)
Think tanks influence policy through a number of different avenues, many
of which have already been identified. These avenues relate to the issues of
how a think tank manages the areas of personnel, product, and
promotion. In terms of personnel, the value of the revolving door aspect
was raised by many respondents as a key to being able to influence policy,
though one respondent noted that some hold a negative view of the
revolving doors having an impact on the important values of objectivity
and integrity, although he personally saw no problem with the practice.
Having a dynamic staff is necessary, together with some key people to give
the organization a higher profile where it matters.
One tactic=strategy used by successful think tanks is marketing, with
several different approaches to marketing their ideas and services.
Generally, this involves developing the elements of a good brand, featuring
the exploitation of personnel and product.
A good quality product that meets (or exceeds) the expectations created by
a think tank’s talk must be readily available. Respondents assigned many
values and attributes to the ‘‘ideal’’ product—objective, realistic, accurate,
readily useable (in terms of policy), timely, innovative, non-controversial
(for example, not criticizing key allies), and compact (not overly long).
Personnel are a think tank’s cornerstone. Its board and chief executive
officer (CEO) need to be known and recognized in government circles;
THE RECIPE FOR THINK TANK SUCCESS 753
AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 29, NUMBER 4
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [Å
bo
 A
ka
de
mi
s B
ibl
iot
ek
] a
t 2
2:1
8 1
3 J
un
e 2
01
6 
they need to be proactive and good networkers, and have good reputations
for the quality of their work.
Marketing involves using these attributes to gain attention, then
recognition, and finally leverage. One point made by the interviewees was
that think tanks needed to be physically located in Washington, DC, in
order to stand a better chance of influencing policy.
The promotion and marketing of ideas is carried out by different means.
Drawing attention from the media is one method, but creating key events
that attract important people from government, industry, and academia—
such as conferences and task forces—is also beneficial. These provide an
opportunity to show potential customers what the think tank has to offer.
They also provide an environment for networking to take place. Although
one respondent noted that product trumps networking, these activities
should be seen as complimentary and not exclusive.
Niche, another tactic=strategy used by think tanks to become successful, is
important process-wise at the policy stage and in terms of subject, for
example: ACUS on cyber; CSIS on cyber but all-round; CFR on foreign
affairs, the UN system, the transatlantic link; Brookings on China and
Russia; CNAS on defense policy and military doctrine, such as ‘‘the
surge.’’ A ‘‘hot’’ niche area at the moment is China’s expansion in the
South China Sea and how the United States could=should respond to this
development. Successful niche positioning is developing expertise in areas
that the government has neither the time nor the resources to cover.
As for policy influence, think tanks were urged to consider entering the
process at an early stage in order to stand any chance of impacting the
process. This is related to the issue of framing and discussion of a
particular issue, with the window for influence closing after the frame has
been established, thereby limiting the allowable parameters of the
discussion. Being able to influence the framing of an issue, and therefore
how it is viewed and discussed, should lead to a greater opportunity of
having some impact upon how policy is formulated.
Additionally, newcomers, both institutional and individual, were advised to
focus upon two or three different issues in order to develop a good reputation
or brand in those areas, thereby gaining recognition for the quality of their
work in those chosen fields. Think tanks that are new entrants in a
competitive field are unlikely to have the financial resources or sufficient
personnel to undertake a large scale and broad research program, and
should therefore narrow their focus and develop a special area of expertise.
Different channels of influence are likewise used by think tanks to become
successful. Traditional reports, seminars, television commentary, and quick
events for media are part and parcel of getting a think tank’s message out
to potential customers and to differentiate itself from competitors.
Apparent from interpreting several of the responses is that the different
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channels are not mutually exclusive. Rather they are mutually reinforcing,
where one channel affects another and the various links help increase a
think tank’s potential influence. One response exemplifies this idea:
[ . . . ] being in those three [academia, government and industry] your
brand will increase [ . . . ] your activity networking, but also the quality
of your products and your funding will increase too because many
people will see you as a compliment for influencing policy and this will
give you more money accordingly and the more money you have the
more you can do all those things that attract money and attract
influence and attract other activities. It all boils together, blisses
together but I think the three elements of the strategies [events,
scholarship and revolving door] are obviously solid, and continuing
and lots and lots of scholarship both internally and externally through
task forces and conferences. (R2, 09-04-2012, Skype)
The ability to exploit channels of influence is enhanced by the think tank’s
perceived reputation and brand among potential customers and end users. A
good reputation and brand will ‘‘speak for itself.’’ One channel of influence
repeatedly identified by respondents was the ‘‘revolving door.’’ Not only does
it give a think tank an expanded network, but perhaps just as valuable, it
provides actual government experience and is no longer deemed too
‘‘academic’’ and unable to produce useable product.
Moreover, the target audience is also important in becoming successful.
Respondents noted a tendency among think tanks of not trying to directly
influence policymakers, since doing so is difficult, in terms of access to them
and the limited amount of time available. Instead, the tendency now is to
target the lower levels of government, such as congressional staff and
bureaucrats. They then become potentially a conduit for the think tank’s ideas
and recommendations to the policymakers. This approach is done through
attention grabbing in either social or mainstream media or both, publishing
reports, or being in a physical location for ‘‘elevator meetings,’’ a very short
and concise meeting where a think tank representative can quickly elaborate
on what it has to offer in terms of ideas and recommendations.
THE VALUE OF VIRTUE
The premiere characteristic of a successful think tank seems to be credibility
based on networks, objectivity, and integrity. An obvious reason for this was
offered by Geoff Mulgan, describing the conversion of political access into
money, money into ideas, and ideas into legitimacy. Networks open the
possibility for political access, but brand and reputation cement those
links. Another reason for the indirect approach, as opposed to direct
lobbying, is the non-profit status of think tanks that constrains their
THE RECIPE FOR THINK TANK SUCCESS 755
AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 29, NUMBER 4
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [Å
bo
 A
ka
de
mi
s B
ibl
iot
ek
] a
t 2
2:1
8 1
3 J
un
e 2
01
6 
strategy and tactics. Failure to do so runs the risk of losing this tax status.
Likewise, a successful think tank must not be seen as ‘‘extreme,’’ but
generally as ‘‘centrist,’’ with access to both Democrats and Republicans.
Next is the academic quality of its reports and studies, as well as the
professionalism of its staff. This quality refers to a balanced combination
of active young university graduates and more senior individuals who
know what decisionmakers need and where the information is available,
and being able to ‘‘open doors’’ to the closed rooms of decisionmaking.
Thereafter comes the role of positioning and niche so as to maintain a
continuously high level in a number of areas that allow a think tank to
have access to comprehensive expertise in-house or close-by. Alternatively,
a think tank may invest in certain areas where it wants to develop a
specialized competence (e.g., ACUS on cyber, CNAS on COIN), notably
in areas where the government lacks a sufficient capacity.
Reponses related to the ‘‘how’’ equation include the networking
factor, mainly between the administration and the think tank (‘‘revolving
door’’), wherein slightly more senior individuals ‘‘go into exile’’ in a think
tank and await an administration of the ‘‘correct’’ political color, as well
as providing opportunities for the personal career ambitions of young
talents who await being recruited. The practice provides the chance for
individuals in the ‘‘revolving door’’ process to expand their networks and
gain insider contacts.
An additional important factor is a ‘‘market feel,’’ with the flexibility,
proactivity, and adaptability to be able to quickly produce a report on a
relevant problem area. It may be a larger set of questions where an
in-depth study spanning over several years is needed or a shorter policy
brief for an under secretary of defense who has been summoned to testify
in a congressional committee. In addition to accurate and attractive
products, a good communication strategy that balances appearances in the
media with other activities such as seminars, report releases, games=
workshops, and individual briefing are included here.
A final factor is adequate and long-term financing by individuals and
institutions that do not seek to or cannot affect the products’ conclusions
and the employees’ judgments. The ability to convince financiers to provide
funds as well as maintaining a good brand are ways of measuring a think
tank’s success. The head of RAND, Michael D. Rich, describes his firm’s
three-stage model34 in which the research agenda is evaluated annually. The
first step is whether the research results are of high quality and objective,
which is a necessary but not sufficient requirement. The second step is,
therefore, being to quickly deliver study results to policymakers and to the
public. A think tank becomes satisfied only when it can determine that the
right people got the information, and that the decisionmaking processes
and policy were directly and perhaps decisively influenced.
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The conclusions perceived after the first round of interviews on the role
and influence of think tanks have been further substantiated here, as has
above all Murray Weidenbaum’s thesis about the indirect influence of the
network and the ‘‘revolving door.’’ Also demonstrated has been that
think tanks have a special role to play in the U.S. constitutional
arrangement with its lack of a European parliamentarianism and
Continental party system, meaning that legislators are generally in greater
need of information from outside. The think tanks studied here definitely
fill a role as knowledge banks and ‘‘lubricants’’ in the security policy
decisionmaking machinery. The increasingly tightening requirements on
governmental departments and agencies, combined with more widespread
and complex assignments that encounter a lack of expertise for qualitative
and long-term assessments, leads to a relatively larger market for think tanks.
Some companies, such as Google, are trying to create think tank-like
sections in an attempt to participate in the public debate. But a cursory
assessment indicates that they probably never could complete successfully
with the mystique, breadth, and quality of the ‘‘Big Five’’—or even the
think tanks further down the list. CNAS—which established itself in six
years and within a niche, which according to some respondents became an
empty shell when the Obama administration took several of its renowned
staff. Becoming successful is a long-term effort, which, without
misjudgments and scandals, generally takes between 30–40 years to achieve.
This study, based on unique interviews with very senior and seasoned
insiders, will hopefully provide greater appreciation—especially in
Europe—of the important and often not fully understood role of think
tanks in the U.S. security policy process.
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183
C. Summary & Conclusions
1. Findings
The research question posed in the introductory chapter concerned an inves-
tigation of the overall decision-making process in all phases of the analysis 
model (A + B + C), as well as indicating the bottlenecks for non-time critical 
threat developments. The assumed basis for an ideal process could be illus-
trated as in the box below.
C
Bureaucracy/
Agencies
Planning/
implementation
B
Cabinet Oces, NSC etc.
The Policy Process (“the missing link”)
“Politics”
Policy Decision
B3
Planning
Directives
B2
Policy/Budget
B1
Intel/Policy
Planning
A
Intelligence
Community
Threat Detection
Analysis model (ideal case)
Figure 6: Ideal Case
1.1. Article 1
This article looked at the policy processes of a number of different countries, 
from the point of realisation that a problem needs attention to the implemen-
tation of government policy. The event that initiates and drives the reform 
process of each country is tracked, revealing differences and similarities in 
urgency and perceived risks in the task of overhauling the legal framework for 
Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP). The final part of the arti-
cle sought to understand and account for those similarities and differences in 
policy implementation or in some cases, the lack of it.
The findings suggested that certain lead countries that initiated the process 
of policy reform in CIIP caused a number of other countries to follow suit, 
which was a form of transnational policy “bandwagoning.” Although there were 
similarities in the trigger mechanism which initiated the process, there was 
divergence in the passage of the recommendations and policy suggestions due 
to the structure of the national governments and bureaucratic structures that 
placed constraints upon the progress in some cases.
The analysis revealed a number of cases, which showed compromises and 
other strategies in an effort to push the reform through in a contested political 
process, and where cooperation from government agencies was not necessar-
184
ily forthcoming. Some of the reform processes have even stalled and were in 
a form of limbo, a position from which they have not been able to gain any 
momentum.
With the apparent fact that there was a difference between countries in this 
aspect, the final finding was that the top politicians own the policy process, 
whilst the bureaucracy/administration owns the implementation component.
1.2. Article 2
The purpose of this article was to investigate how Intelligence Communities 
innovate (adaptability) and how new demands of pluralism in the intelligence 
production process have been fostered. By innovation, it is specifically referring 
to how the intelligence organisations and the legal/political machinery in the 
sector evolve to meet the changes and challenges found in their environment.
The lessons drawn from organisational learning demonstrated that the 
policy process of bringing about innovation and change was not necessarily 
a rational one that applied to best remedy the identified problem or error. It 
revealed a process watered down by bargaining and politics, especially in a sen-
sitive field as intelligence. A number of other factors in the organisation and 
the state which it serves also played a part - personal, “culture” etc. within the 
Intelligence Community - together with their interests and biases.
The finding here was how the intelligence part of the decision chain (A + 
B1) functioned and developed in an environment of closed knowledge monop-
olies, normally also in the absence of external competition and pluralism. An 
important advantage with the American intelligence system seemed to be that 
pluralism and adaption was relatively large in comparison to the rest of the 
world. However, there is then on the “flop-side” a risk with the American sys-
tem of making rapid and hasty organizational decisions, such as creating new 
organizational layers on top of an existing structure.
1.3. Article 3
Article 3 focused on which terrorist organisations might become the first actor 
to use information weapons in their warfare, such as attacking the vulnerabil-
ities of modern information society and how the intelligence community (A) 
could detect these quickly unfolding attacks in light of the complex nature of 
their bureaucracies, which might make such early detection difficult. The article 
illuminated the complexities of understanding a potential leap towards conver-
gence between terrorism and cyber warfare and it offers a potential roadmap 
towards the necessary measures to bolster investigative and enforcement mech-
anisms within the international community.
Here a practical showcase of how a possible new threat phenomenon with 
anonymous information/cyber-terrorists may be assessed, in which it is not 
enough to only assess a threat actor’s intentions and capabilities, but they 
should also be coupled with societal vulnerabilities. This knowledge is not 
always available within the intelligence community, but can be found at the 
185
operational level of relevant governments and private businesses. The ability 
to think in new ways and “outside the box” instead of “inertial navigation” is 
discussed.
1.4. Article 4
This article focused (with a Swedish perspective) on the sometimes blurred 
concept of information operations, which to a large extent can be considered 
as a mirror image of the increased dependencies on electronic information, 
networks and IT systems in modern civilian societies. The article discussed the 
weaknesses and strengths of an ever growing expansion of these networks for 
the sharing of information, and how to implement new cross-sector coopera-
tion to fully adapt to new preparedness measures in the bureaucracy.
The article further described the process and indicated bottlenecks (B3 + C) 
foremost on the agency level based on the same scenarios of IT threats as the 
initial comparative study in Article 1. The proposition that the policy process 
is not able to balance the bureaucracy’s “centrifugal forces” is confirmed and 
deepened by this empirical case study within a Swedish context.
1.5. Article 5.1 and 5.2
Finally, the two contiguous articles 5.1 and 5.2 dealt with the special case of the 
United States in relation to several other countries, in which think tanks have a 
special role concerning cultivating pluralism in security policy decision-mak-
ing, as well as being a disintegrator of knowledge monopolies. The way that 
public policy is formulated has been changing. What had been a governmental 
domain has opened up to the input of other external actors – with public policy 
Think Tanks exemplifying the significant roles that private sector actors can 
play in this sphere.
The first article 5.1 explored how think tanks influence the policy process. 
On the one hand, there are theoretical explanations that have been offered by 
the academic community. On the other hand, this is how practitioners view the 
issue. Therefore, this article seeks to expose a greater level of understanding of 
this influence through comparing and contrasting these two broad conceptual 
camps. A theoretical overview was provided, which was complemented by the 
distribution of a questionnaire to experienced practitioners. The United States 
was chosen as the case study for two main reasons. The greatest concentration 
of think tanks is found there as well as the differences in the traditions of gov-
ernment which allows for external actors to contributing to the policy process. 
Under such conditions, if Think Tank influence can be discovered and therefore 
the ability to analyse it, this is the best place to look for it.
The second article 5.2 dealt with how think tanks were able to gain suc-
cess in influencing the security policy process in the United States. Success 
was understood as the ability to influence at some stage and in some manner 
the policy process – anywhere from identifying a “problem” or opportunity to 
implementing policy. Therefore the focus was on the why and how questions 
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affected the issue of influencing policy. A valuable and unique insider perspec-
tive was also provided by the extensive material collected from the experts 
who responded to the dissertation’s survey, which contribute to developing the 
understanding of how think tanks gain influence in policy in countries such as 
the United States.
1.6. Conclusions of article findings
Observations regarding factors that shorten the timeframe of decision-making 
processes (A + B + C) can already be seen in the comparative study in Article 
1 – namely, countries with homogenous management and ministerial rule (e.g. 
Australia) seem to have shorter decision-making timeframe processes. In par-
ticular, the so-called spoil system in the United States, in which thousands of 
top executives in management are appointed for short terms of office, seems to 
promote a fast decision-making process, perhaps sometimes at the expense of 
substantive expert content. This is one of the reasons why think tanks function 
as a lubricant and knowledge complement in the American environment, at 
least in the best case scenario.
The identified problem of why the bureaucracy has too much room for 
interpretation in relation to the policy process was discussed in the introduc-
tory chapter. One of the findings is that savings on the government office level 
can lead to excessive outsourcing of the governing planning function (B3) to 
agency level.
On the threat side (A), Britain also has certain pluralism regarding intel-
ligence assessments as they have a tradition of systematically and discretely 
collecting assessments from trusted academics within the British academic 
community on an individual basis, such as the tradition of “Oxbridge” as a 
component of the British “ruling class.” In recent years, other countries’ intelli-
gence services have also begun to engage in alternative scenario activities, how-
ever, this leans towards “foresight” as it involves cases of longer time horizons 
of 15-20 years, with such studies requiring extensive academic input.
Otherwise, the decision-making systems are relatively closed in the area of 
security policy, and it is not only due to tradition and the constitution. Even 
though most agree that pluralism is important for the process, the majority of 
the countries do not have a wealthy economy on the scale of the United States 
that can fund this process. Too much pluralism can also be costly and lead to 
problems in balancing efficiency-confidentiality considerations, as well as the 
need, at times, for quickly produced advice.
The assumption in article 1, that the major problem in the decision process 
(A + B + C) is the connection between the policy process and bureaucracy 
(B + C), can be qualified by taking into account the relations within the pol-
icy sub-processes (B1 + B2 + B3). It was observed, especially in small Cabi-
net Offices the planning function (B3) can become a voice of the strong and 
independent agencies, making the policy impact go “upstream”, which might 
increase the tensions between B2 (policy making) and B3 (planning direc-
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tion) when thinking in terms of incrementalism, as opposed to making major 
changes in policy direction. The most important link is between B3 and C (the 
bureaucracy) as this concern directing the planning at the agency level so that 
policy decisions are implemented as intended.
In summary, three conclusions are proposed in this dissertation based on 
the overall observation that the “Knowledge Monopoly” and lack of transpar-
ency and “second opinions” are the main variables preventing better seamless-
ness between the threat and planning communities. Firstly, the main inertias 
found in the closed innermost core of the state apparatus seems to be lack of 
horizontal communication and transparency as well as contradictory bureau-
cratic interest when it comes to implementation. These hardly modify on their 
own due to introversion and knowledge monopolies. Secondly, this relationship 
has received relatively little attention from academics and the research com-
munity at large, due to accessibility difficulties among other issues. Thirdly, the 
employment of the Think Tank model in these processes, in certain circum-
stances, may be a means to reduce such inertias.
Three sub-questions that were posed in the introduction, which require fur-
ther attention. To restate these three questions:
1. How are security policy threats evolving and perceived in the post-Cold War 
era?
2. Do these threats stimulate innovation and change in government bureaucra-
cies as well as policy formulation and implementation?
3. What are the main obstacles/problems in addressing the new threats?
Security policy threats have, and continue to, evolve at a very rapid pace. 
Perception plays a significant role too. There is the need to for planners and 
policy makers to clearly distinguish between the strongest and most capable 
source of threat and the threat that is most likely to occur. For example, Russia 
has a significant military potential, but the probably of it being used against 
the United States in a direct military conflict is less than the militarily weaker 
terrorist organisation ISIS. The threats have moved from an environment of a 
more predictable state-based origin to rapidly evolving non-state based threats 
(such as cyber security, and a plethora of transnational terrorist organisations). 
Some of these threats can easily cross borders, such as the recruitment of West-
ern citizens by ISIS, which creates risks within Western countries as witnessed 
by the numerous terrorist attacks committed in European countries (such as 
the murder of the soldier Lee Rigby in Woolwich, England).
These threats can stimulate innovation and change in government bureau-
cracies, policy formulation and implementation, but this is dependent on a 
number of factors. One of these is perception and awareness among policy 
makers and the bureaucracy. If they are not aware or the issue is a low political 
priority or politically overly sensitive, it may not receive the require attention 
and measures to redress the situation.
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Cyber has been successful in gaining attention and priority around the 
world, it is a high probability and potentially high impact risk faced by most 
countries, and therefore a great deal of time, effort and finances has been 
devoted to the issue, it is also perceived as being an immediate risk in the here 
and now.
Climate change and the means of addressing it have proven to be much 
more problematic owing to diverging interests among countries, governments, 
business, academia and the public as well as the perception that it is not an 
immediate issue as it can projected as being a future threat.
There are a number of observable problems and obstacles in addressing the 
new threats. Not least among these is the issue of perception. If a problem is 
not recognised or is seen as something that can be dealt with in the future as 
there is ‘time’ available before it becomes critical. Conflicts can also emerge 
between different stakeholders in the policy environment. The bureaucracy may 
resist change, given the competitive policy environment the best policy option 
may not be chosen – rather the one that gains the greatest attention amount of 
and appeal.
Ideally, a critical ontological turn is needed in order to tease out knowl-
edge from the unknown, in this case on identifying previously unknown and 
understudied processes, structures and relations within the policy formulating 
government bodies as the Cabinet Offices.
C
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Figure 7: Tainted case
2. Differences depending on policy impact – an alternative case?
The case study in Article 1 that has been the basis for the reasoning about 
pluralism and knowledge monopolies  deals with how critical system threats 
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towards the information society became foundations for planning in different 
countries protective strategies. This type of threat picture has had relatively 
little party political overtones as it is understood as a consequence of the “neu-
tral” technical development.
However, if we look at a case in which the condition for the fundamental 
ideal process is disrupted by distorting inputs from the political level based on 
predetermined ideas, the process can be quite different. Instead, the adjoining 
picture can illustrate the above reasoning.
In the United States during the Gulf War in 2003, the traditional intelligence 
community’s assessment procedures were short-circuited as the political lead-
ership in the Pentagon had its own political agenda and acquired their own 
intelligence cell (Office of Special Plans) which steered the intelligence report-
ing to fit the predetermined policy objectives. This phenomenon is usually 
referred to as “cherry-picking”, which is anathema to all Western intelligence 
services credo to provide the most unbiased knowledge and objective decisions 
that is possible to produce.
In recent years, the Swedish defence policy has, in light of Russia’s actions, 
been put under strong domestic pressure after almost 20 years of constant dis-
armament. The defence policy also became the subject of unusual and intense 
public debate during the election campaign in 2014. The background is that 
disarmament seemed a logical course in relation to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, and influential generals spoke of a “strategic time-out”. The 
parliamentary Defence Commissions that prepared the Government perennial 
defence decisions worked systematically according to the previous model, in 
which a coherent and quite seamless decision process was formed and became 
the model during the entire Cold War. The results were a number of so called 
secret specified threats used for defence planning purposes in which the Armed 
Forces planning was directly linked to the updated security policy assessments.
In Sweden there is a current example concerning Russia’s assumed geopo-
litical intentions in relation to events in the Crimea and Ukraine crisis in 2014 
which, if converted into the above mentioned analysis model, would generate 
a completely different policy outcome. Here the political prerogative view that 
Russia´s intention could not be problematic prevailed too long though warn-
ings from the Intelligence Community. If so, it is not in the relation between 
the policy level and the bureaucracy (B + C) where the bottleneck is the great-
est and the agency level does not implement policy decisions, but the unwill-
ingness from the policy level to accept input from the intelligence system.
Here, we find that the intelligence community (A) warned the policy level 
(B), but without effect. In this case, the problem seems to be within the policy 
sub-processes where especially the intelligence process (B1), which receives 
the information from the Intel Community (A) – and also the planning pro-
cess (B3) who has managerial dialogue with agency C, does not reach B2 that 
is responsible for budgetary considerations. B2 – in this case, officials at the 
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Department of Defence – are subordinate to the political context and the pri-
orities the Secretary of Defence and the Cabinet in general consider trade-offs 
against other domestic political expenditures of interests.
As the Cabinet Office is a politically steered organization there is no objec-
tive requirement that received intelligence assessments and decisions should 
be connected or coordinated with each other. It may even be that those who 
manage assessments (B1) dismiss or even signal disapproval of assessments that 
do not comply with the above mentioned ruling political stance.
In this case, when it comes to a political conceptual perception in relation 
to official policy it probably would not involve an ideally functioning chain of 
command, since, as with the first IT case, the bureaucracy would be expected 
to implement it. The position highlighted in Article 1 – “the politicians own the 
policy process, but the bureaucracy own implementation” – is confirmed as to 
why the process gets stuck already at the starting line.
The answer to the research question if, and possibly how, the chain of 
command can be shortened becomes disappointingly negative in relation to 
whether it is a politically controversial or loaded question – contrary to, for 
example, the case of threats to the information society where decisions have to 
be made in a fast paced environment.
If the result in the comparative Article 1-study is analysed from the point 
of view of which countries had the earliest start on indicating possible threats 
against their information society – with an assumed well functioned relation 
between the intelligence community and the policy level (AàB1) – one might 
consider the UK system as being exemplary. This is due to the fact that they 
started their internal policy debate in the early 1990s and took the necessary 
preparatory steps in response, while other countries like Australia were late 
starters. Even if this area is touched upon in the article 2, there could still be 
room for more thorough analysis, nevertheless. To understand these issues, one 
should refer to the field of Early Warning studies, which is a well-researched 
area with renowned literature such as Richard Betts (1982) Surprise attack: 
Lessons for Defense Planning and Roberta Wohlstetter’s (1962) Pearl Harbor: 
Warning and Decision.
3. The role of Think Tanks
Would the defence and security policy-making process in the case of Sweden 
have been any different if there had been independent think tanks of American 
model in order to provide independent knowledge on these issues? Probably 
not in the concrete example cited above, as the political preconceptions are so 
radically different from the more objective input values that the intelligence 
community aims to contribute to the policy process.
The study of the American think tanks role shows in fact that their influence 
can be quite limited in areas where the political attitudes (e.g. policy towards 
Israel) are strongly held. These cases are however considered to be specific 
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exceptions in relation to the entire policy environment in which think tanks 
operate. Rather, it is when it comes to completing objective knowledge gaps, 
and to evaluate various non-politicized policy options, where the focus of the 
agency level is clarified, the value and need for pluralism is greatest.
Pluralism in policy making is important, but in itself pluralism is not a com-
plete guarantee for better quality decisions and policy as it is a means and not 
an end in itself. There are other factors that need to be taken into account. 
There are dual aspects of the quality of the final product AND the process of 
getting there. Research and market intelligence should not be compromised by 
overt or covert political or economic influence over the nature of report results. 
Such trends have been exposed in recent media exposés of foreign influence of 
think tanks in America through economic incentives to produce findings that 
match the expectations of the funders, who may require legitimation of their 
governments’ policies.
The September 2014 New York Times exposé of the Brookings Institution 
(described in more detail further on) has had a snowball-effect on this one 
particular illustrative case, which has been taken up as a four part investigative 
series in America (see, The Investigative Project on Terrorism, 2014). This is 
indicative of the dangers present in a public policy environment that demands 
a rapid flow of accurate information in order to make correct decisions, but 
when there is an element of deception and hidden agenda within those same 
information flows due to external influences on the researchers.
What are the administrative and legal barriers of introducing a system of 
think tanks in Sweden and other Nordic countries according to the model 
above? Firstly, regarding sensitive national security issues, it becomes necessary 
to change legislation into introducing a system of personal security clearances 
instead of the current system based on function in which someone holding a 
particular position in a defence or security related agency obtains a clearance. 
Thus would have the effect of eliminating formal barriers for access to relevant, 
but confidential information. This requires changes in political culture and 
practice, which do not easily change in short time spans, including the desire 
by researchers to publish their research without government restrictions.
Secondly, changes in economic conditions for think tanks are needed, 
enabling think tanks to operate and recruit senior and competent personnel 
offering competitive salaries. To achieve this it requires, as in the United States, 
a different tax deduction system for donors to enable them to qualify to fund 
these types of research foundations and non-profit research organizations. This 
provides prestige and credo to those who provide funds as well as contributing 
to cognitive diversity in otherwise inaccessible areas. Simultaneously in the last 
year – after the investigation for this dissertation – concerns are raised that the 
integrity of even the big think tanks has started to erode, which is an import-
ant consideration for Swedish research institutes who desire to maintain their 
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independence, even at the cost of not being funded by major corporations or 
foreign governments.
4. Afterword
The dissertation has endeavoured to provide different perspectives on the ratio-
nality of security and defence policy, in which significant identified threats are 
neutralised as quickly as possible through the creation and implementation 
of effective protective measures. As much of the information and planning 
measures imply security classification of the transparency and debate on these 
issues, alternative assessments becomes limited. Still, there should be a need to 
improve the decision-making system and streamlining the state apparatus to 
become more efficient. The remaining significant question is whether in this 
line of work it is possible to ignore the fact that there is a political will that is 
not rationally based that affects the policy making process, thereby limiting the 
possibility of pluralism in policy making.
One of the shortcomings of this thesis can be found in the methodologi-
cal approach that was used, which was not conducive to theory development. 
However, given the relative lack of existing research on the topic of this thesis, 
a different approach was needed. This is why the multi-disciplinary perspective, 
as described by Evans and Davis (1999), was used over a single disciplinary 
approach. It also explains the use of the critical ontological turn, these mecha-
nisms were intended to tease out and enrich the wider implications for further 
research in this field of study. Although this work may not have advanced the-
oretical development in the area, it has developed a greater appreciation and 
understanding of the empirical processes. By developing the empirical basis of 
research, more accurate and reliable predictive theoretical and conceptual tools 
can be conceived. This is a gradual process of gaining knowledge from an envi-
ronment where little existed previously. It is hoped that this thesis may be one 
of the steps in encouraging further research in this area and thereby creating 
the necessary conditions for solid theoretical development.
The transferability of the results could also differ between different coun-
tries, as indicated in article 1 where governments with ministerial rule seems 
to have shorter decision-making cycle than parliamentarian countries like Swe-
den with independent agencies formally adhering only to collective Cabinet 
decisions.
The cross-sectorial research field that this dissertation touches upon has 
demonstrated the existence of such under-researched areas. Hopefully this will 
also have a scholarly relevance and lead to new knowledge within the concept 
of Policy Transfer Analysis, which bridges at least the three disciplines of Secu-
rity Studies, Policy Studies and Public Administration. This thesis is at the cross 
section of these disciplines, specifically how new and emerging security threats 
are recognised, managed and resolved through creating and implementing pub-
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lic policy. It covers the whole process and all stakeholders – organisations (such 
as think tanks), government bureaucracy and governments.
One of the greatly under researched areas, which is raised in the above, 
is the level of covert political and economic influence by external funders on 
think tanks and the policy process in general. This phenomenon is difficult, 
although not impossible, to research, and is dependent on the work of investi-
gative journalism. The New York Times article (New York Times, 2014) men-
tioned earlier scratches the surface and hints at a significant problem that ide-
ally could shake up the system (although, in practice, it is so institutionalized 
and widespread that it is unlikely to change). There have already been some 
political reactions to this issue, so a comprehensive and objective academic 
approach is needed to understand the exact nature and scale of the problem, as 
a first step on the way to addressing it.
Finally, despite such shortcomings, it might be possible for an improvement 
to take place in the relationship between think tanks´ and government policy 
making bodies in the US, with recognition that private sector research insti-
tutes still have a role to play in providing independent sources of policy advice 
to government policy makers.
One outcome in this dissertation is also that of a significant connection 
between pluralism in the decision-making process on one hand, and adapt-
ability as well as faster bureaucracy implementation on the other. A remaining 
issue is whether it will be permitted for tax-exempt think tanks to engage in 
advocacy and lobbying activities – legally and practically. This is an important 
change to understand owing to the implications concerning the covert influ-
ence on policy by external donors – when they might be involved in funding 
such activities.
More multi-disciplinary research needs to be undertaken in the field of 
security and foreign policy in terms of the relationship between think tanks and 
government policy making. Such research should take into account the find-
ings of specific academic disciplines – public policy, sociology, political science 
… etc. Thus, additional strength to arguments and developing an even wider 
perspective on these issues can be gained through combining as wide a spec-
trum of relevant disciplines to exploring how today’s significant and pressing 
national security problems can be solved through effective research, whether 
in think tanks, government agencies, or through a constructive engagement by 
these communities.
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D. Sammanfattning
Huvudfokus för denna avhandling är området byråkratisk förändringsbenägen-
het i förhållande till omvärldsutveckling på det säkerhetsrelaterade området. 
Syftet är att från olika infallsvinklar studera samspelet och kopplingarna mellan 
ett antal statliga nyckelinstitutioner. Dels de som har att uppmärksamma och 
varna för olika former av antagonistiska hot, dels de strukturer som har att 
planera för samhällsskyddet genom att snabbt och smidigt omsätta dessa sig-
naler till styrande inriktningar med motsvarande resursallokeringar till utsatta 
sektorer. Kravet på snabbhet i denna process har ökat radikalt i och med infor-
mationssamhällets utveckling och där gårdagens rutiner inte är anpassade till 
dagens nya hot och sårbarheter. Därför är studier av de mekanismer som kan 
påverka snabbheten i högsta grad policyrelevant.
Avhandlingen är inducerande med försök till teoridiskussioner om poli-
cyformuleringsprocessen (”the missing link”), där konklusioner från de tre 
huvudartiklarna (1,2 och 5) blir pusselbitar i kappans slutkapitel. Avhandlnin-
gen hör hemma inom statsvetenskapens säkerhetsstudier (Security Studies) 
men med en stark koppling till förvaltningspolitiska områden (Public Policy/
Public Administration), och framför allt den tämligen nya underdicplin som 
beskriver policyformuleringsprocessen (Policy Transfer Analysis). Ingen idag 
existerande teoribildning som beskriver incitament för förändring i slutna 
monopol i statsapparatens innersta kärna har dock ännu identifierats.
Den forskningsfråga som står i centrum är: Hur kan man tidsmässigt för-
korta processen från upptäckten av nya hotförutsättningar till att nödvändiga 
skyddsåtgärder implementerats, och var finns flaskhalsarna?
En viktig hypotes som prövas i avhandlingsupplägget är att ökad plu-
ralism – både på hot- och planeringssidan – medför ökad förändringsbenä-
genhet beträffande att implementera föranledda åtgärder och förändra 
förvaltningsstrukturer.
Det kan handla om såväl olika militära försvarssystem som civila kritiska 
informationsinfrastrukturer kopplat till el- och telesystem. Ett särskilt förhål-
lande är att dessa processer till övervägande del äger rum i slutna system med 
kunskapsmonopol där externa inflytelser (”peer review”, marknadsmekanismer 
etc.) är närmast obefintliga. Hur påverkas och utvecklas dessa strukturer för 
”Hot” respektive ”Planering” av omvärldsutvecklingen? Finns det en ”Missing 
Link” här i kedjan ”hotupptäckt-policyformuleringsprocess-byråkratisk imple-
mentering”? Vad hindrar denna process från att proaktivt och linjärt antecipera 
nya förutsättningar?
Strukturen består av en övergripande introduktion samt fem artiklar som på 
olika sätt belyser problematiken och några kärnfrågor. De första två är kortare 
och mer indikativa medan de tre senare är mer djupgående. Den sista femte 
artikeln är i sin tur tudelad i en mer teoretisk del och en mer empiriskt inrik-
tad. Ett avslutande konkluderande kapitel försöker identifiera de flaskhalsar 
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kring denna typ av planering som kan finnas. Även om resonemangen främst 
tar sin utgångspunkt i ett mindre marknadsekonomiskt och informationstekni-
skt utvecklat land som Sverige, så sker flera exemplifieringar från USA bero-
ende på den relativa stora transparensen där kring hanteringen av dessa frågor.
Nyckelord: Threat, Security Policy, Policy Transfer Analysis, Intelligence, 
Bureaucracy, Think Tanks.
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